- 34,644
- 0
- 18 Дек 2022
- EDB-ID
- 42832
- Проверка EDB
-
- Пройдено
- Автор
- PHRACK
- Тип уязвимости
- PAPERS
- Платформа
- MAGAZINE
- CVE
- N/A
- Дата публикации
- 1988-11-04
Phrack #21
Код:
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 21, File 1 of 11
Phrack Inc. Newsletter Issue XXI Index
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
November 4, 1988
Welcome to Phrack Inc. Issue XXI. So far, we've been relatively
productive in getting files and getting issues together for the future. If you
would like to contribute a file for Phrack Inc., please contact The Mentor or
Epsilon and they will forward the files to us, or if you are on any of the
connecting networks, send mail and/or files to Taran King's address:
[email protected]. We are pleased to introduce a trilogy pertaining to
the security of the phreak/hack community and various aspects thereof. The
first file, "Shadows Of A Future Past" and the next two files will be in the
next two issues, so be watching for those. It's great to be "back."
Taran King & Knight Lightning
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
This issue contains the following files;
1. Index by Taran King and Knight Lightning
2. Phrack Pro-Phile on Modem Master by Taran King
3. Shadows Of A Future Past (Part 1 of the Vicious Circle Trilogy) by KL
4. The Tele-Pages by Jester Sluggo
5. Satellite Communications by Scott Holiday
6. Network Management Center by Knight Lightning and Taran King
7. Non-Published Numbers by Patrick Townsend
8. Blocking Of Long Distance Calls by Jim Schmickley
9. Phrack World News Special Edition II by Knight Lightning
10. Phrack World News Issue XXI Part 1 by Knight Lightning and Epsilon
11. Phrack World News Issue XXI Part 2 by Knight Lightning and Epsilon
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 21, File 2 of 11
== Phrack Pro-Phile XXI ==
The Phrack Pro-Phile's purpose is to present to the reader profiles of older or
influential hackers or phreakers that have or do exist. This month's Pro-Phile
features a user of past days...Modem Master, a.k.a. Napoleon Solo.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Personal Information
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Handle: Napolean Solo
Call me: Scott
Past Handle: Modem Master
Handle Origin: I used to be a real "Man from UNCLE" fan
D.O.Birth: March 29, 1970
Current Age: 18 yrs.
Height: 6'0"
Weight: 207 lbs
Eyes: Hazel
Hair: Light Brown
Computers: Apple //+, Apple //gs, normal extra hardware, 2400 baud modem
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I started on my way to hackerdom in early 1983 when I bought my first modem, a
Networker 300 baud (What a gem!!) to use in my Apple II+. I asked the
salesperson for the numbers of the local boards (at the time there were a whole
3 here, and one was an IBM users group board). Well, it just so happened one
was an Apple board run on an old version of Networks II, with a sysop who had
been known to rip off a local extender here and there. After chatting with him
for a while he realized I was one of those eager-to-learn Jr. High kids, so he
put me in touch with several other users of his board. Well, one of those was
Simon Templar, who would later be the sysop of the Pearly Gates, and I guess to
me, about as close a friend a phreak can have that lives 1000 miles a way.
Simon gave me my first code (to an 800 number owned by LDX), and the numbers of
some boards where I might pick up some more additional knowledge (IC's Socket,
AT&T Phone Center, and Sherwood Forest). Well, after pestering just about
anybody that seemed to know ANYTHING, I was on my way. Soon, I was frequenting
at least one board in almost every area code. I also learned the advantage of
scanning exchanges, I found several local PBXes and a Sprint indial that nobody
seemed to known about. That facilitated my "habit" even more and I then found
a little Diversi-Dial dubbed "Beandial." That was where I really got off the
ground. It was frequented by many knowledgeable phreaks, so between that and
all of the BBSes I was on, I had a wealth of knowledge to look to all at my
fingertips when I had a question.
Beandial also left me with several good friends, the most notable being Lord
Kahz. It also put me in touch with someone rather well known, King Blotto (you
should have seen my face the night my phone rang and the guy at the other end
said "Hi, this is King Blotto, wanna be on my board?" and gave me the number!).
As of the last several years, I have left the mainstream phreaking life, and
only look in once in a while through past friends. That may change now, as
Taran King and Knight Lightning have shown me that there are in fact TRUE
phreaks left. I was beginning to doubt it, hence my absence.
Memorable bulletin boards that I have been on include; The Pearly Gates, AT&T
Phone Center, Blottoland (even though I was only actually on during the last
phase of its life), and Bean Dial, plus all the normal ones that everybody and
his brother were on.
Currently I am enrolled at North Dakota State University, majoring in computer
engineering. I work at McDonalds flippin' dem burgers.
Regrets
~~~~~~~
I regret leaving the phreak world in the first place, I was disillusioned
with all the little nerds with computers and modems who thought they were
phreaks just because some dork they knew gave them a code.
Favorite Things
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Chicks: The ones with really big... uh.. Brains! Thats it! Ya know, they
stick out their bras.. Uh.. I mean their intelligence protrudes!!
Ya! thats it!
People: I like just about anybody who has something interesting and
meaningful to talk about (and chicks with big ****)
Music: 70's music like Led Zeppelin, and most heavy metal bands. I also can
go for top 40 as long as we aren't talking Whitney, or Jackson, or G.
Michael or some other puke like that.
Most Memorable Experiences
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The time me and a friend from Idaho called this local guy who THOUGHT he was a
phreak. I talked to him on one line, while MIKE talked to him long distance on
another, convincing him that AT&T security had really busted his ass. I've
never heard ANYONE sound so scared in my life! HAHAH
Starting on my high school's varsity football team for two years instead of the
average 0-1 yr.
Some people to mention
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Lord Kahz
Cookie Cruncher
Android Base -- for pointing me in the right direction
Simon Templar -- for taking that direction and showing me what to do with it.
All others who have helped me in anyway, whether it be questions I had, or
whatever else... Thanks.
Inside Joke
~~~~~~~~~~~
To Kahz: "Hey MM, let's call Mari!"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Serious Section
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I think people who abuse CCs are assholes. That does nothing but hurt all of
us; all that comes out of it is one person's gain and many people's suffering.
Example; Sysops of the board where the inevitably BUSTED asshole posted his CC
numbers.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Although he has never met any hackers, Scott feels that there are a few geeks
out there based on some of his phone conversations.
Thanks for your time Scott.
Taran King
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 21, File 3 of 11
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
<> <>
<> Shadows Of A Future Past <>
<> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ <>
<> Part One Of The Vicious Circle Trilogy <>
<> <>
<> A New Indepth Look At A Re-Occurring Problem <>
<> by Knight Lightning <>
<> <>
<> August 6, 1988 <>
<> <>
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
The Problem?
~~~~~~~~~~~~
The fate of the entire modem community for the most part is based on the
foundation of computer bulletin boards. These realms of information exchange
have become centers of learning and trading various information for thousands
of hackers across the United States and even the world.
However, today's security consultants and law enforcement agencies are smarter
than ever too and they know where to strike in order to do the most damage.
The concept of creating a bulletin board for the purpose of catching hackers
was unheard of until The Phoenix Phortress Incident of 1986. The creation of
this bulletin board system enabled Sergeant Dan Pasquale of the Fremont Police
Department the ability to penetrate the sacred barrier between the phreak/hack
community and the rest of the world.
This file will attempt to show the extent of this problem within the community
and hopefully will lead readers to discover ways of protecting themselves from
the many "venus fly traps" they are likely to encounter. Articles presented in
this file are specially edited reprints from past issues of Phrack World News.
The Evidence - The unseen truths reside in the shadows of our past and future.
~~~~~~~~~~~~
The following is an excerpt from Phrack World News Issue III;
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Phoenix Phortress Stings 7
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
On March 5, 1986, the following seven phreaks were arrested in what has come to
be known as the first computer crime "sting" operation.
Captain Hacker Doctor Bob Lasertech The Adventurer
The Highwayman The Punisher The Warden
Many of them or other members of Phoenix Phortress belonged to these groups:
High Mountain Hackers Kaos Inc. Shadow Brotherhood The Nihilist Order
Of the seven, three were 15 years old; two were 16; one was 17; and one, 19.
Their charges include:
Several misdemeanors
Trafficking in stolen long distance service codes
Trafficking in stolen credit card numbers
Possession of stolen property
Possession of dangerous weapons (a martial arts weapon)
Charging mail-order merchandise to stolen credit card numbers
Selling stolen property
Charging calls internationally to telephone service numbers
Other phreak boards mentioned include:
Bank Vault (Mainly for credit card numbers and tips on credit card scams)
Phreakers Phortress (Mainly of course for phreak codes and other information)
After serving search warrants early Wednesday morning on the seven Fremont
residences where the young men lived with their parents, police confiscated at
least $12,000 worth of equipment such as computers, modems, monitors, floppy
disks, and manuals, which contained information ranging from how to make a
bomb, to the access codes for the Merrill Lynch and Dean Witter Financial
Services Firm's corporate computers.
The sysop of Phoenix Phortress was The Revenger, who was supposedly Wally
Richards, a 25 year-old Hayward man who "phreaked back east a little" in New
Jersey. He took the phone number under the name of Al Davis. However he was
really Sgt. Daniel Pasquale of the Fremont Police Department.
When he introduced his board to other computer users, he called it the "newest,
coolest, phreak board in town."
Pasquale said he got the idea for the sting operation after a 16-year old
arrested last summer for possession of stolen property "rolled them over
(narced) He told us all about their operation."
Pasquale used a police department Apple //e computer and equipment, with access
codes and information provided by eight corporations, including Wells Fargo
Bank, Sprint, and MCI.
Pasquale said he received more than 2,500 calls from about 130 regular users
around the country. The police started to make their first case three days
after the board went up.
"We had taken the unlisted phone number under the name Al Davis," Pasquale
said. "In six days, these kids had the name on the bulletin board. I would
have needed a search warrant to get that information."
The arrests were made after five months of investigation by Dan Pasquale.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Phoenix Phortress incident only led to the arrest of seven hackers.
However, at the same time it enabled the law enforcement agencies to gather
information about over one hundred other hackers, systems being discussed,
anything transmitted in electronic mail on the bulletin board, and most likely
gave them information about hundreds of other hackers, bulletin boards, and so
forth.
The following is an excerpt from Phrack World News Issue VII;
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Maxfield Strikes Again August 20, 1986
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Many of you probably remember a system known as "THE BOARD" in the Detroit 313
NPA. The number was 313-592-4143 and the newuser password was
"HEL-N555,ELITE,3" (then return). It was kind of unique because it was run off
of an HP2000 computer.
On August 20, 1986 the following messages began to appear on THE BOARD;
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Welcome to MIKE WENDLAND'S I-TEAM sting board!
(Computer Services Provided By BOARDSCAN)
66 Megabytes Strong
300/1200 baud - 24 hours.
Three (3) lines = no busy signals!
Rotary hunting on 313-534-0400.
Board: General Information & BBS's
Message: 41
Title: YOU'VE BEEN HAD!!!
To: ALL
From: HIGH TECH
Posted: 8/20/86 @ 12.08 hours
Greetings:
You are now on THE BOARD, a "sting" BBS operated by MIKE WENDLAND of the
WDIV-TV I-Team. The purpose? To demonstrate and document the extent of
criminal and potentially illegal hacking and telephone fraud activity by the
so-called "hacking community."
Thanks for your cooperation. In the past month and a half, we've received all
sorts of information from you implicating many of you to credit card fraud,
telephone billing fraud, vandalism, and possible break-ins to government or
public safety computers. And the beauty of this is we have your posts, your
E-Mail and--- most importantly ---your REAL names and addresses.
What are we going to do with it? Stay tuned to News 4. I plan a special
series of reports about our experiences with THE BOARD, which saw users check
in from coast-to-coast and Canada, users ranging in age from 12 to 48. For our
regular users, I have been known as High Tech, among other ID's. John Maxfield
of Boardscan served as our consultant and provided the HP2000 that this "sting"
ran on. Through call forwarding and other conveniences made possible by
telephone technology, the BBS operated remotely here in the Detroit area.
When will our reports be ready? In a few weeks. We now will be contacting
many of you directly, talking with law enforcement and security agents from
credit card companies and the telephone services.
It should be a hell of a series. Thanks for your help. And don't bother
trying any harassment. Remember, we've got YOUR real names.
Mike Wendland
The I-team
WDIV, Detroit, MI.
Board: General Information & BBS's
Message: 42
Title: BOARDSCAN
To: ALL
From: THE REAPER
This is John Maxfield of Boardscan. Welcome! Please address all letter bombs
to Mike Wendland at WDIV-TV Detroit. This board was his idea.
The Reaper (a.k.a. Cable Pair)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Maxfield was in general extremely proud of his efforts with THE BOARD and
he said that a lot of the people he voice verified should have known it was
him. According to John Maxfield, the only reason this sting board was put up
was to show "What is currently happening in the phreak/hack community." He
said no legal action will be taken at all, and besides, its fattened his
"dossiers" on a lot of people!
[The news stories for WDIV-TV 4 appeared in Phrack World News Issue IX.]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Now, this is a classic example of people not learning from other people's
mistakes. At some point in time prior to this incident, the number for THE
BOARD was posted, it was given a lot of hype and eventually it drew in hackers
to THE BOARD like flies to a spider web from which the unsuspecting users never
broke free.
That is the point I am trying to make -- today's phreak/hacker must learn to be
more security conscious. What makes anyone think that they can trust someone
just because they are running a bulletin board? This blind faith is what will
be the downfall of many a hacker until they wise up and start paying attention
to what they are doing. Safety first; the stakes in this game are a lot higher
than no television after school for a week because once a hacker's phone number
falls into the wrong hands, the law enforcement community or organizations like
the Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA) can find out everything
about you. I know because I have seen their files and their hacker data base
is so incredibly large and accurate...its unbelievable.
The following is an excerpt from Phrack World News Issue XIV;
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Metalland South: Phreak BBS or MetaliFEDS Inc.? June 2, 1987
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Metalland South BBS, at 404-327-2327, was once a fairly well known bulletin
board, where many respected members of the hack/phreak community resided. It
was originally operated by two guys from Metal Communications, Inc., but it
wasn't an MCI club board. The sysop was Iron Man and the co-sysop was Black
Lord. Recently, it has come to the writer's attention, that MLS has come under
new management, new policies, and possibly a new idea; Sting.
Somewhere around September-October 1986, Iron Man removed all of the hack/
phreak related subboards as well as all G-philes from the system. He was
apparently worried about getting busted. The last time this reporter spoke
with him, Iron Man said he intended to put the hack/phreak subs back up. Then,
not long after this conversation, the number was changed (The original number
was 404-576-5166).
A person using the alias of The Caretaker was made co-sysop and Iron Man would
not reply to feedback. Everything was handled by The Caretaker [TC from now
on]. TC did not allow any hack/phreak subs, but said he would put them up if
the users would follow STRICT validation procedures.
Strict validation on MLS includes:
^*^ Your Real Name
^*^ Your Address
^*^ Your Voice Phone Number
^*^ A Self-Addressed Envelope (in which he will send back with your account
number and password.)
It is obvious to see the ramifications here. A board or sysop gets busted and
then makes a deal to turn over the board to some company or agency. To make
sure that they get who they want, you have to give them all this info, and the
only you can get a password is to let them mail it to you, thus guaranteeing
that if something illegal is posted under that account, you are responsible, no
ifs, ands, or buts.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
There was more information that went on to prove that Metalland South was
indeed some kind of a trap or sting board and the whole aura of mystery
surrounding this system made it not worth calling.
Do not EVER give a sysop your address so he can send you your password. There
is no need for such information as it can only hurt you severely and would not
benefit the sysop in any way that would leave you unharmed.
One other item concerning bulletin boards comes from PWN Issue V where mention
of yet another hacker sting board named The Tunnel was discovered in Texas.
And lets not forget about TMC's P-80, sysoped by Scan Man, that was responsible
for the apprehension of Shawn of Phreakers Quest (also known as Capt. Caveman).
However, do not fool yourself into believing that bulletin boards are the only
places you are likely to run into trouble. Regular systems that you like to
work with may be just as dangerous if you are not careful. Druidic Death and
Celtic Phrost found this out the hard way on the Unix system at MIT as they
nearly succumbed to the power of progressive entrapment which would have doomed
them both.
The following is an excerpt from Phrack World News Issue XI;
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MIT Unix: Victim or Aggressor? January 23 - February 2, 1987
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Was the MIT system an innocent victim of hacker oppression or simply another
trap to capture unsuspecting hackers in the act?
It all started like this...
[Some posts have been slightly edited to be relevant to the topic]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIT
Name: Druidic Death
Date: 12:49 am Mon Jan 20, 1986
Lately I've been messing around on MIT's VAX in there Physics Department.
Recently some one else got on there and did some damage to files. However MIT
told me that they'll still trust us to call them. The number is:
617-253-XXXX
We have to agree to the following or we will be kicked off, they will create a
"hacker" account for us.
<1> Use only GUEST, RODNEY, and GAMES. No other accounts until the hacker one
is made. There are no passwords on these accounts.
<2> Make sure we log off properly. Control-D. This is a UNIX system.
<3> Not to call between 9 AM and 5 PM Eastern Standard Time. This is to avoid
tying up the system.
<4> Leave mail to GEORGE only with UNIX questions (or C). And leave our
handles so he'll know who we are.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unix
Name: Celtic Phrost
Date: 4:16 pm Mon Jan 20, 1986
Thanks Death for the MIT computer, I've been working on getting into them for
weeks. Here's another you can play around with:
617/258-XXXX login:GUEST
Or use a WHO command at the logon to see other accounts, it has been a long
time since I played with that system, so I am unsure if the GUEST account still
works, but if you use the WHO command you should see the GUEST account needed
for applying for your own account.
-Phrost
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unix
Name: Celtic Phrost
Date: 5:35 pm Mon Jan 20, 1986
Ok, sorry, but I just remembered the application account, its: OPEN
Gawd, I am glad I got that off my chest!
-(A relieved)Celtic Phrost.
Also on that MIT computer Death listed, some other default accounts are:
LONG MIKE GREG NEIL DAN
Get the rest yourself, and please people, LEAVE THEM UNPASSWORDED!
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIT
Name: Druidic Death 12
Date: 1:16 am Fri Jan 23, 1987
MIT is pretty cool. If you haven't called yet, try it out. Just PLEASE make
sure you follow the little rules they asked us about! If someone doesn't do
something right the sysop leaves the gripe mail to me. Check out my directory
under the guest account just type "cd Dru". Read the first file.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIT
Name: Ctrl C
Date: 12:56 pm Sat Jan 24, 1987
MIT Un-Passworded Unix Accounts: 617-253-XXXX
ALEX BILL GAMES DAVE GUEST DAN GREG MIKE LONG NEIL TOM TED
BRIAN RODNEY VRET GENTILE ROCKY SPIKE KEVIN KRIS TIM
And PLEASE don't change the Passwords....
-=>Ctrl C<=-
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIT Again
Name: Druidic Death
Date: 1:00 pm Wed Jan 28, 1987
Ok people, MIT is pissed, someone hasn't been keeping the bargain and they
aren't too thrilled about it. There were only three things they asked us to
do, and they were reasonable too. All they wanted was for us to not compromise
the security much more than we had already, logoff properly, not leave any
processes going, and call only during non-business hours, and we would be able
to use the GUEST accounts as much as we like.
Someone got real nice and added themselves to the "daemon" group which is
superusers only, the name was "celtic". Gee, I wonder who that could have
been? I'm not pissed at anyone, but I'd like to keep on using MIT's computers,
and they'd love for us to be on, but they're getting paranoid. Whoever is
calling besides me, be cool ok? They even gave me a voice phone to chat with
their sysops with. How often do you see this happen?
A little perturbed but not pissed...
DRU'
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tsk, Celtic.
Name: Evil Jay
Date: 9:39 am Thu Jan 29, 1987
Well, personally I don't know why anyone would want to be a superuser on the
system in question. Once you've been on once, there is really nothing that
interesting to look at...but anyway.
-EJ
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In trouble again...
Name: Celtic Phrost
Date: 2:35 pm Fri Jan 30, 1987
...I was framed!! I did not add myself to any "daemon" group on any MIT UNIX.
I did call once, and I must admit I did hang up without logging off, but this
was due to a faulty program that would NOT allow me to break out of it, no
matter what I tried. I am sure that I didn't cause any damage by that.
-Phrost
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major Problems
Name: Druidic Death
Date: 12:20 pm Sat Jan 31, 1987
OK, major stuff going down. Some unidentified individual logged into the
Physics Dept's PDP11/34 at 617-253-XXXX and was drastically violating the
"agreement" we had reached. I was the one that made the "deal" with them. And
they even gave me a voice line to talk to them with.
Well, one day I called the other Physics computer, the office AT and discovered
that someone created an account in the superuser DAEMON group called "celtic".
Well, I was contacted by Brian through a chat and he told me to call him. Then
he proceeded to nicely inform me that "due to unauthorized abuse of the system,
the deal is off".
He was cool about it and said he wished he didn't have to do that. Then I
called George, the guy that made the deal and he said that someone who said he
was "Celtic Phrost" went on to the system and deleted nearly a year's worth of
artificial intelligence data from the nuclear fission research base.
Needless to say I was shocked. I said that he can't believe that it was one of
us, that as far as I knew everyone was keeping the deal. Then he (quite pissed
off) said that he wanted all of our names so he can report us to the FBI. He
called us fags, and all sorts of stuff, he was VERY!! [underline twice] PISSED!
I don't blame him. Actually I'm not blaming Celtic Phrost, it very easily
could have been a frame up.
But another thing is George thinks that Celtic Phrost and Druidic Death are one
and the same, in other words, he thinks that *I* stabbed him in the back.
Basically he just doesn't understand the way the hacker community operates.
Well, the deal is off, they plan to prosecute whoever they can catch. Since
George is my best friend's brother I have not only lost a friend, but I'm
likely to see some legal problems soon. Also, I can forget about doing my
graduate work at MIT. Whoever did this damage to them, I hope you're happy.
You really messed things up real nice for a lot of people.
Celtic, I don't have any reason to believe you messed with them. I also have
no reason to think you didn't. I'm not making an accusation against you, but
WHOEVER did this, deserves to be shot as far as I'm concerned. Until this data
was lost, they were on the verge of harnessing a laser-lithium produced form of
nuclear fission that would have been more efficient than using the standard
hydrogen. Well, back to the drawing board now.
I realize that it's hard to believe that they would have data like this on this
system. But they were quite stupid in many other areas too. Leaving the
superuser account with no password?? Think about it.
It's also possible that they were exaggerating. But regardless, damage seems
to have been done.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIT
Name: Phreakenstein
Date: 1:31 am Sun Feb 01, 1987
Heck! I dunno, but whoever it was, I think, should let himself (the s00per
K-rad elyte d00d he is) be known.
I wasn't on MIT, but it was pretty dumb of MIT to even let Hackers on. I
wouldn't really worry though, they did let you on, and all you have to prove is
that you had no reason to do it.
----Phreak
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I wonder...
Name: Ax Murderer 15
Date: 6:43 pm Sun Feb 01, 1987
I highly doubt that is was someone on this system. Since this is an elite
board, I think all the users are pretty decent and know right and wrong things
to do. Could be that one of the users on this system called another system and
gave it out!??
Ax Murderer
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was stupid
Name: Druidic Death 12
Date: 9:21 pm Sun Feb 01, 1987
It seems to me, or, what I gathered, they felt that there were going to be
hackers on the system to begin with and that this way they could keep
themselves basically safe.
I doubt that it was Celtic Phrost, I don't think he'd be an asshole like that.
But I can't say. When I posted, I was pretty pissed about the whole deal. I've
calmed down now. Psychic Warlord said something to me voice the other day that
made me stop and think. What if this was a set up right from the start? I
mean, MIT won't give me specifics on just what supposedly happened, Celtic
Phrost denies everything, and the biggest part of it is what George said to me.
"We can forgive you for what you did to us if you'll promise to go straight and
never do this again and just tell us who all of your friends are that are on
the system".
I didn't pay much attention to that remark at first, now I'm beginning to
wonder...
I, of course, didn't narc on anyone. (Who do I know??? hehe)
DRU'
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments...
Name: Delta-Master
Date: 7:15 am Mon Feb 02, 1987
It wouldn't surprise me if it was some kind of setup, it's been done before.
Delta-Master
[All posts in this article were taken from ShadowSpawn.]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Solution
~~~~~~~~~~~~
What more is there to say? It definitely looks like there was a setup involved
and it probably was not the first time and probably will not be the last time
either. So how can you protect yourself?
As far as the bulletin boards go. There is an unwritten rule somewhere that
basically says that to be a good sysop, you first have to be a good user. If
the sysop of some mystery board is not someone you have seen around for a long
time, then I would not call. However, even if it is someone who has been
around, references from someone you feel you can trust is a necessity. It all
boils down to the reliability of the information and the persons involved.
When dealing with systems like the MIT Unix, remember, if its too good to be
true then most likely there will be something that you are not being told.
Who in their right mind is going to give free accounts to an important system
with delicate information to a group of hackers? Its crazy.
This file will hopefully serve as an informative fresh look at an old game. To
me, even if the time I spent putting this article together helps out or saves
only one phreak/hacker, I feel my job has been done successfully.
:Knight Lightning
"The Future Is Forever"
The Phoenix Project
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 21, File 4 of 11
:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:
:.:.: :.:.:
:.: The Tele-Pages :.:
:.: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :.:
:.: Telenet Nodes/Addresses :.:
:.: :.:
:.: Collected by Anonymous Sources :.:
:.: :.:
:.: From Europe, United Kingdom, and The Middle East :.:
:.: :.:
:.: Imported into the USA by Jester Sluggo :.:
:.: :.:
:.: Special Thanks To Sefi :.:
:.: :.:
:.: October 7, 1988 :.:
:.:.: :.:.:
:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:
This file contains the list of Telenet nodes/addresses you use when you are
outside of USA/Canada (Example: United Kingdom, Europe, or the Middle East).
Very much 'thanks' goes towards the wonderful, people who worked
infinite-months on this. -- Sluggo !!
(* = Passwords that have been removed for this presentation. - KL)
_____________________________________________________________________________
| | | | | | | | |
Name |Number |Ext.|User Name |Password |KN|DN|NO|Test|Land|
==============================================================================
Us Telemail |031102020014 | |KKCHUNG |******** | |XX| | | US |
Uni Brighton |023427050015 | |GUEST |******* | |XX| | | UK |
Sysnet Wien |023224221142 |MAI |Gast |**** | |XX| | | AT |
|023424126010604 |,5020015 |*****/*****| |XX| | | UK |
|026243221093001 |U 5Jm11964,|***** | |XX| | | |
|03422351919169 |,10404000 |******( *x)| |XX| | | |
Z E V |022847911118 | |EPSON |***** | |XX| | | CH |
Altos | 45890040004 | |Woodo |****(***** | |XX| | | DE |
Mehlbox HAM | 45400090184 | |Mike |****** | |XX| | | DE |
E C H O | 0270448112 | |UK85041D |******** |XX| | | | NE |
Eis - Vax |???????????? | |????????????|???????????|??|??|??|????|????|
B I X |031060057878 | |Rupert |-----------| | | | | US |
C.L.I.N.C.H. | 4440009031 | |Gast |**** | | | | | DE |
| 45690090125 | |KO/VMUTIL |****** | |XX| | | DE |
E X C O N |022849911102001 |Call 130 |*** | |XX| | | CH |
|023422351919169 |,49000001 |*******/**** |XX| | | UK |
R M I Aachen | 45241090832 | |Guest (Menue 20.3) *****| | | | | DE |
Markt & Tech. | 45890010006 | |EMERY04 |???????????|XX| | | | DE |
Markt & Tech. | 45890010006 | |EMERY05 |???????????| |XX| | | DE |
K D D Vax | 0440820023 | |Conf |**** | |XX| | | JA |
Emery ADO | 03106907626 | |CICS4D |***** | | | | | US |
Euronet | 023421920100513 |Tikatom | | |XX| | | NE |
Netztest DE | 4590049002 |ECHO| | | | | | | DE |
Netztest AU | 05053210001 | | | | | | | | AU |
The Source |0311030100038| |Jinatari |********* | | | |DEMO| US |
The Source |0311030100038| |Josh1 |******** | |XX| | | US |
Delphi |0311061703088| |------------|-----------| | | | | US |
Nuclear Res. | 03110500061 | |Bill |******* | |XX| | | US |
E.S.A. |023421920115600 |MAR15540 | | |XX| | | NE |
Hazylab | 45400030201 | |User |**** | |XX| | | DE |
|023421880100300 |Mudguest |******** | |XX| |18-8| NE |
| 4511042301 | |zzve099/zzueb|******/******* | | | DE |
Datapac | 030292100086| |------------|-----------| | | | | CA |
Dallas | 0310600787 | |------------|-----------| | | | | US |
A M P |023422020010700 |Use Demo Account | | | | | UK |
Canada |0302067100901| |------------|-----------| | | | | CA |
Telenet |0311020200141| |Telemailintl|**** ******| |XX| | | US |
A D P Network |034219200118 | |1300-7777 |*** | |XX| | | NE |
Hostess |023421920101013 |Euonet |***** | |XX| | | NE |
G D P T T |02284410906 | |mit G Laeuten NUA *****| | | | | IT |
Tymnet |4561040250 | | | | | | | | DE |
Autonet |45611040076 | | | | | | | | DE |
PSS DOC |02421920101013 | | | | | | | |
Midnet Gatew. |0234260227227| | | | | | | | UK |
NUMAC |0234263259159| | | | | | | | UK |
Sharp Comp. |0234219200203| |,IPSHIP | | | | | | UK |
College LON |0234219200333| |,EUCLID | | | | | | UK |
Brit. TELECOM |023421920101030 |,TSTB | | | | | | UK |
Phis. Labtory |0234219709111| |,NPL1 | | | | | | UK |
Phis. Labtory |0234219709210| |,NPL2 | | | | | | UK |
Queen Marry C.|023419806160 | |,QMC | | | | | | UK |
Atom.Ener.Res.|0234223519111| |,AERE | | | | | | UK |
Database |023422351911198 |,DAADA | | | | | | UK |
Uni Leverpool |0234251248248| |,LIVE | | | | | | UK |
Space Research|0234290524242| |,RSRERADIO | | | | | | UK |
Brit. Oxig. |0234293212212| |,BOC | | | | | | UK |
A M D A H L |0240515330 | |,QZIBQZ | | | | | | |
Cyber |02405015320 | |,OZCBQZ | | | | | | |
H M I | 45300217 | |,HMI | | | | | | DE |
S W |02405020328 | |,QZXAQZ via reverse Pad| | | | | |
PSS Mail Serv |023421920105 | | | | | | | | UK |
C E R N |022846811405 | | | | | | | | |
W A X Bank FRA| 45611040187| |????????????|???????????| | | | | DE |
Uni Bochum | 45611040240| | | | | | | | DE |
Uni Berlin | 4530040023 | | | | | | | | DE |
Teleprint SBR | 4568100010 | | | | | | | | DE |
Max Planc MUC | 45890040220| | | | | | | | DE |
B B D A |02062221006 | | | | | | | | |
Dialne |0234212300120| | | | | | | | UK |
Euclid LON |0234219200333| | | | | | | | UK |
Decates | 44615440371 | | | | | | | | DE |
R M I Aachen | 44241040341 | | | | | | | | DE |
N P L I |0234219709111| | | | | | | | UK |
T S T B |023421920101030 | | | | | | | UK |
U C L |0234219200300| | | | | | | | UK |
Dimdi |45221040006 | |,DA | | | | | | DE |
Dimdi |45221040104 | |,DA | | | | | | DE |
Emery STR |4471149236 | | | | | | | | DE |
|07222211100171 | | | | | | | |
|43221093001 | |U5JM11964,***** | | | | | DE |
|02222632004 | |ask reply for some NUA's| | | | | IT |
|03106001977 | | | | | | | | US |
|023520014300165 | | | | | | | UK |
______________|_____________|____|____________|___________|__|__|__|____|____|
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
00000 15000006 FTP FOR ECSVAX
00000 15000019 FTP FOR EEVAX
00000 15000034 WEST OF SCOT. COLL. OF AGRIC.
00000 15000036 FTP FOR CSTVAX
00000 1500100750 FTP FOR ITS63A
00000 1500101570 IT SCHOOL 63/40
00000 16000002 EMAS FRONT END
========================
= AUS - Australia =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
AUS 05052 28621000 ANGLO/AUSTRALIAN OBSERVATORY
AUS 05052 28621001 CSIRO RADIO-PHYSICS
AUS 05052 28621001 FTP FOR EPPING
AUS 05052 82620000 FTP FOR AUSTEK
AUS 05052 82620000 VAX IN SIDNEY, AUSTRALIA
AUS 05053 210003 MIDAS FOX TEST
========================
= CH - Switzerland =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
CH 02284 64110115 DATA.STAR
CH 02284 6811405
CH 02284 681140510,LO PACX2
CH 02284 6911003 NOS.CYBER,CIA0543,GUEST
CH 02284 79110650 KOMETH.TELEPAC
CH 02284 7911118 ZEV
CH 02284 64110110 DATASTAR
CH 02284 68113150 MANAGEMENT JOINT TRUST
========================
= D - West Germany =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
D 02624 4890049130
D 02624 5211040026
D 02624 5211040026 PRIMENET
D 02624 5221040002
D 02624 5221040006 MEDICAL DOCS,COLOGNE
D 02624 5221040104 GERMAN MED. INST., COLOGNE
D 02624 5228040187 PI.BONN
D 02624 5300021713
D 02624 5400030029
D 02624 5400030035
D 02624 5400030041
D 02624 5400030046
D 02624 5400030071
D 02624 5400030090 (cierr 1402)
D 02624 5400030104
D 02624 5400030105
D 02624 5400030110 HOST
D 02624 5400030113 (cierr 1402)
D 02624 5400030138
D 02624 5400030150
D 02624 5400030158
D 02624 5400030175
D 02624 5400030187 E2000 HAMBURG VAX
D 02624 5400030201 HASYLAB-VAX
D 02624 5400030202 HERA MAGNET MEASUREMENT VAX 750
D 02624 5400030215
D 02624 5400030259
D 02624 5400030261
D 02624 5400030296 DFH2001I
D 02624 5400030502
D 02624 5400030519
D 02624 5400030566 DFH2001I
D 02624 5400030578 PRIMENET 20.0.4 DREHH
D 02624 5400090184
D 02624 5400091110 DT.MAILBOX
D 02624 5611040009 CENTRE FOR INFO AND DOC,GERMANY
D 02624 5615140282
D 02624 5621040000 TELEBOX
D 02624 5621040000 TELEBOX
D 02624 5621040014 ACF/VTAM
D 02624 5621040025 OEVA
D 02624 5621040026 HOST
D 02624 5621040027 BASF/FER.VAX 8600
D 02624 5621040508 VCON0.BASF.A6
D 02624 5621040516 CN01
D 02624 5621040532
D 02624 5621040580 DYNAPAC MULTI-PAD.25
D 02624 5621040581 DYNAPAC MULTI-PAD.25
D 02624 5621040582
D 02624 5724740001 GERMAN CENTRE FOR TECH.
D 02624 5890040004 ACS.MUNICH
D 02624 5890040081 NOS.SW.SYS.MUNICH
D 02624 5890040185
D 02624 5890040207 DATABASE OTTOBRUNN
D 02624 5890040207
D 02624 5890040220 HOST
D 02624 5890040221 HOST
D 02624 5890040225 QNTEC.MUNICH
D 02624 5890040262 BDS.UNIX
D 02624 5890040266
D 02624 5890040281 DATUS.PAD
D 02624 5890040510
D 02624 5890040522 PLESSEY.SEMICOND.VAX
D 02624 5890040542
D 02624 589009012
D 02624 5913111 ERLANGEN CYBER 173, NURNBURG
========================
= F - France =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
F 02080 34020258
F 02080 7802016901
F 02080 38020676 ILL DIVA
F 02080 91040047 SACLAY, FRANCE
F 02080 91190258 LURE SYNCHROTRON SOURCE
========================
= GB - Great Britian =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
GB 02342 12300120 D.I.SERV.
GB 02342 12301186
GB 02342 1300011
GB 02342 1440012
GB 02342 15710104
GB 02342 19200118 AUTONET
GB 02342 19200146
GB 02342 19200154
GB 02342 19200190 PERG.INFOLN.
GB 02342 19200203
GB 02342 19200222
GB 02342 19200300 UNI.LONDON
GB 02342 19200304
GB 02342 19200394 SIANET
GB 02342 19200871
GB 02342 19201002
GB 02342 1920100515 HOSTESS
GB 02342 1920100615
GB 02342 192010100513
GB 02342 1920101013
GB 02342 1920101030
GB 02342 19709111
GB 02342 206411411 UNI.ESSEX
GB 02342 20641141 UNI.ESSEX
GB 02342 22236236
GB 02342 2271511 ---,GUEST,FRIEND (CALL PIP)
GB 02342 2790014302 ALCATEL
GB 02342 12080105
GB 02342 12300120 DIALOG VIA DIALNET IN LONDON
GB 02342 123002920
GB 02342 12301281 ONE TO ONE COMMS
GB 02342 13900101 ALVEY MAIL FACILITY
GB 02342 1390010150 ALVEY MAIL SYS FTP
GB 02342 19200100 UNI OF LONDON COMPUTING CENTRE
GB 02342 19200171
GB 02342 19200220 BRITISH LIBRARY ON-LINE SYSTEM
GB 02342 19200300 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON
GB 02342 19200394 COMPUTER SERVICES, LONDON
GB 02342 1920100513 BRITISH TELECOM SERVICES
GB 02342 1920100620 P. ON-LINE BILLING SERVICE
GB 02342 1920102517
GB 02342 20641141 UNI OF ESSEX FTP
GB 02342 2223616300 CARDIFF UNIVERSITY MULTICS
GB 02342 27200110 GEAC 8000 ITI
GB 02342 27200112 HEWLETT PACKARD LABS, BRISTOL
GB 02342 31300101 PRIME OFFICE, EDINBURGH
GB 02342 31300102 FORESTRY COMMISSION FTP
GB 02342 31300105 LATTICE LOGIC LTD
GB 02342 31300107
GB 02342 34417117 ICL BRACKNELL
GB 02342 41200107
GB 02342 4620010243 ICL WEST GORTON 'B' SERVICE
GB 02342 4620010248 ICL WEST GORTON 'X' SERVICE
GB 02342 4620010277 FTP FOR ICL WEST GORTON PERQ
GB 02342 4620010277 ICL WEST GORTON PERQ
GB 02342 46240240 ICL KIDSGROVE
GB 02342 53300124 LEICESTER
GB 02342 5820010604 AGRENET CPSE
GB 02342 60227227 UNI OF LEICESTER FTP
GB 02342 61600133 IBM - SALE
GB 02342 61600133 IBM SALE FTP
GB 02342 61643365 ICLBRA
GB 02342 6164336543 ICL WEST GORTON 'B' SERVICE
GB 02342 6164336548 ICL WEST GORTON 'X' SERVICE
GB 02342 6164336577 FTP FOR ICL WEST GORTON PERQ
GB 02342 6164336577 ICL WEST GORTON PERQ
GB 02342 64200136 PRIMENET
GB 02342 70712217 HATFIELD POLYTECHNIC
GB 02342 75312212 BRITISH OXYGEN
GB 02342 75312212 THE WORLD REPORTER
GB 02342 78228282 ICL LETCHWORTH
GB 02342 78228288 ICL LETCHWORTH
GB 02342 90468168
GB 02342 90840111 SCICON, SOUTH ENGLAND
GB 02342 93765265 BRITISH LIBRARY LENDING DIVI.
========================
= I - Italy =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
I 02222 620021 EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, ROME
========================
= IRL - Ireland =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
IRL 02724 31540002 EUROKOM (UNIV COLLEGE DUBLIN)
IRL 02724 3154000803
IRL 02724 3154000803 IRL.HEA.TCD.DEC20 (TOPS-20)
IRL 02724 3159000630
========================
= N - Norway =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
N 02422 11000001 DEC-10, OSLO UNI
========================
= NL - Netherlands =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
NL 02041 294002 DUPHAR WEESP,HOLLAND
========================
= S - Sweden =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
S 02402 00310228 UNI.LUND
S 02405 015503 GOTTENBURG, SWEDEN
S 02405 02032832 ODEN, SWEDEN
========================
= SF - Finland =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
SF 02442 02007 CANDE IN FINLAND
SF 02442 03008 VAX 11/750 IN FINLAND
========================
= USA = USA =
========================
CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK
=========================================================================
USA 03020 58700900 DATAPAC
USA 03020 60100010 UNI.ALBERTA
USA 03106 0050
USA 03106,DELPHI TYMNET
USA 03110 2020014275
USA 03110 20423
USA 03110 4150002000 D.I.SERV.
USA 03110 60300020 COL.DARTMOUTH
USA 03106 GATEWAYS
USA 03106 000000 Unknown
USA 03106 000023
USA 03106 000032
USA 03106 000034
USA 03106 000050 NLM MIS bsd unix
USA 03106 000060
USA 03106 000065
USA 03106 000066 BCS ** to be investigated **
USA 03106 000071
USA 03106 000081 COMPUTONE ** to be investigated **
USA 03106 000093
USA 03106 000096 REMOTE COMPUTING
USA 03106 000098 LOCKHEED DATAPLAN
USA 03106 000101 SIO
USA 03106 000113 1=LINK SYS
3=BANK OF USA,ABACIS,DIRECTOR)
USA 03106 000155
USA 03106 000173 TYMNET/CODAN NET. Inter-link
USA 03106 000179 LBL
USA 03106 000188
USA 03106 000210
USA 03106 000227
USA 03106 000241 HOST A,4 BAIFS BANK OF AMERICA
S,3 SFDCS1
USA 03106 000249
USA 03106 000280 HONEYWELL MPL
USA 03106 000289 ROSS SYSTEM (32,26,2,3,12,20,21)
7,5,17,18,47,51,A - unknown VAX systems
14,15 - RSTS ROSS SYSTEMS
9,43,44,45,48 - MICRO VMS VAX
USA 03106 000307 INFOMEDIA SERVICE CENTRE ONE
USA 03106 000315
USA 03106 000327
USA 03106 000331 (VM/370 system)
USA 03106 000377 MONSANTO AD RESEARCH PRODUCTION
APPLICATION NETWORK
USA 03106 000379
USA 03106 000401 TMCS PUBLIC NETWORK
USA 03106 000411 TYMNET/BOSTON/TNS-PK1 interlink
USA 03106 000423 CORPORATE COMPUTER SERVICES
USA 03106 000424 (link to 4 VM/370 systems)
USA 03106 000428 AAMNET
USA 03106 000439 MIS 2 (cierr 1402)
USA 03106 000463 SIGNETICS VM/370
USA 03106 000464
USA 03106 000496
USA 03106 000497 UBS COMPUTER SYSTEMS (host)
USA 03106 000498
USA 03106 000515 ONTYME II
USA 03106 000581
USA 03106 000585 C/C/M
USA 03106 000619 SPNB VM/370
USA 03106 000632 TYMNET/TRWNET inter-link
USA 03106 000633 PUBLIC TYMNET/TRWNET INTERLINK
USA 03106 000636 LINK TO TRAC SYSTEMS (over one 120 terminal)
USA 03106 000646
USA 03106 000664
USA 03106 000674
USA 03106 000685 MTS-A RESEARCH (HOST) 10 - TOPS-20,
12 - UNKNOWN
14 - UNKNOWN,
20 - MTS(C) TOPS-20
30 - MTS(F) TOPS-20,
32 - UNKNOWN
USA 03106 000704 TYMNET-CUP(704)/DUBB-NTS(4) inter-link
USA 03106 000715 TYMNET TEST system
USA 03106 000729 (VM/370 system)
USA 03106 000731
USA 03106 000742 LADC L66A
USA 03106 000755 CORPORATE COMPUTER SERVICES
USA 03106 000759
USA 03106 000760 DEC host Solar Cae/Cam
USA 03106 000761 DOJ host
USA 03106 000788 TYMNET-6754/McGRAWHILL inter-link
USA 03106 000793 J&J HOST
USA 03106 000798
USA 03106 000800 link to: CSG VAX, CYBER 815, SB1,
SB2, SB3, SCN-NET
USA 03106 000821
USA 03106 000832 ONTYME II
USA 03106 000842
USA 03106 000850 CISL SERVICE MACHINE
USA 03106 000859
USA 03106 000871
USA 03106 000898 P&W
USA 03106 000932
USA 03106 001010 DITYMNET01
USA 03106 001024
USA 03106 001030
USA 03106 001036 IBM1
USA 03106 001042 IDC/370
USA 03106 001043
USA 03106 001053 STRATEGIC INFORMATION
USA 03106 001056 SYNTEX TIMESHARING
USA 03106 001105 HOST SGNY 1 - VAX II PRODUCTIONS SYSTEM
3 - VAX II PRODUCTIONS SYSTEM
(tried to 5)
USA 03106 001110
USA 03106 001134 COMPUSERVE
USA 03106 001141 MESSAGE SERVICE SYSTEM (FOX)
USA 03106 001143
USA 03106 001152
USA 03106 001158 TYMNET USER SERVICE
USA 03106 001227 ACF2
USA 03106 001288
USA 03106 001304 ONTYME II
USA 03106 001309
USA 03106 001316
USA 03106 001320
USA 03106 001328
USA 03106 001330 MULTICS, HVN 862-3642
USA 03106 001341
USA 03106 001358
USA 03106 001361 THOMPSON COMPONENTS-MOSTEK CORPORATION
USA 03106 001383 HOST 1,A - TILLINGHAST BENEFITS T.SHAR.SYS.
2,C - TILLINGHAST INSURANCE T.SHAR.SYS.
4,D - OUTDIALS
6 - TILLINGHAST VAX 8600
(tried to 10,G)
USA 03106 001391 SOCAL
USA 03106 001399 C80
USA 03106 001400 TMCS PUBLIC NETWORK
USA 03106 001410 DATALYNX/3274 TERMINAL
USA 03106 001417
USA 03106 001434 (host system) - double digits
VM is active, tried to BZ
USA 03106 001438
USA 03106 001443
USA 03106 001467 STN INTERNATIONAL
USA 03106 001482 FNOC DDS
USA 03106 001483 ADR HEADQUARTERS
USA 03106 001487
USA 03106 001488 (cierr 1402)
USA 03106 001502 ARGON NATIONAL LAB
USA 03106 001508 IDC/370
USA 03106 001509
USA 03106 001514 (HOST) DC-10
USA 03106 001519
USA 03106 001533 SBS DATA CENTRE
USA 03106 001557
USA 03106 001560
USA 03106 001572 PRIMECON NETWORK (system 50)
USA 03106 001578
USA 03106 001589
USA 03106 001594 CON138
USA 03106 001611
USA 03106 001612 TYMNET-NEWARK/TSN-MRI inter-link
USA 03106 001616 TYMNET-5027/McGRAW HILL inter-link
USA 03106 001624
USA 03106 001642 Host, A - CORNELLA (system choices displayed)
USA 03106 001659 BYTE INFORMATIO EXCHANGE,GUEST,GUEST
USA 03106 001663 PEOPLE LINK
USA 03106 001665
USA 03106 001709
USA 03106 001715 TYMNET/BOFANET inter-link
USA 03106 001727
USA 03106 001757
USA 03106 001763
USA 03106 001765
USA 03106 001766 PRIMENET
USA 03106 001769 S.C. JOHNSON & SON R & D COMPUTER SYSTEMS
USA 03106 001789 HOST WYLBUR.N - CICS TWX A,C,D,G,H,P,R,S,V,Z
USA 03106 001799 (HOST) classes: 5 - VM/370, 20,23,26 UNKNOWN
(TRIED TO 32)
USA 03106 001807
USA 03106 001817 MITEL Host (no luck up to sys 20)
USA 03106 001819 TMCS PUBLIC NETWORK
USA 03106 001831 MULTICS
USA 03106 001842
USA 03106 001844
USA 03106 001851
USA 03106 001853
USA 03106 001854
USA 03106 001857
USA 03106 001864 SUNGARDS CENTRAL COMPUTER FACILITY NETWORKS
USA 03106 001873 MULTICS MR10.2I
USA 03106 001874
USA 03106 001880
USA 03106 001881
USA 03106 001892 PRIMENET (certain hours)
USA 03106 001897
USA 03106 001912
USA 03106 001977
USA 03106 002040
USA 03106 002041
USA 03106 002046 MITEL CORP IN KANATA
USA 03106 002050 TYMNET/BOFANET inter-link,ABACIS,SFDCS1
1 - link,
2 - SFDCS1,DIRECTOR,
3 - ABACIS,ABACIS
A - ABACIS 2
(note, Abacis may be used as
U/N for many systems on tymnet)
USA 03106 002060
USA 03106 002070
USA 03106 002086
USA 03106 002095 COMODEX ONLINE SYSTEM
USA 03106 002098 D & B,COMMANDO,DIRECTOR,FUCK
USA 03106 002099 D & B,COMMANDO,ASSASIN,SHIT
USA 03106 002100 D & B,COMMANDO,DIRECTOR,FUCK,RAIDER
USA 03106 002109 TYMNET/15B (inter-link)
USA 03106 002164 MITRE SYSTEM
USA 03106 002179
USA 03106 002188
USA 03106 002196
USA 03106 002200
USA 03106 002201
USA 03106 002212
USA 03106 002222
USA 03106 002286 Primenet TFGI
USA 03106 002299 CONSILIUM
USA 03106 002306
USA 03106 002314
USA 03106 002320
USA 03106 002329 MFE
USA 03106 002330
USA 03106 002384
USA 03106 002387 ** TO BE INVESTIGATED **
USA 03106 002391
USA 03106 002408
USA 03106 002418 UNC VAX
USA 03106 002443 DATAHUB
USA 03106 002445
USA 03106 002446
USA 03106 002453 PRIMENET
USA 03106 002470
USA 03106 002496 NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM
USA 03106 002519
USA 03106 002537
USA 03106 002539 TYMNET/CIDN Inter-link
USA 03106 002545 CENTRE FOR SEISMIC STUDIES
USA 03106 002578 SEL
USA 03106 002580 ** to be investigated **
USA 03106 002584 (HOST)
USA 03106 002602 MULTICS
USA 03106 002603 MULTICS system M
USA 03106 002609 CON5
USA 03106 002614 HOST
USA 03106 002623 VAX/VMS,GUEST
USA 03106 002624 SUNEX-2060 TOPS-20
USA 03106 002632
USA 03106 002635 QUOTDIAL
USA 03106 002646
USA 03106 002657
USA 03106 002667
USA 03106 002677 THE TIMES
USA 03106 002694 PVM3101,SPDS/MTAM, MLCM,VM/SP,STRATUS-1,STRATUS-2
USA 03106 002700 ANALYTICS SYSTNE
USA 03106 002709 AUTONET
USA 03106 002713
USA 03106 002730
USA 03106 002732
USA 03106 002744
USA 03106 002765 MULTICS
USA 03106 002768 (cierr 1402)
USA 03106 002779 SCJ TIMESHARING
USA 03106 002790 VM/370
USA 03106 002800
USA 03106 002807 ISC
USA 03106 002824
USA 03106 002842
USA 03106 002843
USA 03106 002851 CHEM NETWORK DTSS
USA 03106 002864 RCA SEMICUSTOM
USA 03106 002871 (same as 5603)
USA 03106 002875 (cierr 1402) MTECH/COMMERCIAL SERVICES DIVISION
USA 03106 002889 ** to be investigated **
USA 03106 002901
USA 03106 002910 (CIERR 1402)
USA 03106 002921 CHRYSLER NETWORK
USA 03106 002971
USA 03106 002991 US MIS IS400
USA 03106 002995 VAIL VAX
USA 03106 002998 TYMNET/FIRN DATE NETWORK Inter-link
USA 03106 003002 MULTICS
USA 03106 003009
USA 03106 003028 DCOM class - 0
USA 03106 003030 DCOM class - 0 *investigate*
USA 03106 003036
USA 03106 003050 ATPCO FARE INFORMATION SYSTEM
USA 03106 003062 (Host) class 0,1 ** to be investigated **
USA 03106 003079 VM/370
USA 03106 003092 TYMNET/PROTECTED ACCESS SERVICE SYS. Inter-link
USA 03106 003168 VM/370
USA 03106 003214 VM/370
USA 03106 003220 VM/370
USA 03106 003221 VM/370
USA 03106 003248
USA 03106 003284 COMPUFLIGHT
USA 03106 003286 VAX
USA 03106 003295 TYMNET/PROTECTED ACCESS SERVICE SYSTEMS
Inter-link,ABACIS
USA 03106 003297 TYMNET/PROTECTED ACCESS SERVICE SYSTENS
Inter-link,ABACIS
USA 03106 003310
USA 03106 003321
USA 03106 003356
USA 03106 003365
USA 03106 003373 IOCSQ
USA 03106 003394 (HOST WYN) 1 - VM/370,
2 - VM/370,
3 - IKJ53020A,
5 - VM/370
6 - NARDAC <CR> - NARDAC
USA 03106 003420
USA 03106 003443 ** TO BE INVESTIGATED **
USA 03106 003520
USA 03106 003527
USA 03106 003529 (CIERR 1402)
USA 03106 003534
USA 03106 003564 (CIERR 1402)
USA 03106 003568 OAK TREE SYSTEMS LTD
USA 03106 003572 NORTH AMERICA DATA CENTRE
USA 03106 003579
USA 03106 003604 VM/370
USA 03106 003605
USA 03106 003623
USA 03106 003797
USA 03106 003828 TYMNET/AKNET Inter-link
USA 03106 003831
USA 03106 003846 (same as 5603)
USA 03106 003879 (CIERR 1402)
USA 03106 003882 BEKINS COMPANY MUS/XA ACF/VTAM NETWORK
USA 03106 003946
USA 03106 003973 FORD -ELECTRICAL ELECTRONIC DIRECTORY
USA 03106 003994 FORD -ELECTRICAL ELECTRONIC DIRECTORY
USA 03106 004007
USA 03106 004016
USA 03106 004028 MDS-870
USA 03106 004041 RCA GLOBCOM'S PACKET SWITCHING SERICE
USA 03106 004092
USA 03106 004125
USA 03106 004129 ---,ABACIS
USA 03106 004131 ---,ABACIS
USA 03106 004137 TSO, VM/370
USA 03106 004173
USA 03106 004174 VM/370
USA 03106 004202
USA 03106 004206 MAINSTREAMS
USA 03106 004210
USA 03106 004288
USA 03106 004296
USA 03106 004341 (HOST) 2 - VM/370, T - VM/370, 1,3,4,A,C,E,Z
USA 03106 004350 AEC ** TO BE INVESTIGATED **
USA 03106 004365 NATIONAL LIB.OF MEDICINE'S TOXIC.DATA NETWORK
USA 03106 004389 BUG BUSTING MACHINE OF NYN
USA 03106 004468 BETINS COQ,6R5u(VACF/VTAM NETWORK
USA 03106 004472 ROLM CBX DATA-SWITCHING
USA 03106 004499 MRCA
USA 03106 004514 US MISS (IS400)
USA 03106 004530 (Host) active centre AA, ** investigate ! **
USA 03106 004541 (Host)
USA 03106 004545 HMN
USA 03106 004555 2 CASTER BACKUP
USA 03106 004562
USA 03106 004573
USA 03106 004579
USA 03106 004580 TSO
USA 03106 004619
USA 03106 004645
USA 03106 004702 PRIMENET
USA 03106 004706 (Host)
USA 03106 004726 NALCOCS DEC-10
USA 03106 004743 TYMNET INFO SERVICE
USA 03106 004755 STORE DEVELOPMENT MACHINE
USA 03106 004759 (Host)
USA 03106 004791 MIS GROUP/CAD DIVISION/COMPUTERLAND CORP.
USA 03106 004828 VTAM007
USA 03106 004865 GAB BUSINESS SERVICES
USA 03106 004869
USA 03106 004898
USA 03106 004946
USA 03106 004949
USA 03106 004956 (Host) 0 - Vax,
1 - KL1,
2 - KL,
3 - IBM,
8 - VAX 2,
11 - PC1-130
USA 03106 004957 NEC SEMI-CUSTOM DESIGN CENTRE
USA 03106 005018 (Host)
USA 03106 005034 (cierr 1402)
USA 03106 005058
USA 03106 005062 UIS SUPPB=MQDIRNET
USA 03106 005080
USA 03106 005082 COMPAQ
USA 03106 005107
USA 03106 005119 (Host)
USA 03106 005124 OPERATIONAL INFO SYSTEM VAX
USA 03106 005136 ** to be investogated **
USA 03106 005224 (Host)
USA 03106 005229 UNIV.OF PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCE
USA 03106 005267 CHANEL 01
USA 03106 005320 (Host) US DIGMAL COMPUTER SERVICES
USA 03106 005433
USA 03106 005438
USA 03106 005453
USA 03106 005463 VM/370
USA 03106 005528 STRATUS/32
USA 03106 005531 STRATUS/32
USA 03106 005539 VA II/730
USA 03106 005564 STRATUS/32
USA 03106 005566 Host sys A,1 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system ALICE
B,2 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system BAMBI
3 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system CHIP
4 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system DALE
5 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system ELLIOT
6 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system FLOWER
12,7 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system GRUMPY
8 - TRAC CLUSTER VIRGO, SYSTEM HAPPY
9 - TRAC CLUSTER VIRGO, SYSTEM ISABEL
10 - TRAC CLUSTER VIRGO, SYSTEM JUMBO
11 - TRAC CLUSTER VIRGO, SYSTEM KANGA
13 - VAX
18 - DIGITAL ETHERNET
28 - unknown
31 - CIERR 1402
32 - CIERR 1402
33 - CIERR 1402
34 - CIERR 1402
35 - CIERR 1402
36 - unknown
37 - CIERR 1402
38 - unknown
40 - CPU-STP-A
41 - CIERR 1402
43 - UNKNOWN
44 - ATLAS VAX
45 - FAXON INFO SERVICE
46 - ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS
LABORATORY VASX II/750
47,48,49 - unknown
52 - SERC COMPUTER RESOURCES VAX
53 - unknown
54 - SERC COMPUTER RESOURCES VAX
55 - BDS UNIX
81,61 - TRAC CLUSTER LIBRA system LADY
62 - TRAC CLUSTER LIBRA system MICKEY
63 - TRAC CLUSTER GEMINI system NEMO
64 - TRAC CLUSTER GEMINI system OWL
65 - TRAC CLUSTER LIBRA system PLUTO
67 - TRAC CLUSTER GEMINI system QUASAR
68 - unknown
70 - TRAC TIMESHARING VAX
71 - TRAC TIMESHARING VAX
72 - TRACE TIMESHARING VAX
73 - DIGITAL ETHERNET TERMINAL SERVER
74 - TRAC TIMESHARING VAX
76 - TRAC TIMESHARING VAX
81 - TRAC TIMESHARING VAX
USA 03106 005569 STRATUS/32
USA 03106 005571 STRATUS/32
USA 03106 005603 (Host) systems 1,2,3,4,5,C (5=Outdial)
USA 03106 005622
USA 03106 005683 TECHNICAL SUPPORT PRODUCTIONS
USA 03106 005697
USA 03106 005702 AUTH
USA 03106 005704 SPOOL
USA 03106 005705
USA 03106 005706
USA 03106 005707
USA 03106 005708 IFPSE
USA 03106 005709 IFPSE
USA 03106 005711 IFXMP
USA 03106 005712
USA 03106 005725 PRIMENET
USA 03106 005744 (Cierr 1402)
USA 03106 005755 Host system, active links = A,B,C,E,F,H,G,I,
J,K,L,M,O,P,Q,R,
S,T,U,V,W,X,Y,Z
USA 03106 005758 SEI/MUS SYSTEM
USA 03106 005805
USA 03106 005818 CORPORATE MANAGEMENT INFO SYSTEMS
USA 03106 005846 (Host)
USA 03106 005897
USA 03106 005903
USA 03106 005941
USA 03106 005969 PLESSEY SEMICONDUCTORS-IRVINE
USA 03106 005984 CREDIT AGRICOLE-USA
USA 03106 006019 PRIMENET
USA 03106 006046
USA 03106 006093 NALCO CHEMICAL COMPANY NETWORK
USA 03106 006121 CORPORATE MANAGEMENT INFO SERVICE
USA 03106 006187
USA 03106 006190 CLEVELAND
USA 03106 006191
USA 03106 006227
USA 03106 006251
USA 03106 006281 EDCS
USA 03106 006283 EDCS
USA 03106 006296
USA 03106 006432 EASYLINK
USA 03106 006434 EASYLINK
USA 03106 006440
USA 03106 006590 US CENTRA SERVICE
USA 03106 006597
USA 03106 006686
USA 03106 006722 INTERNATIONAL NETWORK
USA 03106 006828
USA 03106 006832 A&A DATANET (SYSTEMS 1,8,0,14)
USA 03106 006833 (GO AWAY)
USA 03106 006834
USA 03106 006835 TOC
USA 03106 006867 DATABILITY TIMESHARING SYSTEM II
USA 03106 006994
USA 03106 007028
USA 03106 007103
USA 03106 007177
USA 03106 007272 (CIERR 1402)
USA 03106 007351 PRIMENET
USA 03106 007352 PRIMENET
USA 03106 007377
USA 03106 007596 (Host) A - VM/370, B - VM/370
USA 03106 007640
- J. Sluggo
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 21, File 5 of 11
////////////////////////////\n / /
/ Satellite Communications /\n / ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ /
/ By Scott Holiday /\n / July 11, 1988 /
/ /\n ////////////////////////////
Satellite communications systems employ microwave terminals on satellites and
ground to earth stations for highly reliable and high-capacity communications
circuits. The communication satellites are positioned in geosynchronous orbits
about 22,000 miles above the earth. Thus the rotation of the satellite matches
that of the earth, and the satellite appears motionless above earth stations.
Three equally spaces satellites are required to cover the entire world.
The satellite's microwave terminals receive signals from an earth station and
retransmit those signals on another frequency to another earth station.
Because of the long distances involved, the round-trip communications path
takes about a half second. This is referred to as the propagation delay. The
propagation delay on a regular terrestrial phone line is about 1 millisecond
(ms) per 100 miles.
Each microwave terminal on the satellite, designated as a repeater or
transponder, includes a receiver for uplink transmissions and a transmitter for
down-link transmissions. Separate bands of frequencies for up-link and
down-link transmissions are designated in the 1.5-30 GHz frequency range (1.5
GHz is equal to 1,500,000,000 Hz, or 1.5 billion hertz). Typical frequencies
for communications satellites are 4-6 GHz for INTELSAT 5 and 12-14 GHz for
Anik-B, a Canadian satellite.
Each satellite transponder typically has twelve 36-MHz channels which can be
used for voice, data, or television signals. Early communications satellites
had some 12 to 20 transponders, and the later satellites have up to 27 or more
transponders. INTELSAT 5, for example, has a total of 27 or more transponders
providing 24,500 data/voice channels, one transponder providing two 17.5-MHz TV
channels, and one SPADE transponder with 800 channels. SPADE (Single carrier
per channel, Pulse code modulation, multiple Access, Demand assignment) is a
digital telephone service which reserves a pool of channels in the satellite
for use on a demand-assignment basis. SPADE circuits can be activated on a
demand basis between different countries and used for long or short periods of
time as needed.
Propagation Delay:
The approximate quarter second one-way propagation delay in satellite
communications affects both voice telephone and data communications. Users of
voice communications via satellite links face two objectionable
characteristics; delayed speech and return echoes. Echo suppressors are
installed to reduce the return echoes to an acceptable level. Data
communications operations face more serious problems caused by propagation
delay. Line protocol and error detection/correction schemes are slowed down
dramatically by the quarter second of delay. User response time requirements
can be difficult to meet because of these cumulative effects.
Satellite delay compensation units are available to ensure a connection and
afford better operation for the terrestrial communications terminal that were
never designed to deal with the propagation delay of communications satellites.
One delay compensation unit is required at each final destination. The units
reformat the data into larger effective transmission blocks so that
retransmision requests are sent back less frequently. This reduces the number
of line turnarounds, each of which requires about a quarter second to go from
or return to the destination terminal or computer. One error detection and
correction method used, called GO-BACK-N, requires that all blocks of data held
in the transmitting buffer, back to the one with the error in it, must be
retransmitted. A more efficient method is to retransmit only the block of data
with the error, but this requires more logic in the equipment at each end.
Link to Earth Stations:
Most users cannot afford a satellite earth station, so a land line is needed
for a connection to the nearest earth station (Which they tell me is 65,000 bps
for a leased line). Because of the great distance the signal must travel in
space, the relatively short distance between the two users on earth becomes
insignificant and actually does not affect the operating cost. It is generally
not economical. This is particularly true of high-capacity or broadband
applications. Even though operating costs are insensitive to distance,
satellite companies may still charge more for longer distances based on
terrestrial line competition.
Nonterrestrial Problems:
The nonterrestrial portion of satellite communications bypasses the problems
encountered with broken phone lines, etc., but it has its own unique set of
problems. Since satellite communications employ high-frequency microwave
radio transmission, careful planning is required to avoid interference between
the satellite and other microwave systems. Eclipses of the sun, and even the
moon, can cause trouble because they cut off the source of energy for the
satellite's solar batteries. Backup batteries are used to resolve most of
these difficulties, but the problem that is the most severe is when the sun
gets directly behind the satellite and becomes a source of unacceptable noise.
This occurs 10 times a year for about 10 min each time. In order to obtain
uninterrupted service, an earth station must have a second dish antenna a short
distance away or the single dish antenna must have access to another satellite.
Accessing the Satellite:
There are three methods by which multiple users (earth stations) can access the
satellite. The first is frequency-division multiple access (FDMA), whereby the
total bandwidth is divided into separate frequency channels assigned to the
users. Each user has a channel, which could remain idle if that user had no
traffic. Time-division multiple access (TDMA) provides each user with a
particular time slot or multiple time slots. Here the channels are shared, but
some time slots could be idle if a user has no traffic to offer. With
code-division multiple access (CDMA) each user can utilize the full bandwidth
at any time by employing a unique code to identify the user's traffic. There
are, of course, trade-offs among the three methods; they involve error rate,
block size, throughput, interference, and cost.
Advantages:
o Satellite lines are exceptionally well suited for broadband applications
such as voice, television, and picture-phone, and the quality of
transmission is high.
o Satellite lines are generally less expensive for all voice and data
types of transmission, whether it be dial-up or a leased line that is not
short. This is particularly true of overseas transmissions, and there is
no underwater cable to create maintenance problems.
Disadvantages:
o The propagation delay of about a quarter second way requires the
participants of a voice conversation so slightly delay their responses to
make sure no more conversation is still on the way. The propagation delay
has more of a severe effect on the transmission of data, and the effect
becomes more pronounced with high speeds, half duplex operation, smaller
blocks of data, and polling. Satellite delay units, front end processors,
multiplexers, and other devices have been designed to get around these
problems, but there is no solution to the half second lost in total
response time for interactive applications.
o Some of the modems currently in use today have not been designed to handle
the long delay of the initial connection via satellite, and the result can
be a lost connection. This can be frustrating when the common carrier
elects to use satellite lines for regular dial-up calls up to say, 55
percent of all calls out of a particular city during the busy traffic
periods.
Closing:
Satellite communications is a very interesting topic to study. Perhaps even
the present/and future satellite and Ham radio "Hackers" will one day be
running a Bulletin Board off of a WESTSTAR satellite -- Who's to say there
isn't one now? (Devious Snicker)
--Scott Holiday
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 21, File 6 of 11
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
<> <>
<> Organizations Supporting The Telecommunications Network Operations <>
<> <>
<> NETWORK MANAGEMENT CENTER <>
<> _____________________________________________________ <>
<> | | <>
<> | A description of the Network Management Center/NMC | <>
<> | and its role in providing the best possible service | <>
<> | to the customers of the telecommunications network. | <>
<> |_____________________________________________________| <>
<> <>
<> Brought to you by <>
<> Knight Lightning & Taran King <>
<> <>
<> August 9, 1988 <>
<> <>
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Introduction To Network Management - Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Modern Telecommunications Networks, relying on direct customer input and common
and stored program controlled switching, are generally very reliable and have
provided the means to supply low cost telecommunication service to all who
desire it. Because these networks are designed on the probability that all
customers do not require service simultaneously, they are engineered and
equipped to provide acceptable levels of service during normal traffic load
periods. When customer demands or equipment malfunctions cause a deviation
from the engineered requirements or heavier than normal calling occurs, modern
networks can become congested and network throughput can be affected.
Network Management provides a means to improve the
performance of the network during these contingencies.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Purpose And Objectives
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Network Management Centers purpose is to provide the constant surveillance
and control activities necessary to maintain the network at its optimum level
of performance. This includes the Bell Operating Company (BOC) Intra-Lata
Networks and Inter-Exchange Facilities and Circuits.
NMC's objective is to meet customer and market needs and expectations, and at
the same time, maximize revenues derived from the provision of network service.
While the NMC cannot guarantee a certain level of service to the customer, it
can ensure the most effective use of existing network capacity in all
situations. This will result in:
- More completed calls
- Higher return on network capital investment
- Better customer service
- Protection of essential services such as 911, during abnormal network
situations
- Ensuring equal access
- Assisting in national security and emergency preparedness
The NMC has the capability to alter or change the switching network on a near
real-time basis. This is accomplished thru Network Control Actions in the
switching machines. Control messages from the NMC are acted upon by the
switching machines to either expand capacity by utilizing idle equipment and
trunks or to restrict the network by denying access to traffic that has a poor
chance of completion, thereby freeing equipment and trunks for traffic that has
a good chance of completion.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Principles And Responsibilities Of Operations
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In accomplishing the purpose and objective of the NMC, decision on network
control actions are guided by standard principle applicable to switching
technology or network architecture. All network management control actions are
generally based upon at least one of the standard principles.
Inhibit Switching Congestion
----------------------------
Large numbers of ineffective attempts in a switching machine due to traffic
overload or equipment malfunctions can exceed the engineered capacity of the
system. If not controlled, this congestion can spread to other connected
switching systems. Network management controls are available that remove
ineffective attempts to a congested machine, inhibiting switching congestion
and preventing its spread to adjacent switching systems.
Use All Available Trunks
------------------------
The switching network is sized and equipped to accommodate the average business
day calling requirements. Focused overloads (storms, holidays, floods, and
civil disturbances) can often result in greatly increased calling patterns for
which the network is not designed. This aberration can also be caused by
facility failures and switching system outages. In these cases some trunk
groups are greatly overloaded while others may be virtually idle. Network
management reroutes can be activated in many of these cases to use temporary
idle capacity in the network, thereby completing calls that would otherwise be
blocked.
Keep All Trunks Filled With Messages
------------------------------------
A message is a completed call. Since the network is normally trunk limited, it
is important to optimize the ratio of messages (revenue) to non-messages (non
revenue producing) on any trunk group. When unusual or abnormal conditions
occur in the network that cause increased short holding time calls (non-message
such as busy tone, reorder tone, recorded announcement, and high-and-dry - dead
air), the number of carried messages decreases because non-message traffic is
occupying a larger percentage of system capacity. Network management controls
are designed to reduce non-message traffic and allow more calls to complete.
This results in higher customer satisfaction and increased revenue for the
industry.
Give Priority To Single-Link Connections
----------------------------------------
In networks designed to automatically alternate route calls, the most efficient
use of available trunking occurs when traffic loads are at (or below) normal
engineered values. When the engineered traffic load is exceeded, more calls
alternate route and therefore are required to use more than one trunk in order
to complete a call. During overload situations, the use of more than one trunk
to complete a call occurs more often and the possibility of a multilink call
blocking other call attempts is greatly increased. Thus, in some cases, it
becomes necessary to use network management controls to limit alternate routing
in order to give first routed traffic a reasonable chance to complete more
calls on the network than would otherwise be completed.
The responsibility of the Network Management Center is far-reaching, affecting
many work groups and organizations both in Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,
other telephone companies, and the customers.
The NMC provides:
- Real-time surveillance and control of the switching network
- Identifying abnormal network situations
- A centralized point for information to higher management, IC's,
Independent Companies, and other BOC's.
- A focal point for national security and emergency preparedness concerns
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The System -- A Picture
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Network Management System consists of three major components: The
switching network itself, the data gathering support system, and the
surveillance and control system (NMC).
The NMC is driven by customer actions in the switching network which are
recorded and displayed via the EADAS/NM (Engineering Administration Data
Acquisition System for Network Management). Network management control actions
are directed from the CRT to the switching network via the same system.
Diagram;
Switching Data Gathering NMC Surveillance
Network System and Control
____________ __________________ ______________________
/ / / \n ____________ ___ _______________
| |_______________________| | | |
| Access | | E | /| Display Board |
| Tandem | ___ | A | / |_______________|
| | | |__________| D | /
| End Office |________| E | Data | A |/
| | | A |__________| S |\n | Equal | | D | Network | / | \n | Access | | A | Controls | N | \n | End Office | | S |__________| M | \n |____________| |___| | | __________________
| | | | |
_|_ | | | Cathode Ray Tube |
/ | | |__________________|
\___/ |___|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Introducing: The Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
Network Management Centers
___________________
| |
___| Southwestern Bell |__________________________________________
| | Corporations | | | |
| |___________________| ______|_______ ______|_______ ______|_______
| | || || |
| | SW Bell || SW Bell || SW Bell |
| |Mobile Systems|| Telecom || Publications |
| |______________||______________||______________|
__|________________
| |
| Southwestern Bell |
| Telephone |
|___________________|
|
|----> Little Rock NMC Arkansas (Non EADAS/NM) (501)373-5126
|----> St. Louis NMC Missouri & Kansas (314)658-6044
|----> Oklahoma City NMC Oklahoma (405)278-5511 *
|----> Dallas NMC North Texas (214)464-2164
|----> Houston NMC South Texas (713)850-5662 *
* - After hours, this number goes to a beeper,
at the tone, dial in your telephone number.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Summary
~~~~~~~
Network Management is the term used to describe a variety of activities
associated with improving network traffic flow and customer service when
abnormal conditions (unusual traffic patterns or equipment failures) may have
resulted in a congested inefficient network. These activities include the
application of network controls when and where necessary and planning the means
by which the impact of network overloads can be minimized.
Network Management is based upon the use of near real-time trunk group and
switching system data and the ability to implement appropriate network controls
thru the use of EADAS/NM.
Network Management is concerned with completing as many calls as possible
within the Intra-Lata network and providing equal treatment for the traffic
flow to and from all inter-exchange carriers.
"The Future Is Forever"
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 21, File 7 of 11
()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()
() ()
() Non-Published Numbers ()
() ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ()
() An Observation Of Illinois Bell ()
() ()
() by Patrick Townson ()
() of The Portal System (TM) ()
() ()
() Special Thanks to Hatchet Molly ()
() ()
()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()
All examples in this message pertain to Illinois Bell Telephone Company, which
covers the Chicago metropolitan area, and quite a bit of the rest of Illinois.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
There are three types of phone numbers which do not appear in the printed and
publicly available directory;
(1) Too new to list
(2) Non-listed
(3) Non-published
The third category of numbers not in the phone book or available from the
Directory Assistance Bureau are non-published numbers. Non-published numbers
are NOT available at the directory Assistance level. Inquiries about same
which are input into a DA (Directory Assistance) terminal simply come up with a
message that "at the customer's request, the number is not listed in our
records; the number is non-published."
Well, who does keep non-pub records then? The Business Office has no handy way
to retrieve them, since they depend on an actual phone number when they pull up
a record to discuss an account. Once a service order is processed, the number
and associated name are no longer available to the average worker in the
central office.
There was for several years a small group known as the "NonPub Number Bureau"
which at the time was located in Hinsdale, Illinois. Needless to say, the
phone number to the NonPub Number Bureau was itself non-published, and was only
available to specified employees at Illinois Bell who were deemed to have a
"need to know clearance." Now with all the records being highly computerized,
the keepers of the Non-Pub phone numbers are themselves scattered around from
one phone office to another.
When there is some specific need for an employee at the phone company to
acquire the non-published number of a subscriber, then certain security
precautions kick into place. Only a tiny percentage of telephone company
employees are deemed to have a "need to know clearance" in the first place;
among these would be the GCO's (Group Chief Operators), certain management
people in the central offices, certain people in the Treasury/Accounting
office, and of course, security representatives both from Illinois Bell and the
various long distance carriers, such as AT&T, US. Sprint, and MCI.
Let us have a hypothetical example for our correspondent; Your mother has taken
seriously ill, and is on her deathbed. Your brother is unable to reach you to
notify you of this because you have a non-pub number. When his request for the
number has been turned down by Directory Assistance, simply because they do not
have it, he asks to speak with a supervisor, and he explains the problem. He
provides his own name and telephone number, and the supervisor states he will
be called back at a later time. The supervisor does not question if in fact an
emergency exists, which is the only valid reason for breaking security. The
supervisor may, if they are doing their job correctly, ask the inquirer point
blank, "Are you stating there is an emergency situation?"
Please bear in mind that the law in Illinois and in many other states says that
if a person claims that an emergency exists in order to influence the use (or
discontinuance of use) of the telephone when in fact there is no emergency is
guilty of a misdemeanor crime. You say yes this is an emergency and I need to
contact my brother/sister/etc right away. The supervisor will then talk to
his/her supervisor, who is generally of the rank of Chief Operator for that
particular facility.
The Chief Operator will call the NonPub people, will identify herself, and
*leave her own call back number*. The NonPub people will call back to verify
the origin of the call, and only then will there be information given out
regards your brother's telephone number. It helps if you know the *exact* way
the name appears in the records, and the *exact* address; if there is more than
one of that name with non-pub service, they may tell you they are unable to
figure out who it is you want.
The NonPub person will then call the subscriber with the non-published number
and explain to them what has occurred, "So and so has contacted one of our
operators and asked for assistance in reaching you. The party states that it
is a family emergency which requires your immediate attention. Would it be
alright if we give him/her your number, or would you prefer to call them back
yourself?"
Based on the answer given, the number is either relayed back to the Chief
Operator, or a message is relayed back saying the non-pub customer has been
notified. If the customer says it is okay to pass his number, then the Chief
Operator will call you back, ask who YOU are, rather than saying WHO she wants,
and satisfied with your identification will give you the number you are seeking
or will advise you that your brother has been given the message by someone from
our office, and has said he will contact you.
Before the NonPub people will even talk to you, your 'call back number' has to
be on their list of approved numbers for that purpose. A clerk in the Business
office cannot imitate a Chief Operator for example, simply because NonPub would
say that the number you are asking us to call back to is not on our list.
"Tell your supervisor what it is you are seeking and have them call us..."
Other emergency type requests for non-pub numbers would be a big fire at some
business place in the middle of the night, and the owners of the company must
be notified at their home; or a child is found wandering by the police and the
child is too young to know his parent's (non-pub) number.
They will also handle non-emergency requests, but only if they are of some
importance and not frivolous in nature. You have just come to our city to
visit and are seeking a long lost friend who has a non-pub number; you are
compiling the invitations to your high school class fiftieth re-union and find
a class member is non-pub. Within certain reasonable limits, they will pass
along your request to the desired party and let them make the choice of whether
to return the call or not. But always, you leave your phone number with them,
and in due time someone will call you back to report what has been said or
done.
You would be surprised -- or maybe you wouldn't -- at the numerous scams and
stories people tell the phone company to get the non-pub numbers of someone
else. Fortunately, Bell takes a great deal of pride in their efforts to
protect the privacy of their subscribers.
-PT
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 21, File 8 of 11
``````````````````````````````\n ` `\n ` BLOCKING OF LONG-DISTANCE CALLS `\n ` by Jim Schmickley `\n ` `\n ` Hawkeye PC, Cedar Rapids, Iowa `\n ` `\n ` Special Thanks To Hatchet Molly `\n ` `\n ``````````````````````````````\n
SUMMARY -- This file describes the "blocking" by one long-distance telephone
company of access through their system to certain telephone numbers,
particularly BBS numbers. The blocking is applied in a very arbitrary manner,
and the company arrogantly asserts that BBS SYSOPS and anyone who uses a
computer modem are "hackers."
The company doesn't really want to discuss the situation, but it appears the
following scenario occurred. The proverbial "person or persons unknown"
identified one or more "valid" long-distance account numbers, and subsequently
used those numbers on one or more occasions to fraudulently call a legitimate
computer bulletin board system (BBS). When the long-distance company
discovered the fraudulent charges, they "blocked" the line without bothering to
investigate or contacting the BBS System Operator to obtain his assistance. In
fact, the company did not even determine the sysop's name.
The long-distance carrier would like to pretend that the incident which
triggered the actions described in this article was an isolated situation, not
related to anything else in the world. However, there are major principles of
free, uninhibited communications and individual rights deeply interwoven into
the issue. And, there is still the lingering question, "If one long-distance
company is interfering with their customers' communications on little more than
a whim, are other long-distant companies also interfering with the American
public's right of free 'electronic speech'?"
CALL TO ACTION -- Your inputs and protests are needed now to counter the
long-distance company's claims that "no one was hurt by their blocking actions
because nobody complained." Obviously nobody complained for a long time
because the line blocking was carried out in such a manner that no one
realized, until April 1988, what was being done.
Please read through the rest of this article and judge for yourself. Then,
please write to the organizations listed at the end of the article; insist that
your right to telephone whatever number you choose should not be impaired by
the arbitrary decision of some telephone company bureaucrat who really doesn't
care about the rights of his customers. Protest in the strongest terms. And,
remember, the rights you save WILL BE YOUR OWN!
SETTING THE SCENE -- Teleconnect is a long-distance carrier and telephone
direct marketing company headquartered in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The company is
about eight years old, and has a long-distance business base of approximately
200,000 customers. Teleconnect has just completed its first public stock
offering, and is presently (August 1988) involved in a merger which will make
it the nation's fourth-largest long-distance carrier. It is a very rapidly
growing company, having achieved its spectacular growth by offering long
distance service at rates advertised as being 15% to 30% below AT&T's rates.
When Teleconnect started out in the telephone interconnection business,
few, if any, exchanges were set up for "equal access," so the company set up a
network of local access numbers (essentially just unlisted local PABXs -
Private Automatic Branch eXchanges) and assigned a six-digit account number to
each customer. Later, a seventh "security" digit was added to all account
numbers. Teleconnect now offers direct "equal access" dialing on most
exchanges, but the older access number/account code system is still in place
for those exchanges which do not offer "equal access." That system is still
very useful for customers who place calls from their offices or other locations
away from home.
"BLOCKING" DISCOVERED -- In early April 1988, a friend mentioned that
Teleconnect was "blocking" certain telephone lines where they detected computer
tone. In particular, he had been unable to call Curt Kyhl's Stock Exchange BBS
in Waterloo, Iowa. This sounded like something I should certainly look into,
so I tried to call Curt's BBS.
CONTACT WITH TELECONNECT -- Teleconnect would not allow my call to go through.
Instead, I got a recorded voice message stating that the call was a local call
from my location. A second attempt got the same recorded message. At least,
they were consistent.
I called my Teleconnect service representative and asked just what the problem
was. After I explained what happened, she suggested that it must be a local
call. I explained that I really didn't think a 70 mile call from Cedar Rapids
to Waterloo was a local call. She checked on the situation and informed me
that the line was being "blocked." I asked why, and she "supposed it was at
the customer's request." After being advised that statement made no sense, she
admitted she really didn't know why. So, on to her supervisor.
The first level supervisor verified the line was being "blocked by Teleconnect
security," but she couldn't or wouldn't say why. Then, she challenged, "Why do
you want to call that number?" That was the wrong question to ask this unhappy
customer, and the lady quickly discovered that bit of information was none of
her business. On to her supervisor...
The second level supervisor refused to reveal any information of value to
a mere customer, but she did suggest that any line Teleconnect was blocking
could still be reached through AT&T or Northwestern Bell by dialing 10288-1.
When questioned why Teleconnect, which for years had sold its long-distance
service on the basis of a cost-saving over AT&T rates, was now suggesting that
customers use AT&T, the lady had no answer.
I was then informed that, if I needed more information, I should contact
Dan Rogers, Teleconnect's Vice President for Customer Service. That sounded
good; "Please connect me." Then, "I'm sorry, but Mr. Rogers is out of town,
and won't be back until next week." "Next week?" "But he does call in
regularly. Maybe he could call you back before that." Mr. Rogers did call me
back, later that day, from Washington, D.C. where he and some Teleconnect
"security people" were attending a conference on telephone security.
TELECONNECT RESPONDS, A LITTLE -- Dan Rogers prefaced his conversation with,
"I'm just the mouthpiece; I don't understand all the technical details. Our
security people are blocking that number because we've had some problems with
it in the past." I protested that the allegation of "problems" didn't make
sense because the number was for a computer bulletin board system operated by a
reputable businessman, Curt Kyhl.
Mr. Rogers said that I had just given Teleconnect new information; they had not
been able to determine whose number they were blocking. "Our people are good,
but they're not that good. Northwestern Bell won't release subscriber
information to us." And, when he got back to his office the following Monday,
he would have the security people check to see if the block could be removed.
The following Monday, another woman from Teleconnect called to inform me that
they had checked the line, and they were removing the block from it. She added
the comment that this was the first time in four years that anyone had
requested that a line be unblocked. I suggested that it probably wouldn't be
the last time.
In a later telephone conversation, Dan Rogers verified that the block had been
removed from Curt Kyhl's line, but warned that the line would be blocked
again "if there were any more problems with it." A brief, non-conclusive
discussion of Teleconnect's right to take such action then ensued. I added
that the fact that Teleconnect "security" had been unable to determine the
identity of the SYSOP of the blocked board just didn't make sense; that it
didn't sound as if the "security people" were very competent. Mr. Rogers then
admitted that every time the security people tried to call the number, they
got a busy signal (and, although Mr. Rogers didn't admit it, they just "gave
up," and arbitrarily blocked the line). Oh, yes, the lying voice message,
"This is a local call...," was not intended to deceive anyone according to Dan
Rogers. It was just that Teleconnect could only put so many messages on their
equipment, and that was the one they selected for blocked lines.
BEGINNING THE PAPER TRAIL -- Obviously, Teleconnect was not going to pay much
attention to telephone calls from mere customers. On April 22, Ben Blackstock,
practicing attorney and veteran sysop, wrote to Mr. Rogers urging
that Teleconnect permit their customers to call whatever numbers they desired.
Ben questioned Teleconnect's authority to block calls, and suggested that such
action had serious overlays of "big brother." He also noted that "you cannot
punish the innocent to get at someone who is apparently causing Teleconnect
difficulty."
Casey D. Mahon, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Teleconnect,
replied to Ben Blackstock's letter on April 28th. This response was the start
of Teleconnect's seemingly endless stream of vague, general allegations
regarding "hackers" and "computer billboards." Teleconnect insisted they did
have authority to block access to telephone lines, and cited 18 USC
2511(2)(a)(i) as an example of the authority. The Teleconnect position was
summed up in the letter:
"Finally, please be advised the company is willing to 'unblock' the line in
order to ascertain whether or not illegal hacking has ceased. In the
event, however, that theft of Teleconnect long distance services through
use of the bulletin board resumes, we will certainly block access through
the Teleconnect network again and use our authority under federal law to
ascertain the identity of the hacker or hackers."
THE GAUNTLET IS PICKED UP -- Mr. Blackstock checked the cited section of the
U.S. Code, and discovered that it related only to "interception" of
communications, but had nothing to do with "blocking." He advised me of his
opinion and also wrote back to Casey Mahon challenging her interpretation of
that section of federal law.
In his letter, Ben noted that, "Either Teleconnect is providing a communication
service that is not discriminatory, or it is not." He added that he would
"become upset, to say the least" if he discovered that Teleconnect was blocking
access to his BBS. Mr. Blackstock concluded by offering to cooperate with
Teleconnect in seeking a declaratory judgment regarding their "right" to block
a telephone number based upon the actions of some third party. To date,
Teleconnect has not responded to that offer.
On May 13th, I sent my own reply to Casey Mahon, and answered the issues of her
letter point by point. I noted that even I, not an attorney, knew the
difference between "interception" and "blocking", and if Teleconnect didn't,
they could check with any football fan. My letter concluded:
"Since Teleconnect's 'blocking' policies are ill-conceived, thoughtlessly
arbitrary, anti-consumer, and of questionable legality, they need to be
corrected immediately. Please advise me how Teleconnect is revising these
policies to ensure that I and all other legitimate subscribers will have
uninhibited access to any and all long-distance numbers we choose to call."
Casey Mahon replied on June 3rd. Not unexpectedly, she brushed aside all
my arguments. She also presented the first of the sweeping generalizations,
with total avoidance of specifics, which we have since come to recognize as a
Teleconnect trademark. One paragraph neatly sums Casey Mahon's letter:
"While I appreciate the time and thought that obviously went into your
letter, I do not agree with your conclusion that Teleconnect's efforts to
prevent theft of its services are in any way inappropriate. The
inter-exchange industry has been plagued, throughout its history, by
individuals who devote substantial ingenuity to the theft of long distance
services. It is not unheard of for an interexchange company to lose as
much as $500,000 a month to theft. As you can imagine, such losses, over a
period of time, could drive a company out of business."
ESCALATION -- By this time it was very obvious that Teleconnect was going to
remain recalcitrant until some third party, preferably a regulatory agency,
convinced them of the error of their ways. Accordingly, I assembled the file
and added a letter of complaint addressed to the Iowa Utilities Board. The
complaint simply asked that Teleconnect be directed to institute appropriate
safeguards to ensure that "innocent third parties" would no longer be adversely
affected by Teleconnect's arbitrary "blocking" policies.
My letter of complaint was dated July 7, 1988 and the Iowa Utilities Board
replied on July 13, 1988. The The reply stated that Teleconnect was required
to respond to my complaint by August 2, 1988, and the Board would then propose
a resolution. If the proposed resolution was not satisfactory, I could request
that the file be reopened and the complaint be reconsidered. If the results
of that action were not satisfactory, a formal hearing could be requested.
After filing the complaint, I also sent a copy of the file to Congressman Tom
Tauke. Mr. Tauke represents the Second Congressional District of Iowa, which
includes Cedar Rapids, and is also a member of the House Telecommunications
Subcommittee. I have subsequently had a personal conversation with Mr. Tauke
as well as additional correspondence on the subject. He seems to have a deep
and genuine interest in the issue, but at my request, is simply an interested
observer at this time. It is our hope that the Iowa Utilities Board will
propose an acceptable resolution without additional help.
AN UNRESPONSIVE RESPONSE -- Teleconnect's "response" to the Iowa Utilities
Board was filed July 29, 1988. As anticipated, it was a mass of vague
generalities and unsubstantiated allegations. However, it offered one item of
new, and shocking, information; Curt Kyhl's BBS had been blocked for ten
months, from June 6, 1987 to mid-April 1988. (At this point it should be noted
that Teleconnect's customers had no idea that the company was blocking some of
our calls. We just assumed that calls weren't going through because of
Teleconnect's technical problems).
Teleconnect avoided putting any specific, or even relevant, information in
their letter. However, they did offer to whisper in the staff's ear;
"Teleconnect would be willing to share detailed information regarding this
specific case, and hacking in general, with the Board's staff, as it has in the
past with various federal and local law enforcement agencies, including the
United States Secret Service. Teleconnect respectfully requests, however, that
the board agree to keep such information confidential, as to do otherwise would
involve public disclosure of ongoing investigations of criminal conduct and the
methods by which interexchange carriers, including Teleconnect, detect such
theft."
There is no indication of whether anyone felt that such a "confidential"
meeting would violate Iowa's Open Meetings Law. Nobody apparently questioned
why, during a ten-months long "ongoing investigation," Teleconnect seemed
unable to determine the name of the individual whose line they were blocking.
Of course, whatever they did was justified because in their own words,
"Teleconnect had suffered substantial dollar losses as a result of the theft of
long distance services by means of computer 'hacking' utilizing the computer
billboard which is available at that number."
Teleconnect's most vile allegation was, "Many times, the hacker will enter the
stolen authorization code on computer billboards, allowing others to steal long
distance services by utilizing the code." But no harm was done by the blocking
of the BBS number because, "During the ten month period the number was blocked,
Teleconnect received no complaints from anyone claiming to be the party to whom
the number was assigned." The fact that Curt Kyhl had no way of knowing his
line was being blocked might have had something to do with the fact that he
didn't complain.
It was also pointed out that I really had no right to complain since, "First,
and foremost, Mr. Schmickley is not the subscriber to the number." That is
true, I'm just a long-time Teleconnect customer who was refused service because
of an alleged act performed by an unknown third party.
Then Teleconnect dumped on the Utilities Board staff a copy of a seven page
article from Business Week Magazine, entitled "Is Your Computer Secure?" This
article was totally unrelated to the theft of long-distance service, except for
an excerpt from a sidebar story about a West German hackers' club. The story
reported that, "In 1984, Chaos uncovered a security hole in the videotex system
that the German telephone authority, the Deutsche Bundespost, was building.
When the agency ignored club warnings that messages in a customer's private
electronic mailbox weren't secure, Chaos members set out to prove the point.
They logged on to computers at Hamburger Sparkasse, a savings bank, and
programmed them to make thousands of videotex calls to Chaos headquarters on
one weekend. After only two days of this, the bank owed the Bundespost $75,000
in telephone charges."
RESOLUTION WITH A RUBBER STAMP -- The staff of the Iowa Utilities Board replied
to my complaint by letter on August 19, 1988. They apparently accepted the
vague innuendo submitted by Teleconnect without any verification; "Considering
the illegal actions reportedly to be taking place on number (319) 236-0834, it
appears the blocking was reasonable. However, we believe the Board should be
notified shortly after the blocking and permission should be obtained to
continue the blocking for any period of time."
However, it was also noted that, "Iowa Code 476.20 (1) (1987) states, 'A
utility shall not, except in cases of emergency, discontinue, reduce, or impair
service to a community or a part of a community, except for nonpayment of
account or violation of rules and regulations, unless and until permission to
do so is obtained from the Board." The letter further clarified, "Although the
Iowa Code is subject to interpretation, it appears to staff that 'emergency'
refers to a relatively short time..."
CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE -- Since it appeared obvious that the Utilities Board
staff had not questioned or investigated a single one of Teleconnect's
allegations, the staff's response was absolutely astounding. Accordingly, I
filed a request for reconsideration on August 22nd.
Three points were raised in the request for reconsideration;
(1) The staff's evaluation should have been focused on the denial of
service to me and countless others of Teleconnect's 200,000 customers,
and not just on the blocking of incoming calls to one BBS.
(2) The staff accepted all of Teleconnect's allegations as fact, although
not one bit of hard evidence was presented in support of those
allegations.
(3) In the words of the staff's own citation, it appeared that Teleconnect
had violated Iowa Code 476.20 (1) (1987) continuously over a ten
months' period, perhaps as long as four years.
Since Teleconnect had dumped a seven page irrelevant magazine article on the
staff, it seemed only fair to now offer a two page completely relevant story to
them. This was "On Your Computer - Bulletin Boards," from the June 1988 issue
of "Changing Times." This excellent article cited nine BBSs as "good places to
get started." Among the nine listed BBSs was Curt Kyhl's "Stock Exchange,
Waterloo, Iowa (319-236-0834)." Even the geniuses at Teleconnect ought to be
able to recognize that this BBS, recommended by a national magazine, is the
very same one they blocked for ten months.
MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE RANCH -- You are now up-to-date on the entire story.
Now, we are in the process of spreading the word so that all interested people
can contact the Iowa authorities so they will get the message that this case is
much bigger than the blocking of one BBS. YOU can help.
Read the notice appended to this file and ACT. If you are a Teleconnect
customer, it is very important that you write the agencies listed on the
notice. If you are not a Teleconnect customer, but are interested in
preserving your rights to uninhibited communications, you can help the cause by
writing to those agencies, also. Please, people, write now! Before it is too
late!
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
T E L E C O N N E C T C U S T O M E R S
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
If you are user of Teleconnect's long distance telephone service, you
need to be aware of their "blocking" policy:
Teleconnect has been "lashing out" against the callers of bulletin boards
and other "computer numbers" by blocking access of legitimate subscribers
to certain phone numbers to which calls have been made with fraudulent
Teleconnect charge numbers. Curt Kyhl's Stock Exchange Bulletin Board in
Waterloo has been "blocked" in such a manner. Teleconnect representatives
have indicated that other "computer numbers" have been the objects of
similar action in the past, and that they (Teleconnect) have a "right" to
continue such action in the future.
Aside from the trampling of individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights of the U.S. Constitution, this arbitrary action serves only to
"punish the innocent" Teleconnect customers and bulletin board operators,
while doing absolutely nothing to identify, punish, or obtain payment from
the guilty. The capping irony is that Teleconnect, which advertises as
offering significant savings over AT&T long-distance rates, now suggests to
complaining customers that the blocked number can still be dialed through
AT&T.
Please write to Teleconnect. Explain how long you have been a customer,
that your modem generates a significant amount of the revenue they collect
from you, and that you strongly object to their arbitrarily deciding what
numbers you may or may not call. Challenge their "right" to institute a
"blocking" policy and insist that the policy be changed. Send your
protests to:
Teleconnect Company
Mr. Dan Rogers, Vice President for Customer Service
500 Second Avenue, S.E.
Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52401
A complaint filed with the Iowa Utilities Board has been initially resolved
in favor of Teleconnect. A request for reconsideration has been filed, and
the time is NOW for YOU to write letters to the State of Iowa. Please
write NOW to:
Mr. Gerald W. Winter, Supervisor, Consumer Services
Iowa State Utilities Board
Lucas State Office Building
Des Moines, Iowa 50319
And to:
Mr. James Maret
Office of the Consumer Advocate
Lucas State Office Building
Des Moines, Iowa 50319
Write now. The rights you save WILL be your own.
After filing a request for reconsideration of my complaint, I received a reply
from the Iowa State Utilities Board which said, in part:
"Thank you for your letter dated August 22, 1988, with additional comments
concerning your complaint on the blocking of access to certain telephone
numbers by Teleconnect.
"To ensure that the issues are properly investigated, we are forwarding
your comments to the company and requesting a response by September 15,
1988."
Again, this is a very large issue. Simply stated; Does ANY telephone company
have the right to "block" (or refuse to place) calls to ANY number on the basis
of unsubstantiated, uninvestigated charges of "telephone fraud," especially
when the alleged fraud was committed by a third party without the knowledge of
the called party? In the specific case, the question becomes; Can a long
distance carrier refuse to handle calls to a BBS solely because some unknown
crook has placed fraudulently-charged calls to that BBS? Incidentally, when
you write, please cite file number C-88-161.
If you have any additional information which might be helpful in this
battle, please let me know.
You can send mail to me via U.S. Mail to: Jim Schmickley
7441 Commune Court, N.E.
Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52402
(See "On The Edge Of Forever" in PWN XXI/1 for an update on this issue. -KL)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 21, File 9 of 11
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN Special Edition PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Phrack World News PWN
PWN Special Edition Issue Two PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Special Thanks To Hatchet Molly PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN Special Edition PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Ed Schwartz Show on WGN Radio 720 AM
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
September, 27-28, 1988
Transcribed by Hatchet Molly
Hello. In this special presentation of Phrack World News, we have the abridged
transcripts from the Ed Schwartz Show, a late night talk show broadcast by
WGN Radio 720 AM - Chicago, Illinois.
The transcripts that appear here in Phrack have been edited for this
presentation. For the most part, I have decided to omit the unrelated chatter
as well as any comments or discussions that are not pertinent to the intent of
Phrack World News. In addition to this, I have also edited the speech somewhat
to make it more intelligible, not an easy task. However, the complete unedited
version of this broadcast can be found on The Phoenix Project (512)441-3088,
sysoped by The Mentor.
:Knight Lightning
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Cast;
A = Anna (Self-proclaimed phone phreak in Kansas City, Missouri)
AA = Sergeant Abagail Abraham (Illinois State Police; Computer Crime Section)
B = Bob (A bulletin board system operator)
BG = Bob Gates (Manager of Corporate Security for Ameritech)
CM = Chuck Moran (Director of Internal Affairs; Ameritech Applied Technologies)
D = Dan (A computer science major at DeVry Technical Institute in Chicago, IL)
ES = Edward Schwartz (Our host)
EZ = Ed Zahdi (A researcher from THE READER, a local publication in Chicago)
G = Gordon (Hatchet Molly, a graduate student at Northern Illinois University)
JM = John F. Maxfield (Our famous friend from BoardScan in Detroit, Michigan)
K = Kevin (A BBS sysop)
L = Louis (A caller)
P = Penny (A victim)
R = Robert (A legal hacker)
R = Ray (A former software pirate)
S = ?? (A consulting engineer)
Also mentioned, but not on the show, was SHADOW HAWK of Chicago, Illinois, who
was recently arrested for theft of software from AT&T, and TOM TCIMPIDIS, a
famous sysop who was arrested for having, unknown to him, AT&T Calling Card
numbers on his legal bulletin board.
^*^
ES: It's 12 minutes after the hour. The hour, of course, is eleven o'clock. We
have a tremendous amount of commerce that goes on late at night and in the
early morning. When I say commerce I'm talking about computer operations
of all kind from keypunching to tabulating - you name it.
We've done two programs with Ed Zahdi who is the researcher from THE READER
(the weekly newspaper) from the "straight dope" column. Ed Zahdi does the
research and on two appearances (on two Friday nights) within the last year
or so on this program Ed Zahdi has received a number of phone calls...
about computer hacking, about people whose telephones mysteriously ring in
the middle of the night -- or almost any time of the day but constantly do
so and they pick up the phone and there's nobody there.
The last time Ed Zahdi was on, we were flooded with calls from people who
claimed that;
o There are all kinds of telemarketing people who are ringing telephones.
o That the phone company is testing phones and you don't know it.
o That the phone network gets tested every day and everybody's phone rings
once or for half a ring and nobody's ever there.
I was amazed at the number and type of calls that came in. We called the
phone company and we asked for some cooperation and tonight we are having
as guests not only Mr. Ed Zahdi from THE READER, but also Mr. Chuck Moran,
the Director of Internal Affairs from Ameritech Applied Technologies. We
also have Mr. Bob Gates, Manager of Corporate Security for Ameritech.
We're gonna get into this whole thing as to whether or not people are using
and abusing the phone networks. Whether or not computer hackers are
ferreting out phone numbers with computers. Whether or not you can really
program a computer to randomly ring every telephone in the city or not.
If you're a computer person hang around. We're also going to talk about
some of the things that the phone company and other allied businesses are
doing to catch up with the computer hackers.
JC: Well, that sounds interesting to me.
ES: Well now are you ready for this? The Bureau of Criminal Investigation of
the Illinois State Police has a computer fraud unit.
JC: Uh-huh
ES: And do you know what they like to do?
JC: What do they like to do?
ES: Lock up computer hackers. Tonight we're going have the computer hackers
running for the hills! Well maybe I should say "typing for the hills" huh?
JC: Probably! (chuckle)
ES: Because they don't run...most of them are couch potatoes.
JC: That's right!
ES: Glad to see you here Ed.
EZ: Glad to be here Ed. In In the "straight dope" we deal with all kinds of
questions one of the questions we got onto was the question of ghost
rings. People would hear these things primarily at night.
ES: On their home phone?
EZ: On their home phone. What would happen is that they'd be sitting at home
and the telephone would ring for a half a ring or a whole ring or maybe
even two rings. They would pick it up and nobody would be there. And I'd
heard about this in the past. I thought it was some peculiarity of buying
a phone from K-Mart or who knows where.
We got easily a dozen calls in the course of the evening from people who
had the same experience happen to them. And it would always, oddly
enough, happen at the same time of the night or on the same day of the
week at the same time of the night and it was pretty eerie.
We got one woman, who I've spoken to several times since who said that she
was an answering service operator and she had whole banks of phones and
sets of these phones would jingle once at a certain time of the night and
then the next day a different set would jingle at a certain time of the
night and then the following week or the following whenever the pattern
would repeat, but nobody was ever there. And so we decided there had to be
some obvious solution to this problem and the speculation at the time was
that it was some sort of a testing program that the phone company had to
check out the trunk lines or something like that.
So, I called up the phone company, Illinois Bell, I called up CenTel,
called up Bell Labs, called up places like that to ask if they knew
anything about it. I asked whether there was a testing program, if not
what explanation could they offer. They said no, there was no testing
program, they had no idea. They had some speculation they thought
conceivably some sort of computer ringing service was involved, but they
didn't have any really clear idea so we came back here a couple of months
ago to talk about it again.
ES: We were swamped with calls again.
EZ: I asked for the woman, whose name is Pat, who was the answering service
operator to give me a call. She did and she volunteered to help us out
and see if we could use her phone system as a guinea pig and have the
telephone company try and find out, if they had means of doing this, what
the source of these ghost rings was. One of the things she pointed out
was that during the Hinsdale fire or during the time that the Hinsdale
switching system was out of operation after the fire there the ghost rings
stopped.
ES: Ahhhh!
EZ: After it was repaired the rings started up again, but they were on a more
irregular basis whereas before they were sort of like clockwork at a given
time of the night.
ES: Uh humm.
EZ: Now the same sets of phones would ring on a given day, but at predictable
times. And it would vary within an hour or so. So what I hoped to do at
that point was to get together with Pat and try and get together with the
phone company at her place and see what we could find out. Unfortunately
she got sick, had a bad infection, so she was out of work for a long time.
ES: Uh humm.
EZ: She has just recently gotten back on the job and I spoke her today and our
plan now is that I'll go over to her place of business on Thursday just to
see for myself and at that point I'm going to call up probably your friend
Ken Went at Illinois Bell.
ES: Head of Security
EZ: We'll see what we can find out and see if they'll do it for cheap 'cuz we
haven't got a whole lot of resources yet. Now the problem is that the
connection only lasts for a split second and I hope that they can find
something out in that short of a period of time in terms of tracing but
its not clear to me that its totally possible.
ES: Now one of the things that we found out when you were here a few
weeks ago on a Friday night was another element to all of this.
Telemarketers have been known to, in terms of getting a hold of people,
ring phones of people whose numbers they don't know.
EZ: We got some real interesting things. There were two basic theories here
that I guess that I should talk about. One is that computer hackers do
this. One of the things that computer hackers do is program their
computers to use their modems their modems to find other computers. When
they find one, there will be a characteristic tone that will tell the
computer on the other end that its reached another computer. If they
don't find a computer they can disconnect real quickly before the
connection is actually made and the charge is placed to their bills. So
they can do this all for free basically. They'll do this routinely to
try and find new locations of computers.
ES: Right.
EZ: So that was one theory. The drawback to that theory is well, why would
they do this repeatedly with a given number? Because obviously if the
computer isn't there Tuesday its not going to be there Friday afternoon.
Why would they try this repeatedly every week. That was one problem. The
second theory that was presented to us was that telemarketing firms do
this to keep their files up to date. They want to find out if given
numbers are still in use or something along those lines.
ES: Cause people do move and people do change their phone numbers.
EZ: Right, so what they do is they dial a number up real quick and hang up
before you can answer it. At least they can detect whether the line is
actually in use. This gives them apparently some useful information. So
these were the two main theories and there were several elaborations on
these that we'll probably hear more about tonight, but those were the
theories that we had. he problem of course as I say is its not clear
exactly what the advantage of doing this on a routine basis, weekly or
whenever would be to the person who is doing it.
ES: There there are some very important elements to all of this. First of all
there was a guy on yesterday morning who apparently filed some lawsuits
against companies that do telemarketing for disturbing him and he is going
to set a precedent that if you are bothered at home by telemarketers that
you can sue them and collect damages.
Not often a lot of money but enough to make them uhh sit up and take
notice and he is trying to teach other people how to sue telemarketing
people.
(Break for commercial followed by re-introductions)
CM: Thank you, Ed. It is our pleasure to be here.
ES: It's a pleasure to have you here. Ameritech Applied Technologies is a
division of Ameritech the phone company, right?
CM: Right. We're a subsidiary of Ameritech that that deals with information
technology needs of the Ameritech family which includes Illinois Bell.
ES: What are some of the things you work on or are responsible for?
CM: I'm responsible for computer security for the Ameritech companies. I also
happen to have auditing for Ameritech Applied Technologies, physical
security for our company. That kind of stuff.
ES: Big job!
CM: Yes. We are involved with hackers regularly all the time.
ES: Good to have you here tonight Chuck. Also I would like to introduce Mr.
Bob Gates, manager of Corporate Security also with Ameritech Applied
Technologies.
BG: Good Morning.
ES: And a good morning to you. Bob previously was a police officer. You have
been in Corporate Security at Ameritech for how long now Bob?
BG: Since divestiture which was in January 1984. Its a much more specialized
field and you deal with one particular aspect of the whole scenario.
ES: Is it correct, are our callers correct? Do you ring people's phones at
various hours of the day and night? Are there "ghost" rings? Are there
people out there playing around? Is it the phone company or is it others?
What's going on?
CM: Well, I've been in this telephone business for 22 years now.
ES Okay now this is the Director of Internal Affairs for Ameritech Applied
Technologies, Mr. Moran, go ahead.
CM: In my days at Illinois Bell, we very often heard these complaints. We
kept trying to find out what it was some of the things the we've
discovered is the computer hackers! They love to scan a prefix and look
for a computer tone. They want a computer to talk to, so it'll ring a
phone. Their computer will ring your phone.
ES: Now this can be done from the bedroom of a thirteen year of a computer
phreak right? Or anybody else for that matter.
CM: If he has got a semi-good computer mind he can do it while he is asleep.
He can program his PC to use his modem to dial your number.
ES: Is most of the computer hacking and unauthorized use of computers done in
the off hours? In other words its not people in business during the day,
right? Would that be basically your computer hacker description?
CM: People still have to live, they still have to have jobs to feed themselves,
and they still have to go to school or go to classes and so your going to
find that since hacking is a hobby, it is going to done during their free
time. Which is typically evenings, weekends, and vacation periods.
ES: I guess what I'm getting at here is I'm trying to establish most of the the
computer related misbehavior comes more from private homes than from
business offices.
CM: No. The studies seem to indicate that 80% of computer abusers are in fact
people in business and are abusing their own company, but that is not going
to cause your phone to ring. The people who are using the network to call
and look for computers are the people which we typically call hackers,
which amount for 15-25% of the computer abuse that goes on in the world.
ES: How concerned is Ameritech and the other technology and phone
companies around the country about all of this?
CM: Well just as any business Ameritech is highly dependent upon information
systems to survive. So we are concerned with whatever risks go with
computer usage.
ES: Did you both see the film WarGames with Matthew Broderick?
CM and BG: Yeah.
ES: Now while the plot is pretty far-out, the theory is workable, correct?
BG: The natural inquisitiveness of the youthful mind, the need to explore.
ES: We've heard stories about computer hackers who have gotten into computers
in government offices, high schools, colleges, and universities. They've
changed grades, added and subtracted information from formulas, and done
all kinds of things.
Payroll records have been changed and we've got a thing now called the
computer virus. We've got a conviction of a guy who is going to jail for
literally destroying a computer program two days after he left the company
and apparently that is something that computer people are very worried
about.
Are we going to end up with a huge number of people called "computer
police" here at some point? To get a handle on all of this, is that what
we need?
BG: I think computer security is just a natural extension of using your
computers to ensure that they are used in a secure manner. That they
aren't tampered with and they aren't abused. To do that you have to take
some degree of effort to protect your computer system.
ES: Is law enforcement geared up to deal with the kinds of crimes that you guys
are working on, investigating and trying to deal with?
BG: Law enforcement does have experts with them. They also have to investigate
everything else that occurs. So it becomes a priority item to private
companies to make a commitment to look at it themselves to protect their
systems and include law enforcement if appropriate.
ES: Is there a naivety on the part of a lot of people that just left computer
systems unguarded.
BG: Yes. In reference to the law enforcement, in our current criminal justice
system I know that in the states that we deal with and the federal agencies
that I have dealt with part of the problem is finding a prosecutor, a
judge, and a jury that understands what a computer crime is, Because they
are not computer literate.
ES: Well stealing information and stealing time are crimes. How about the
stories of computer hackers breaking into computers at nuclear laboratories
like Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in California. This is where they do
the research on nuclear weapons and God knows what else. Think of the
potential of this kind of misbehavior it's frightening.
BG: That's why computer security has become a hot job.
EZ: I'm still trying to focus on my immediate problem here which was the
question of the ghost rings. What I'm hearing you say is that you think
that the ghost rings are primarily the work of hackers.
CM: I think its a very plausible cause.
EZ: The question that people raise about this of course is that you can see it
happening once in a while, but why all the time on a regular basis?
CM: The computer hacker scans prefixes and will set his dialer look for
computer tones. He may find a few numbers and tell two or three friends.
Those two or three friends will now tell two or three other friends. They
will see these numbers and then they will go and scan that whole thousand
number group again.
EZ: I still don't quite see why the ghost rings occur at exactly the same time
all of the time.
CM: I can't answer that.
ES: I respond to that by saying the times are most likely approximate. Most
people's watches aren't perfect and neither are their memories. However
if the majority of the hackers are in high school, then they are probably
going to sleep at about the same time every night and setting their dialers
to run while they are asleep, therefore hitting the same numbers at roughly
the same time every night.
Is it correct to say that they can program these computers to do this work
without any billing information being generated? And how can they do this?
Or is that an area we should stay away from, I don't want to compromise
you guys.
BG: You're talking toll fraud and that's really not my area of expertise. Toll
fraud is a fact of life, but I'm not a toll fraud person.
CM: The presumption is that the billing doesn't kick in for a split second
after the phone is picked up and that is what enables these guys to get
away with this.
BG: Talk to Ken.
ES: Ken will tell you things that you'll never be able to talk about on the
radio or write about I'm afraid. We're going to get into some other
elements of all of this. Are the penalties for computer hackers set to
meet the crime these days? I mean do we catch many of them do they get
punished and does the punishment fit the crime?
CM: The computer hackers that usually get caught are juveniles, which means the
most you can do is keep them in jail until they are 21 and confiscate their
computer equipment. The U.S. Attorneys Office in the Northern District for
Illinois did in fact return a juvenile indictment against a hacker who used
the code name SHADOW HAWK. It made the front page of the Chicago Tribune.
ES: What did he do? Can you tell us?
CM: According to the Tribune, he stole software from AT&T.
ES: This proves that as smart as some of these hackers are, some of them get
caught, maybe even a lot of them get caught. So as hard as they're working
to defy the system apparently you people are working from inside the system
to foil what they are doing and catch them.
CM: Exactly
ES: If you don't prosecute them when you catch then then it will not mean a
thing so does that mean that the various phone companies and their
subsidiaries have got a very serious mood about prosecuting if you catch
people? Is that the way of the future?
CM: Every case is different. Prosecution is always an option.
ES: Are we a couple of years late in dealing with this problem?
BG: The laws typically catch up to the need. You have to identify a problem
before you can really address it.
ES: We have made arrangements thanks to our guests tonight to speak to an
Illinois State police detective sergeant who works on computer fraud;
Sergeant Abagail Abraham.
AA: Good morning I appreciate being here.
ES: Have you been listening to the radio prior to our call?
AA: I've been glued to the radio yes.
ES: Okay. Your unit is called Computer Crime Section?
AA: Sure.
ES: How long have you been in existence?
AA: Since February 1986.
ES: There obviously was a need for it. Do we have enough state laws or state
statutes for you to do what you have to do?
AA: I think so. At the time that the section came into existence, the laws
were not very good. Most computer crimes were misdemeanors until a few
months later when the attorney general held hearings in which we
participated and thus they drafted a law.
ES: Sergeant, is it handled better at the state level as opposed to the federal
level? The gentlemen here from Ameritech mentions that the US Attorneys
Office has recently brought a prosecution here in Northern Illinois. Is
his office going to be doing much more of this or do you see it being done
at a state level?
AA: I think it depends upon the kind of case. Certain cases are probably
better handled at the federal level and certain cases are handled best at
the local. When dealing with the federal agencies, the jurisdiction for
computer fraud is shared between the FBI and the Secret Service. So it
depends upon the nature of the case as to which agency would take it, but
many cases are not appropriate for the federal government to take part in.
ES: Let's say we have a student who changes a grade in a school computer
system. That would be more a state case I would presume than a federal
case right?
AA: Certainly it would be likely to be a state case, we had a case like that.
ES: If you were able to develop a case like that and have evidence, are you
liable to get a conviction? Our guests were saying that the courts don't
necessarily understand all of this. When you go into state court on this
kind of a thing are you getting judges and/or juries who understand what
you're talking about?
AA: Well we have had no cases go to jury trials. As a matter of fact, no cases
have even gone to bench trials because as like the vast majority of cases
in the system they are plead out.
ES: They plead guilty?
AA: We have a 100% conviction rate.
ES: Really!
AA: Our success is based very good cooperation from state's attorneys offices.
We've had no problems bringing our cases to them.
ES: Your data is so good that by the time you make your pinch there is no way
they can talk their way out of it. You've got them dead to rights.
AA: Yeah, we haven't had a problem with that.
ES: What kind of penalties are you getting Sarg?
AA: All of our cases have had a 100% conviction rate, be we haven't had that
many finally adjudicated. They are in various stages because the law is so
new.
ES: I presume that you're going to continue working very hard put more people
in jail.
AA: Yes, it's a growth industry.
ES: Is Director Margolis supportive of what you are doing?
AA: I think so. Our unit came into existence under the prior director, Zegal,
but Director Margolis has been very supportive of our efforts and I suspect
that he will become even more so.
ES: Do people who are victims of computer crime know who to report it to? If
you operate a business and your computer has been violated or anything at
all has been done to you, does the average computer owner know who to
report it to?
AA: No. That's a really easy question!
BG: I would, but only because I'm in the industry. However, the average small
business man would probably be somewhat at a loss.
AA: He might not even realize that is is a crime.
BG: That's exactly true and fortunately Illinois has had the foresight to put
together a unit such as the Sergeant's.
ES: Let's say there is a medium size company that uses computers. I'll invent
a company. My name is Mr. X and I own a a fairly nice real estate company
in the neighborhood of Chicago. I've got maybe a dozen employees and a
couple of years ago we went to computers to keep track of our listings, and
all of our accounting and our bookkeeping, our past customers, and all our
contactees. I mean we've got a lot of data. We communicate with some
other real estate agencies and so we use modems, telephone lines and let
computers talk to computers. Since some of this work is done when our
office is closed, we leave our system hooked up. I came in yesterday
morning and low-and-behold somebody got into our computer and erased all of
our data, or part of it, or changed something. I am the victim of a crime
should I pick up the phone and call the Illinois State Police
AA: Sure.
ES: You'll show up and you'll investigate?
AA: Sure.
ES: Okay.
AA: There are several ways in which a case can get to us. One of them is that
you as the victim could contact us directly and another way would be to
contact the local police and hope that they would call us.
ES: There's the key word...hope. Does the Chicago Police, the Wilmette
police, the Joliet police, do they know enough to refer these cases to you?
AA: I don't know if Joliet does, but Chicago and Wilmette certainly do. For
any of the police that are out there listening at this point let me add
that if we were to get a case referred to us, we will handle the case in
any one of a number of ways. If the local agency brings it to us and wants
nothing to do with the case because they have too much on their own we will
take the case over. If they would just like to either work cooperatively
or have us go with them on an interview or two to translate what the victim
may be saying we'd be happy to do that too. So we have enough work to do
now that we need not take cases over. We are happy to work with any
agency.
CM: I think one thing worth pointing out here is that we're focusing on on a
crime via telephone. Computer crime is done from afar where the victim
doesn't know the offender.
AA: That's true.
CM: The majority of cases probably don't involve telephones at all. They
involve companies' own employees who are committing what amounts to
embezzlement using computers. Either transferring money by computer to
their own accounts or somehow playing with the books and the employer might
not realize for a long time until some auditing process occurs that the
crime has even occurred.
AA: You're right. There are a number of cases like that. What happens very
often in a case like that when it is somebody in-house is that the company
will choose to not call it to the attention of the police they will choose
instead to take disciplinary action or fire the person. Their argument
most times is that they don't want the embarrassment. We do not go out and
seek headlines unless our victim is interested in having headline sought.
We don't choose to publicize cases and embarrass our victim. The stuff is
simply not reported that much.
EZ: I was talking to a computer consultant once who said that the higher you
are up in the company if you're involved with something like this the less
likelihood there is of not only you never doing time, but even getting any
sort of penalty involved. I was there was one particular case of a guy who
was an executive vice president for a bank who I think stole some
phenomenal amount of money was in the millions who was discovered after
some period of time and they didn't want it to get out that one their
trusted employees was a crook so they gave threw this guy a retirement
banquet
ES: Hahahahahaha.
EZ: They retired him from the company and he left with honors.
AA: I like this....
EZ: The consultant said he was there and it was the most hypocritical thing he
ever saw, but they will do it to avoid the unfavorable publicity.
ES: I believe it.
AA: Certainly if you are high in the organization and you control things then
you can control various procedures so that you are less likely to be caught
and you are probably in control of enough money that you are able to come
up with creative ways to embezzle it with less suspicion aroused. I'm not
sure why, but the more money you take the less likely you are to get
prosecuted.
ES: People admire these kinds of crime.
(Commercial Break and then reintroductions including...)
ES: I want to welcome a new player to our game tonight, Mr. John Maxfield.
John Maxfield owns a corporate security consulting company. John...are you
there?
JM: Yes I am, good morning.
ES: Good morning I guess you are outside of Chicago and are you close enough to
have been listening to our program?
JM: Well ahhhhh, unfortunately ahhhh I'm ahhh a bit to the east of you and I
had a little trouble listening in on the radio so uhhh I've been listening
the last few minutes on the telephone.
ES: We've gotten into all kinds of data here. Have you and the sergeant ever
talked before?
JM: I don't believe so. I may have talked to somebody in the Illinois State
Police ummmm maybe a year or so ago, but it was not the sergeant.
ES: Sergeant Abraham you're still there, correct?
AA: Yes. I'm here
ES: I presume John that you know Chuck Moran and Bob Gates.
JM: Yes I ahhh am acquainted with ah Bob Gates.
ES: What does a private computer security company do?
JM: Well uhhh we get involved with ahhhhhh ahhhhh the cases that perhaps don't
make the headlines. Ummmmm and my role is more of kind of in counseling
clients as to how they should secure their systems and to acquaint them
with the risks and the kind of the nature of the enemy what they are up
against.
ES: We were talking earlier about a movie called WarGames which I'm sure you
must be familiar with. My guests have been telling us a little bit about
some of the things that go on. I suspect that the computer hacking problem
and related behaviors is probably very severe isn't it?
JM: Yes ahhh it certainly is a growing problem The movie WarGames kind of put
out into the public eye what had been going on very quietly behind the
scenes for a number of years. And uhhh of course as a result of WarGames I
think there was an increase in hacking activity because now a lot of the
uhhh hackers suddenly realized that it was something that maybe something
they should do and achieve notoriety.
ES: I have a question here that may or may not have an answer. Why is that the
legitimate use of the computer isn't enough to satisfy its user or owner.
In other words, why hack? Why misbehave? Why break the law? Why cost
people a fortune? I mean there are so many fascinating things you can do
with a computer without breaking the law why are so many people into this
anti-social, anti-business behavior?
JM: Well that's a difficult question..ahhhhhh you could say "why do we have
criminals?" You know when you know there's plenty of gainful employment out
there. Ahhhhh the thing with the computer hackers uhhh most of them are
thrill seekers. ahhh they are not the kind of people that are going to be
ahhhh good achievers with computers they're really only know how to do the
destructive things. They're kind of the analog of the vandal. Ahhhh
they're not really ahhh some of them are very bright but they're very
misguided. Misdirected. And uhhh it's it's kind of hard to make a
generalization or a stereotype because they do kind of cover a wide
spectrum. We've got a one end of the spectrum a lot of these young kids
ahhh teenagers. And they mostly seem to be boys there is very few female
hackers out there.
ES: really?
JM: Yeah that's an interesting phenomenon. I would say that maybe there is one
girl for every ten thousand boys. But ahhh anyway at the one end of the
spectrum we have these kids that are just kind of running loose they really
don't know how to do very much but ahhhh when they do manage to do it they
do a lot of damage. Just by sheer numbers. And then on the other end of
the spectrum you perhaps got a the career criminal whose chosen to commit
his crimes over the telephone line. Instead of you know holding up people
with guns uhhh he robs banks by telephone. So you've got this wide
spectrum and it's very hard to put a stereo type to it, but most of the
hackers start out because there's kind of a thrill there's sort thrill of
ripping off the phone company or breaking into a bank computer and
destroying data or something. There's a ahhhh kind of a power trip
involved.
ES: Now what you're trying to do is advise your clients how to avoid this
before it happens. Do most of them end up getting burned before they come
to you or are people smart enough to invest early?
JM: Security unfortunately in the business world tends to take kind of a back
seat because it doesn't generate profits, it doesn't generate any revenue.
It's an expense uhhh if if you're worried about burglars and you live in a
big city like I do or like Chicago. Then you know you've got to spend
extra money for locks and burglar alarms and it's a nuisance you've gotta
unlock your door with three different keys and throw back all these dead
bolts and stuff and turn the burglar alarm off and back on again when you
leave so it's a big nuisance. So security tends to be left sort of as the
last thing you do. And uhhh of course after a corporations been hit their
data's been damaged or stolen or destroyed or whatever. Then they can't
spend enough money, you know, to keep it from happening again.
ES: We have been told there is not premise that is burglar proof, there is no
person regardless of their importance in this world who is totally
protectable. Is a computer or a computer system totally protectable? I
mean can you teach somebody how to secure the system so the hacker just
can't get at it?
JM: Quite frankly you're you're correct. I think the only secure computer is
one that is unplugged. Or you change all the passwords and don't write
them down so no one can log on. Like any other form of security if you put
enough locks and bars on your doors and windows the burglar's going to go
somewhere else where its easier pickings. The same is true with computer
security. You can secure your system from all but the really ummmm you
know intense organized attack. Now obviously in industry we've got certain
segments that are targets, if you will. Banks obviously are a target,
that's where the money is.
ES: If computers are so capable and so smart, can't we say to a computer "Okay
Computer, protect yourself"?
JM: The computer actually is fairly capable of defending itself, the only
problem is it's not intelligent. Uhh and it doesn't really care you see
whether somebody breaks in or not. You see there's no human in the loop, if
you will. So you have to have you have to have a human someplace that
looks at the exception report that the computer generates and says "hey!
What's all these two o'clock in the morning logons...those accounts are
supposed to be active at that time of night." Now you can program a
computer to do some of that, but you still need a human auditor to
scrutinize the workings of the system ever now and then just to be sure
that the computer is protecting what its supposed to protect.
ES: John, what's the name of your company?
JM: My company is called BoardScan and we're in Detroit Michigan
ES: We have some callers, first up is young lady by the name of Penny. Are you
there Penny?
P: Yes I am Ed, how are you?
ES: Good. Are you enjoying the program?
P: Yes! I'm a victim!
ES: A victim! Tell us how.
P: We moved in about three months ago, two of our phones are rotary service
and one of them is a cheapy touch-tone that you go from touch to pulse or
something on it. When somebody dials out on one of the rotary phones, this
cheapy phone beeps back at us. Well I don't mind it too much because I've
got little kids and I get to know who's using the phone. Except, 10:38 at
night when my kids are sleeping and I'm sitting in the family room, my
little touch-tone phone beeps at me. Twice.
JM: Oh I think I can explain that, perhaps. Now it just beeps...
P: Twice!
JM: It does it every night about the same time?
P: Just about, yeah.
JM: Well there's an automatic scanner in every telephone exchange that runs at
night testing lines.
ES: Oh no! Now wait a minute!
P: Now wait a minute! They said that doesn't happen! No no no no.
ES: The phone company all right. This is the one thing that everybody we've
talked to in the telephone industry has denied!
EZ: We, ahh, yeah....
ES: Go ahead Ed! Take over, take over
EZ: We talked to a number of people at the phone company and the original
thought was the phone company was doing some sort of testing, but the
people at the phone company we talked to said "no...they don't." That
testing occurs only when the actual connection is made in a routine phone
call. This is part of the on-going sort of testing program. There is no
additional testing, however, they said. Now does it work differently in
Michigan?
JM: Well I don't know. I know I have a phone that ahhh will ahh...it's got
like a little buzzer in it and it will go "tick- tock" at about 1:30am
every night. And ummmm if you're on a if you're on one of the older
electro-mechanical exchanges uhh then I dare say there is a scanner that
does scan all the lines at night. And it it only stops on each line for
about oh a 1/2 second...just long enough to make your phone go beep-beep.
And I'm sure that's what the explanation is. I am pretty qualified, before
I got computer security work I used to install telephone exchanges.
P: Okay, I have a home computer. It's a Commodore I do not have a modem. Is
there anyway that I could get one and verify this?
JM: Ahhhhh I don't what a modem would have to do with the telephone company
testing your line at 10:30 at night. I don't see the connection there.
P: What would verify it? Could I verify that I'm being used as a test or
would it verify that I'm being scanned by some other computer someplace?
JM: Well no. If you were being scanned by a hacker, you'd be getting an actual
ring, you wouldn't get just say a short beep.
EZ: Penny where do you live?
P: Oaklawn.
EZ: Would you be willing to participate in a little experiment?
P: Sure, it happens pretty regularly.
EZ: Okay. Well is it every night or just some nights?
P: 6 nights out of 10. More than 50-50. It happened tonight as a matter of
fact.
EZ: Okay well tell you what.
P: It happened last night as a matter of fact!
ES: Penny, we'll get your name and your number and Ed is going to
call you during the day and do a little work with you, okay?
P: Sounds good.
ES: Thanks Penny. Hold on a minute okay?
P: Thank you.
ES: You see now, Mr Maxfield is telling us something that every source we've
gone to has denied. There's no such thing they tell us as of random
testing of the phone network either by the local phone company or by AT&T
they say to us "what for?" There's no need to do it. There's no reason to
do it. Let me ask our guests in the studio here from Ameritech. Has
either one of you ever heard of anything like this? Is it the kind of
thing that either one of you can address? I know that you're computer
guys, but what about this?
CM: I know who you've talked to over at Illinois Bell Security and at one time
historically they used to do testing, but they stopped that when I was
still at Illinois Bell.
ES: So this is some years ago.
CM: Yeah.
EZ: Now did it only apply to the electro-mechanical systems?
CM: The only offices I ever worked out of were electro-mechanical, so yes.
JM: Well I don't know. That would be my first guess because I know when I was
on electro-mechanical exchange here in Detroit that's what would happen
every night.
ES: It's a different phone company.
JM: Well I know, it's the same equipment though. Now on two electronic
switching systems the line is tested every time you make a call. So there
isn't any scanner like that. I think the mystery would be solved by just
verifying what kind of equipment you know she was being served out of.
EZ: It never dawned on us that that would make a difference.
(Commercial Break and then reintroductions including...)
ES: I've got a call coming in here long distance from Missouri. Anna are you
there?
A: Yes I am.
ES: Where in Missouri are you?
A: I'm in Kansas City.
ES: And you're listening to us tonight?
A: Yes.
ES: Okay now my producer tells me that when you called up you identified
yourself as a computer hacker, is that correct?
A: I am a female phone hacker and computer hacker, Yes.
ES: One of the few because apparently mostly males are into this.
A: Uh-huh.
ES: Anna, talk up a little bit louder. How old are you?
A: I'm 27.
ES: Twenty seven years old and do you have a job?
A: No.
ES: You don't?!
A: No I have a lot of idle time.
ES: And you're a computer hacker. By definition what do you do
with your computer that makes you a hacker?
A: Well I scan out codes that residents and companies have with US Sprint and
different companies and I've used about fifteen thousand dollars worth of
free long distance.
ES: Are you calling free right now?
A: Yes I am. I am not paying for this call.
ES: Your computer has allowed you to make an illegal long distance call?
A: Through the computer I obtain the codes and then I dial codes with the
touch-tone.
ES: Sergeant, should I be talking to her since she's committing crime right
now. Am I aiding and abetting her? No wait..no. I've got a police officer
on here....Sarge?
AA: Yes.
ES: What do you think? Should we continue with this?
AA: I'd be real curious to know what her justification is for her behavior.
ES: How about that Ann, how about giving us an answer for this?
A: Well I have a lot of idle time and very little money and I like to talk to
a lot of my friends. I have a suggestion for companies and residents out
there who might have remote access codes. You might make them difficult,
not not easy where hackers could, you know the first things they try are
like 1-2-3-4, etc.
ES: Well let me ask you a question Anna. Have you found your computer hacking
to be relatively easy to do?
A: Yes I have.
ES: So you're saying that the computer people of the world have not tried hard
enough to keep you out?
A: No they haven't. I would suggest as far as the phone companies who use
remote access codes to make the codes more difficult.
ES: When we run into people like Anna who obviously have some intuitive talent
and some success at this, why don't we hire some of these people and put
their knowledge to work?
AA: No!
ES: No?
JM: No. No. I'd have to say no to that also.
A: Why not?
JM: You have to understand the the technical side of it. Just knowing how to
hack out a code doesn't qualify you as knowing how to change they system so
you can't hack codes anymore.
AA: There's a perception that these people are all whiz-kids and I don't think
that's the case.
ES: Are you a whiz-kid Anna?
A: No, I don't always use the computer to find these codes I have a lot of
friends and I also do some hacking of my own and there are a lot of
different methods. What you figure out is what how many digits are in the
codes and different things like that so it does require some brains.
Unless you have friends of course and that's all you rely on.
ES: Do you not understand that what you are doing is illegal? Does that not
even enter into the equation?
A: Of course I understand that! Yes.
ES: That what you are doing somebody else ultimately has to pay for Doesn't
that bother you? I mean if you were the victim of a thief or a burglar, I
presume you would call the police and you'd scream and yell until they did
something about it. And yet you and so many thousands of other people think
nothing of committing thievery and fraud by wire and God knows what other
crimes and because your victim is not sitting in the same room with you it
just doesn't seem to bother you.
A: Well I haven't I haven't physically bodily hurt anybody and it's mostly
companies you know that I've dealt with.
ES: That makes it okay? Companies are made up of people. Sometimes they're
privately owned and sometimes they're made up of stockholders, but
companies are people and so you're hurting people.
CM: I don't know what service she's coming through on, but you gotta remember
its costing that company money right now to enable her to talk and they've
got to recover those costs from their legitimate customers.
A: Don't they just use it as a tax write-off?
BG: No.
JM: There's been some of the smaller long distance companies, some of the
people that resell service provided by AT&T or Sprint, some of these
smaller companies have actually been bankrupted by people like Anna.
A: Well I happen to know the person who bankrupted one of them.
AA: I don't see why that's something that would make anybody proud.
A: I'm not proud to know this person.
AA: Why would you be proud to do what you're doing because you're doing the
exact same thing, just perhaps not at the same scale.
A: Well I don't I don't deal with small time companies.
AA: So, you and many people like you are costing large companies a enormous sum
of money. You're the people you're the reason that a company like Sprint
is not profitable and could in fact bankrupt or could have to lay people
off and could put people out of work.
A: They're not profitable?
JM: Sprint has been losing money almost since the beginning.
CM: Or just make a basic rate increase which makes phone service less
affordable.
EZ: My long distance company is All-Net which has had to change access codes
three times in the last year. Primarily because of hackers and I don't
think it's ever been profitable.
CM: Which is inconvenient to you as a customer.
EZ: Sure
ES: I think what bothers me the most out of this whole thing with Anna is the
fact that she is, committing crime literally every day and just doesn't
acknowledge that as either morally offensive.
JM: Yes you've hit on the crux of the problem here. Ahhh these phone phreaks
and hackers really don't see themselves as criminals and the crime here is
totally anonymous it's as simple as dialing some numbers on a telephone
that belong to someone else. Okay and so there is no victim. I mean the
hacker or the phone phreak doesn't even know the victim that ahh they're
billing the call to. In most cases.
ES: Like the burglar who burglarizes during the day when nobody is home he
doesn't see the faces of his victims and so its a very impersonal crime.
Anna how would you feel if someday you get a knock on the door and it's
the FBI or the Secret Service and they have finally tracked you down and
the US Attorney for Kansas City decides to indict you and they've got a
good case and you end up going to prison. How would you feel then?
A: My original reason for taking an interest in this particular hobby is that
someone got hold of my AT&T calling card and ran up my phone bill to
several thousand dollars and I took an interest in it to find out
originally what was going on with it. Now I have had contact with the
Secret Service and the FBI and they didn't do anything about the person who
offended me. They didn't do anything at all.
AA: That doesn't answer the question.
ES: Well what's going to happen if they come back and grab you? How would you
feel if you ended up having to go to prison?
A: I guess those are the breaks.
ES: Are you married or single?
A: I'm single.
ES: Does your family know that you're involved in all this?
A: Yes they do.
ES: I mean how would they react if you ended up being arrested?
A: I guess they wouldn't get anymore free long distance.
ES: They're using it too!?
A: They have me place the calls for them.
ES: You know what disturbs me. You know don't sound like a stupid person, but
you represent a lack of morality that disturbs me greatly. You really do.
I think you represent a certain way of thinking that is morally bankrupt.
I'm not trying to offend you, but I'm offended by you!
A: Well I appreciate your time and you giving me air time an everything. I
thought I'd let some of you know that we are out there and look out for us.
Change those remote access codes to more difficult codes and...
BG: Is that to make the challenge more difficult for you?
A: Possibly for some of us, but to also those hackers who don't have the
intelligence or don't have the friends or don't have the computers or
whatever they're using.
BG: Or the idle time.
A: Right, the idle time. There you go.
ES: How do you pay your rent Anna? Or do you live at home with your folks?
A: I live with my parents.
ES: Oh...okay.
AA: Why not take that time and do something constructive or socially useful?
A: Well I went out and applied for a job with US. Sprint and didn't get hired.
AA: That's good!
EZ: Is it any wonder?!
ES: Anna, do you listen to this program very often? I don't believe you've
ever called before have you?
A: No.
ES: Do you listen every once in a while?
A: Yes. I had just happened to hear through a friend that it was coming on.
ES: Okay. I tell you what Anna. A little something for all new callers. I've
got very fancy WGN T-shirts. If you give my producer your name and address
we'll send one to you. Okay?
A: Okay
ES: We'll be right back. (Click!) She hung up. I have to tell you the truth.
I thought we had her there for a minute.
AA: Well done!
JM: She hung up on you?
ES: The minute we went in on the line to get her address to send her the prize
she hung up.
JM: Yeah, I don't doubt that.
ES: I'm not trying to make an enemy out of the woman, but I really am disturbed
by her lack of moral fiber. I got another person on the phone claiming to
be a computer hacker. Dan, are you there?
D: Yes
ES: Are you a computer hacker?
D: No. I'm a computer science major.
ES: Oh, okay.
D: I'd like to ask your security experts what types of risk avoidance is
involved in providing unauthorized people into corporation's computer
systems?
BG: What you're asking us is what we do to try to keep unauthorized people out
and for me to answer that, would give away the store.
AA: Besides it would take about two days.
JM: I think you can answer that in generalities. As a number we're talking
about I guess, telephone dial-up access to computers.
BG: I think he's asking generically. Just computing. I don't think it would
be appropriate for me to discuss. There is enough literature out there,
you're a computer science major you read the literature and I think your
answer lies there.
EZ: Just to give you an example I know in terms not so much as computers, but
misuse of long distance credit card numbers, the All-Net people who I deal
with made their numbers longer which is the simplest thing you can do.
It's harder to find one that's working.
JM: When protecting your computers, the first line of defense is the password.
Obviously you don't want to use trivial passwords. Ahhh that's the first
line of defense. After that you add on other things like dial-back,
encryption and various other techniques to rule out anyone with just a
casual ahhh attempt at access that is just not going to get through.
ES: Dan, where are you going to school?
D: Right across the street from WGN, the Devry institute.
ES: What is your feeling when you hear somebody else talk about, you just heard
Anna, what what's your feeling about what she's doing?
D: I'm not really familiar with the hackers.
ES: Don't you see things being stolen? Does that bother you at all? I mean
you see the illegality of it? The immoral...morality of it?
D: I think it's very unethical because a lot of the companies have billions of
dollars in equipment.
ES: It's not something you're into? Correct?
D: That's correct, yes.
ES: I'm glad. Thanks for your call Dan.
D: Okay.
ES: Hello Louis are you there?
L: Yes I'm here.
ES: Okay you're on with all of our panel members Louis.
L: Thank you very much. I heard a story that had to do with a certain hacker
who had gotten inside the computer system of a let's say a large oil
company. We'll leave the names out of it. They had set up a security
system which automatically traces the call directly back to wherever the
originating connection is made and this goof called from his home. Two or
three days later, he found FBI agents on his front door step.
AA: I'm not familiar with the case, but it's certainly is within the realm of
possibility.
JM: This happens quite a bit. A person like Anna for example might use a long
distance service that is subscribing to a service from the originating
telephone company of identification of calling number. When the fraudulent
bill is generated the number that placed the call is also there and working
it backwards is very trivial at that point.
L: They simply did something like putting a trap on the line.
JM: On some of the systems, the trap is already there. It's just part of the
system, it's not really a trap at all.
ES: There are ways to catch people and the computer hackers like to play the
odds. All right Louis thank you.
L: Hopefully this will teach a lot of people who are considering doing
something like this to keep their hands off.
ES: I hope so, good point. Thanks for the call.
L: Thank you very much
ES: We've got a call here. Hello Bob!
B: I'd like to make a few comments on computer law. I live in Oaklawn and
they've got the most modern exchanges that Illinois Bell has to offer. My
son lives in that area and I know they offer features that are only
available on the newer switches out there. I go back with computers to
before Apple and IBM sold PC's, I had a couple sitting here at home.
ES: Uh-humm.
B: I bought my first modem about 1978. I consider myself somewhat a hacker,
but I've never really tried to get into anybody else's system, not so much
that I considered it illegal, simply because there wasn't that much of
interest to me available. As far as computers go, if I sit here and dial
random phone numbers in some states, now that is illegal. It's illegal if
your 14 year old is sitting at home at a computer, but it's not illegal if
your using a computerized phone system for generating sales leads.
ES: We call it tele-marketing.
B: Tele-marketing is essentially what some hackers have been hassled for and n
some states it is illegal now. I've accidentally accessed systems I did
not intend to access.
CM: You didn't pursue that right?
B: No, I've never used it. I've never used a computer for theft of services.
I am not about to try and defend somebody that uses a computer to as a tool
for theft of service from a telecommunications company. However, there are
certain computer laws that never should have been passed. The case of the
fellow out in California two or three years back that had a bulletin board,
somebody had posted access codes on his bulletin board. He has an
automated machine that answers his telephone. The telephone line is in his
name, the Secret Service came and confiscated his equipment Its not right
that this happened because of third party theft of service.
BG: I think the rationale is over simplistic.
B: Am I responsible for what you say when I answer my phone is essentially the
question.
BG: No, I think the question is, is the bulletin board operator responsible for
what is posted on his bulletin board.
B: Well that literally makes no sense. If a telemarketer calls me am I
responsible for anything he says after I pick up the phone?
BG: A bulletin board is used to disseminate information further. When a person
posts something, in this case a code, the bulletin board is used to further
spread that information.
JM: I believe that is the Tom Tcimpidis case that you're referring to and I'm
quite familiar with it. It was not quite as you put it. The stolen AT&T
calling card that was posted was posted anonymously one minute and one
minute after the AT&T card being posted by the anonymous party, Tom
Tcimpidis, the sysop, the operator of the bulletin board himself had been
on-line and had posted other messages. So there was reason to believe
perhaps that the anonymous person was actually the system operator. There
was a further complication that arose in that the stolen AT&T card belonged
to a former employer of the system operator. Ultimately there was not
enough evidence with which to charge anybody and the whole thing was
quietly dropped, but it did raise some interesting questions as to
responsibilities of the system operator because Mr. Tcimpidis said that he
didn't know the code was there and yet his own equipment log showed that he
had been on-line.
B: Let's take that a little further then. Let's say there was an answering
machine connected to his phone and we know he listened to the answering
machine. Let's say somebody with a voice message left him half a dozen
stolen credit card numbers. Would the action of the law enforcement
agencies have been the same?
JM: No...no, you're
B: I think you must look at a situation where over the years an unnecessary
fear has grown of some of the hackers. The phone phreaks scare me to an
extent. I've got bogus calls on my US. Sprint and All-Net bills, never got
one on my AT&T bill. I can see this is a definite problem, the phone
phreaks do scare me, and I realize that real problem is that nobody seems
to reconcile every call or even read their long distance bills.
AA: If I have an answering machine on my phone and somebody calls up and leaves
me information that were I to use it it would be illegal and I either erase
the information or turn that other person in. I have no intent to use it
and there is no law enforcement officer that I can imagine who is going to
take action and no prosecutor who would take the case.
ES: In other words if a guy sets up a computer bulletin board for the express
purpose of exchanging information he is not supposed to have when other
people have information their not supposed to have, I don't think there's
any doubt about what their intent is and about the fact that they are
violating the law.
Sarge, if you went after somebody like Anna for what she admitted doing,
stealing $15,000 dollars worth of long distance and you were able to handle
the investigation, come up with the evidence, and bust her, what kind of
penalty might she get?
AA: A very difficult question to answer because it depends upon her prior
criminal history. Most of these hackers do not have a history. In Anna's
case the crime would be a class four felony which would result in probably
simple felony probation.
ES: She admitted to stealing $15,000!
AA: I'm sure that her estimate is wildly off on the low end. if she is
disseminating codes then she is also somewhat responsible for other
people's use of the same codes.
ES: Could we charge someone like her with conspiracy?
AA: Sure!
ES: She is generating a continuing criminal enterprise.
AA: It depends again on whether you choose to prosecute her federally or at the
state level. She would be looking here at a class three or class two
felony depending upon the sum of money that she had stolen.
ES: The bottom line here is if the punishment doesn't fit the crime, its not
going to stop the criminals.
AA: You have to remember that these are the people who have not been processed
in the criminal justice systems and even to hold them over the weekend in
Cook County would not be an experience I'd care to repeat.
ES: Many of them are pretty arrogant sounding it seems.
(Commercial Break And Reintroductions)
ES: We've got an interesting new telephone law here; Chapter 38 of the Illinois
Criminal Code. A person can be prosecuted, arrested and convicted for
bothering somebody even if the person doesn't answer the phone. Just
ringing a persons phone now is against the law, it's harassing them.
JM: I might add, since we're discussing harassment by phone... the hackers
don't like me too well and I'll get about a death threat a week from a
hacker.
ES: Really.
JM: Oh yeah and every now and then I figure out who it was and I call them back
and that kind of shakes up a little bit.
ES: There was this reporter here that was being harassed like crazy in the news
department here by a hacker who had a computer that was ringing the phone.
He was ringing the phones like crazy and I didn't know about. Finally the
reporter asked what I could recommend. I made a phone call and the
Illinois Bell Security did what it had to do and then the Chicago Police
were brought in and one night when I was on the air the officers went to
guys home, knocked on the door, and this kid was shocked! He was a
telemarketing representative for a major magazine and apparently he was
working at home he had some of their equipment at home including a rapid
dialer. He's got two detectives at the front door and he had literally
just gotten off the phone. We've got all the data and so now comes the
decision what do you want to do. Take him to court? Lock him up? Go to
his boss? I went back to the reporter in our news room and asked him what
he wanted to do about it?
JM: What did he say?
ES: Write a 500 word essay on why he was never going to do it again.
JM: Ha Ha! We had one 14 year old one hacker who was on the bulletin boards
and posting messages about how to make pipe bombs, different types of
poison, long distance codes, and computer passwords, etc. On the bulletin
boards he would come across like Ghengis Khan or or Joseph Stalin or
something. I mean his language was all four letter words and yet face to
face he was a very meek, mild mannered, well behaved youngster. However,
get him behind the keyboard and he just sort of changes personality. What
do you do to a 14 year old? He is much too young to really be put through
any of the the serious criminal prosecutions so his penalty was that he had
to read out loud to his parents all of the messages that he'd posted on the
bulletin boards, four letters words and all. And that cured him... hahaha.
In most of the cases I've worked on it's rare that someone goes to jail. I
think the longest sentence that I've been involved with was probably like
30 days. I think there was one fellow down in Virginia, if I recall
correctly, that got 90 days. You don't necessarily want to put these
folks in jail because then they'll meet the real crooks and teach them all
these nifty tricks.
ES: God help us. Lets grab a call real quick here from Gordon. Hello Gordon,
where are you calling from?
G: Hello, I'm calling from DeKalb, Illinois.
ES: You have a question for our panel...go ahead.
G: Yeah I do. I'm a graduate student in Criminology up here at Northern
Illinois University and I'm kinda involved in some field research with the
types of people that you're discussing tonight. I've heard a lot of terms
flying back and forth between phreakers and hackers and things like that.
I'd like to hear some input from the people on the panel as far as how they
define these types of activities, if they draw and distinctions between the
two, and secondly, if anybody can add any insight into maybe just how many
people are currently active in this type of activity.
JM: I could take that because one of my specialties is identification and
gathering data about how many perpetrators there are. To answer the first
question, a computer hacker would be someone who concentrates mainly on
breaking into computer systems. The phone phreak would be someone who,
like Anna we heard earlier tonight, just makes long distance calls for
free. The problem is you can't really separate them. The hacker needs to
know the phone phreak tricks in order to break into computers in other
states or other countries. Certainly the phone phreak perhaps needs some
computer aids in obtaining stolen codes. It is hard to separate them. You
can call them phreakers or you can call them hackers or you can just call
them criminals.
As to how many, this is a tough one because at what point to you draw the
line? Do you say somebody that makes fifteen thousand dollars worth of
calls in a year is a phone phreak and somebody that makes $14,900 is not?
The problem is that its been a tradition to rip off the phone company ever
since day one. There has been phone phreaks for twenty-five or thirty
years at least. Ever since we've had long distance dialing.
BG: The phone companies not the only one under siege either.
JM: There are thousands of hackers, I would say just in the state of Illinois
there are several thousand active computer hackers.
G: Those hackers are the active ones? Would you say that most of them are
involved in communicating via the bulletin board systems and voice
mail-boxes and things like that or is this pretty much a solitary activity.
JM: There are a few solitary hackers, in fact the beginnings of hacking, 25-30
years ago, it was a solitary activity. The bulletin boards have changed
all that. Now the hackers no longer really operate in solitude.
AA: One thing also about the criminal element here, the hacker and the
phreakers, my experience has been that we have had very few "clean" if you
will, computer frauds. We have had some people who are only into
multi-level marketing of codes, which ends up being enormous sums of money,
but very often we've found that hackers are involved in other things too.
For example, credit card frauds, we have done search warrants and found a
reasonable quantities of illegal substances, of weapons, of other evidence
of other offenses. We have probably easily 50% of our warrants turn up
other things besides computer fraud. Which I think is an interesting point
to keep in mind.
ES: Very good point.
(Break For Commercial and re-introductions)
R: Hello, I just wanted to call up and clarify something concerning computer
hackers. I'm a hacker, but I'm not a criminal.
ES: We'll be the judge of that Bobby.
R: I think you will be. The reason I say that is, you're confusing things.
The hacker is term that you could apply or compare more or less to "ham."
It's a computer hobbyist, whether he does it just on his machine at home or
he accesses legitimate services throughout the country and pays for his
services he's a hacker. There are a lot of people who are irresponsible,
mostly teenagers, who are quite impressed with the power of this machine
and get carried away with it and do criminal acts. They happen to be
hackers, but they're also criminals. I think that distinction.
CM: I think the point is well taken I think originally the hacker was a very
positive term historically and for whatever reasons the word hacker has
taken on some negative connotations.
R: Yes and that is unfair because I know legions of people who are hackers.
JM: I consider myself to be a hacker, but I'm certainly not a computer criminal
(No, at least not a COMPUTER criminal). I mean my business is catching the
criminal hackers. If we go back to 1983 when hackers made headlines for
the first time, that was the Milwaukee 414 gang, they called themselves
hackers and so right away the good term, hacker being someone who could do
wonderful things with a computer got turned into someone who could do
criminal things with a computer.
ES: I remember back to a time a few years ago when there was a group of
criminals that got busted for coming up with a device called a black box
which they used to circumvent paying the tolls you know on long distance
phone charges. Was that kind of the beginning of this computer
misbehavior? I mean was that a computer device?
JM: There are several boxes; the black box, blue box, red box, silver box, etc.
I must confess that back when I was a teenager, over thirty years ago,
there were not any computers to play around with, but there was this
wonderful telephone network called the Bell System. I was one of the
original inventors of the device known as the black box and another device
known as the blue box (Yeah right, YOU invented these). In those days the
phone network was such that you could manipulate it with very simple tone
signals.
A black box essentially allows all calls to your phone to be received free
of charge to the caller. In other words if somebody called you from a
payphone they got their dimes back and if someone dialed you direct long
distance they never got a bill.
The blue box was a little more insidious. It allows you to actually take
over the long distance lines and dial direct anywhere in the world.
I got into it just out of curiosity as a true hacker and I found out that
these things were possible and I told a friend of mine at the phone company
about what I could do with their circuits and of course he turned me into
the security people.
It never really got started, but I do have sitting here in front of me a
device that makes some of those tones. You could call it a blue box. I
guess this is legitimate piece of test equipment, but let's see if it will
pick up. (Beeeep!)
ES: Came through loud and clear.
JM: The blue box today is obsolete, it really doesn't work anymore. There,
there are a few circuits that still us those kind of signals, but back
25-30 years ago that was the way to make your free phone calls. You didn't
have Sprint and MCI to abuse.
S: I'm a consulting engineer now but, I have been a communications manager for
three Fortune 500 companies. One of the reasons I was hired was to put a
stop to some long distance calling that had cost that company over a
million and a half dollars in 27 months. We found the person that was
doing it and he got a suspended sentence of six months. Then we turned
around and sued him in civil court.
ES: We've got to start treating these criminals like criminals. Suspended
sentences are unacceptable, hard jail time is absolutely mandatory and
unfortunately, and I think that sergeant you probably will agree with me,
it must be very frustrating to spend all the hours you do chasing people
and even when you get them to plead guilty seeing how easy sometimes they
get away.
AA: Oh sure.
S: How many people do you have assigned to your unit here in this state sarge?
AA: You're talking to 50% of the unit.
(Break for commercials and re-introductions)
ES: Okay Ray, go ahead.
R: You would not believe how long I've been trying to get in touch with you.
Since I was 14 years old, every time I've called, you've been busy.
ES: So how old are you tonight?
R: 18
ES: Four years!? What's on your mind?
R: I used to pirate games when I was younger. As a matter of fact when I was
14. I mean my Dad had just bought me a computer and modem and I was
pumped. People are always complaining about it, but it's so easy for a 14
year old kid to do this, don't you think that they should make it a little
bit harder? Do you understand what I'm trying to say?
ES: Yes, but Ray it's easy to steal a car. If your neighbor leaves his car in
the driveway with the key in the ignition does that give you the right to
take it?
R: I know I did wrong, but there is no way I can give it back. Its just
stupid because when you get older you feel guilty about things.
ES: What did you used to do?
R: I used to call up certain places and I would like break in and take their
games and then just keep them for myself.
BG: It was more entertainment for you?
R: It kept me occupied and it was so easy that I began to think that maybe it
was meant to be easy so they could get publicity.
JM: There is perhaps a difference because when you copy a a computer program
you can't tell it from an original, but if you make a copy of a tape or a
record it doesn't sound quite the same.
CM: When you're 14 years old it's something new, right?
R: I got the biggest pump out of it.
CM: I think you did something for your ego and it gave you a sense of power.
ES: Okay Ray
R: Bye
ES: I've really enjoyed this program, but we're out of time. John, I want to
thank you for staying up and I have a feeling that we'll do more radio
because you're an interesting guy.
JM: Thank you. It's been interesting talking with you. By the way, I think I
know who Anna is, but we'll keep that a secret from our listeners.
ES: Oh. Well why don't you just tell the FBI?
JM: The Secret Service, yes.
ES: Right and I want to thank everyone else for being on the show tonight.
Everyone: Its been our pleasure. Lets do it again some time.
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 21, File 10 of 11
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN The Legacy... ...Lives On PWN
PWN Phrack World News PWN
PWN Issue XXI/1 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Written and Edited by PWN
PWN Knight Lightning and Epsilon PWN
PWN PWN
PWN The Future... ...Is Forever PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
On The Edge Of Forever November 4, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Greetings and welcome to Phrack World News Issue XXI! As most of you have
realized, Taran King and I are back to stay and the tradition of Phrack Inc.
lives on. November 17, 1988 marks the Three Year Anniversary of Phrack Inc.
and we have never been prouder of our efforts to bring you the best magazine
possible.
However, we can not do it alone. Both Taran King and I have been reduced to
completely legal status and can not afford the luxury of calling bulletin
boards or contacting all the people we would like too.
Epsilon has been helping us a lot by acting as the collection agency for many
of the files for Phrack and several news articles as well. Please, if you have
a file for Phrack Inc. or an article for PWN contact him or leave mail for The
Mentor. And speaking of The Mentor, The Phoenix Project has a new number;
(512) 441-3088. Be sure to give it a call.
The article about Pacific Bell in this issue may contain some information that
has been seen before. Regardless of that, PWN is a place where such
information can be indexed for later reference and helps keep important events
and happenings in a certain continuity which is beneficial to everyone.
This issue of Phrack features the Second Special Presentation of Phrack World
News, which contains the abridged edition of the WGN Radio Show that dealt with
computer hackers and features John Maxfield.
With regard to the file about Teleconnect Long Distance. Hatchet Molly says
that now Teleconnect "flags" suspect bulletin boards and if a Teleconnect
calling card is used to call one, the card number is cancelled and a new card
is mailed to the customer within three days. What a wonderful company policy
that is.
For the months ahead, I am working on a file about hackers abroad, mostly
focusing on the Chaos Computer Club, which I have begun to have strong
relations with, and some other hacker instances in Europe and other parts of
the world.
Scheduled for January/February is a file series on the Wide Area Networks;
Bitnet and quite possibly ARPAnet, MILInet, NSFnet, IBM's VNET, CCnet, UUCP,
CSnet, SPAN, JANet, JUNet, and the list goes on. The main emphasis will be on
Bitnet though with secondary emphasis on UUCP and the other networks.
Hope you enjoy this issue and remember... "The Future Is Forever"
:Knight Lightning
_______________________________________________________________________________
Pacific Bell Means Business October 6, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The following information originally appeared in WORM Newsletter, a publication
produced and distributed by Sir Francis Drake. The series of memos presented
here are shown to enable the members of today's hacking community to fully
understand the forces at work that seek to bring them down. The memo(s) have
been edited for this presentation. -KL
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Copy For: Roland Donaldson August 3, 1987
Subject: Unauthorized Remote Computer Access
San Francisco, July 29, 1987
Case Nos.: 86-883, 87-497
T. M. CASSANI, Director-Electronic Operations:
Electronic Operations recently investigated two cases involving a number of
sophisticated hackers who were adept at illegally compromising public and
private sector computers. Included among the victims of these hackers was
Pacific Bell, as well as other local exchange carriers and long distance
providers.
Below is a synopsis of the two cases (87-497 and 86-883), each of which
demonstrate weaknesses in Pacific Bell's remote access dial-up systems.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Case No. 87-497
---------------
On May 14, 1987, Electronic Operations received a court order directing Pacific
Bell to place traps on the telephone numbers assigned to a company known as
"Santa Cruz Operations." The court order was issued in order to identify the
telephone number being used by an individual who was illegally entering Santa
Cruz Operations' computer and stealing information.
On May 28, 1987, a telephone number was identified five separate times making
illegal entry into Santa Cruz Operations' computer. The originating telephone
number was 805-PRE-SUFF, which is listed to Jane Doe, 8731 W. Cresthill Drive,
Apt. 404, Thousand Oaks, California.
On June 3, 1987, a search warrant was served at 8731 W. Cresthill Drive, Apt
404, Thousand Oaks, California. The residents of the apartment, who were not
at home, were identified as Jane Doe, a programmer for General Telephone, and
Kevin Hacker, a known computer hacker. Found inside the apartment were three
computers, numerous floppy disks and a number of General Telephone computer
manuals.
Kevin Hacker was arrested several years ago for hacking Pacific Bell, UCLA and
Hughes Aircraft Company computers. Hacker was a minor at the time of his
arrest. Kevin Hacker was recently arrested for compromising the data base of
Santa Cruz Operations.
The floppy disks that were seized pursuant to the search warrant revealed
Mitnick's involvment in compromising the Pacific Bell UNIX operation systems
and other data bases. The disks documented the following:
o Hacker's compromise of all Southern California SCC/ESAC computers. On
file were the names, log-ins, passwords, and home telephone numbers for
Northern and Southern ESAC employees.
o The dial-up numbers and circuit identification documents for SCC computers
and Data Kits.
o The commands for testing and seizing trunk testing lines and channels.
o The commands and log-ins for COSMOS wire centers for Northern and Southern
California.
o The commands for line monitoring and the seizure of dial tone.
o References to the impersonation of Southern California Security Agents and
ESAC employees to obtain information.
o The commands for placing terminating and originating traps.
o The addresses of Pacific Bell locations and the Electronic Door Lock
access codes for the following Southern California central offices ELSG12,
LSAN06, LSAN12, LSAN15, LSAN23, LSAN56, AVLN11, HLWD01, HWTH01, IGWD01,
LOMT11, AND SNPD01.
o Inter-company Electronic Mail detailing new login/password procedures and
safeguards.
o The work sheet of an UNIX encryption reader hacker file. If successful,
this program could break into any UNIX system at will.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Case No. 86-883
---------------
On November 14, 1986, Electronic Operations received a search warrant directing
Pacific Bell to trap calls being made to the Stanford University computer. The
Stanford Computer was being illegally accessed and was then being used to
access other large computer systems throughout the country.
The calls to the Stanford Computer were routed through several different common
carriers and through numerous states. Through a combination of traps, traces
and sifting through information posted on the Stanford computer, several
suspects were identified throughout the United States.
The group of computer hackers who illegally accessed the Stanford computer
system were known as "The Legion of Doom." Subsequent investigation indicated
that the Legion of Doom was responsible for:
o The use of Stanford University high-speed mainframes to attack and hack
ESAC/SCC mini compuuters with an UNIX password hacker file. Password
files were then stored on the Stanford systems for other members of the
Legion of Doom to use. Login and passwords for every local exchange
carrier as well as AT&T SCC/ESAC mini computers were on file.
o The Legion of Doom used the Stanford computers to enter and attack other
institutions and private contractors' computers. Some of the contractors'
computers were used for national defense research.
On July 21, 1987, eight search warrants were served in three states at homes
where members of the Legion of Doom reside. Three of the searches were
conducted in California. Steve Dougherty, Senior Investigator-Electronic
Operations, accompanied Secret Service agents at the service of a search
warrant at 2605 Trousdale Drive, Burlingame, California, which was the
residence of Stan QUEST, a sixteen-year-old member of the Legion of Doom.
(Correction - Oryan QUEST has never been a member of the Legion Of Doom. -KL)
Dougherty interviewed QUEST, who had used the pseudonym "O'Ryan Quest," (Oryan
QUEST) when accessing computers. During the interview, QUEST admitted the
following:
o The entering of central offices, (Burlingame, San Mateo, San Bruno,
Millbrae) disguised as a Federal Express deliveryman. The entries were
done to case out the CO's for the purpose of finding computer terminals
with telephones, the locations of switches and bays, the names of
Comtechs, and materials related to the operations of the central office.
QUEST also claimed to have been in the AT&T Administration office on
Folsom Street, San Francisco.
o QUEST's telephone service had been disconnected twice for nonpayment, and
twice he had his service restored by impersonating a service
representative.
o Learning to test circuits and trunks with his computer by using ROTL and
CAROT test procedures.
o Members of the Legion of Doom often accessed test trunks to monitor each
other's lines for fun.
o On several occasions QUEST would post the telephone number of a public
coin phone for access to his BBS, Digital IDS. He would then access teh
Millbrae COSMOS wire center and add call forwarding to the coin phone. He
would activate the call forwarding to his home telephone number, securing
the identity of his location.
o QUEST would impersonate an employee who had authorization to use a Data
Kit and have it turned on for him. When he was done, he would call back
and have the Data Kit turned off.
o QUEST also would use his knowledge to disconnect and busyout the telephone
services of individuals he did not like. Further, he would add several
custom calling features to their lines to create larger bills.
o It was very easy to use the test trunks with his computer to seize another
person's dial tone and make calls appear on their bills. QUEST did not
admit charging 976 calls to anyone, but he knew of others who did.
o When the Legion of Doom attacked a computer system, they gave themselves
five minutes to complete the hacking. If they were not successful in five
minutes, they would attempt another system. The Legion of Doom was able
to crack a computer in under five minutes approximately 90% of the time.
o QUEST would impersonate employees to get non-published telephone listings.
QUEST received the non-published listing for Apple Computer Founder, Steve
Wozniak, and members of The Beastie Boys rock group.
o QUEST told Dougherty of one New York member of the Legion of Doom, "Bill
from Arnoc," (Bill From RNOC) who has been placing his own traps in New
York. Bill from Arnoc (Bill From RNOC) helped QUEST place traps in
Pacific Bell.
(Gee Stan, you forgot to admit sneaking over the border. -KL)
The review of the evidence seized at QUEST's residence tends to corroborate all
QUEST's statements.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Conclusions
-----------
There are some important conclusions that can be drawn from the above two cases
regarding future computer system concerns.
o The number of individuals capable of entering Pacific Bell operating
systems is growing.
o Computer Hackers are becoming more sophisticated in their attacks.
o Dial-up ports will always be a target for computer entry by a hacker.
o Even dial-up ports with remote callbacks and manually controlled modems
can be compromised.
o A hacker can place a central office off-line by overloading a SCC mini
computer by improperly placing traps or by putting traps on several DID
multi-trunk groups such as MCI or Sprint groups.
o Terrorist or Organized Crime organizations could use this underground
computer technology against Pacific Bell or to their own advantage.
o Pacific Bell proprietary data bases such as PTT ESAC or PB2 ESAC could be
compromised.
o The integrity of accurate customer billing statements have been
compromised through access to the CEBS (Computerized Electronic Billing
System) and will remain questionable. A customer can dispute large
direct-dialed calls and claim his telephone was accessed by a computer
hacker.
- - -
o Oryan QUEST has a really BIG mouth and would dick over anyone and everyone
to overcome his inferiority complex from being an illegal alien without a
green card. Outside of the Dan The Operator/Maxfield incident, I have
never seen such a mass admission of guilt. To make matters worse, QUEST
probably made up most of the incidents to make himself sound like a really
big time hacker.
- - -
Recommendations
---------------
The information gained as a result of the above investigations should be shared
with those individuals responsible for the integrity of our computer systems.
Further, an ongoing business partnership between security and the individuals
responsible for the integrity of our computer systems should be initiated and
maintained to ensure prompt, effective resolution of future computer related
security issues.
JOHN E. VENN
Manager-Electronic Operations
Special Thanks To Sir Francis Drake
_______________________________________________________________________________
He's Really Just Out Of Control PostCon'88
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"I would SHRED everything, because
we get so much information
out of the dumpster,
it's UNREAL..."
-- Control C
Over the last few months there has been a lot of controversy about the
mysterious cricumstances regarding Michigan Bell and Control C. To set the
record straight, ^C gave me the full details of what happened so I could pass
it on to you.
Just prior to leaving Chicago, where ^C had been going to school, he had
illegally accessed an AOL system belonging to Michigan Bell. The system
operator broke in on him and ^C tried unsuccessfully to pass himself off as a
legitimate user. When this did not work, he hung up and did not give it a
second thought. Upon returning home to Detroit, he had a message waiting for
him to contact the sysop of the AOL system. He calling him and they,
accompanied by Michigan Bell security, went out to lunch. To avoid being
prosecuted, Control C had to give up all of the information he had on that
system and explain how he had gotten in. Since he had cooperated, they let him
go without further hassle. Unfortunately, Control C was soon busted again for
breaking into his Central Office, but this time he was not going to get off so
easily. He had to agree to making a talk show movie and a poster (quoted in
the beginning of the article) for Michigan Bell. Both of these items have been
distributed across the country to better illustrate the hacker mind-set and as
a reminder to destroy important documents that were being thrown away.
While being interrogated by Michigan Bell security department, Control C was
shown a list of recently busted hackers from the July 21, 1987 sweep of the
country. On this list was Sir Francis Drake, which is how the rumor about SFD
being busted last year got started. However, what Control C and Michigan Bell
did not know was that when Mark Gerardo was apprehended last year, he was
believed to be SFD and as such was entered in their files incorrectly.
Information Provided by Control C
With a little help figuring out the SFD mixup from me and Taran King
:Knight Lightning
_______________________________________________________________________________
North Dakota Nightmare September 10, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"For Kracking Crue's Docs Avage The Game Is Over"
In March of 1987, the North Dakota members of Kracking Crue (Docs Avage and
SpyroGyra (also known as Ractor)) found a local extender and were able to hack
out a code. They both lived on campus at North Dakota State University and
were able to abuse the code without the worry of being caught because of the
campus's Dimension phone system giving them a high degree of anonymity.
They used this code for the entire rest of the school year and nothing had
happened to prevent them from abusing it. Because of this lack of security, DA
and SG began to believe that the code would be safe for them to use anywhere.
The school year ended and the members of the Crue went home. Eventually the
Crue discovered a 1-800 number for the long distance service they had been
abusing and began to use it once again. However, they were soon to discover
that they were not half as safe as they thought.
The LD company had indeed been watching that code, but could not do anything to
catch the Crue because of the Dimension system on NDSU campus. Docs Avage
started to use the code from his apartment to call SpyroGyra and a few other
people and the company got his line tapped and kept a record of where all his
calls went to.
In Docs Avage's own words;
"On July 27th, 1988, I arrived back at my apartment after spending a
weekend with my parents at their home. I found it rather interesting to
discover three extra cars in the parking lot, one of which was a Dodge
Diplomat.
I walked into my apartment and discover two police detectives, two phone
officials, and two "computer experts" blissfully dismantling my Apple and
all my peripherals. One of my roommates was handcuffed and seated in a
chair and my other roommate was kept closely watched as he was sitting in
the kitchen. I was asked who I was, and read my rights. I agreed to
cooperate. I was busted on a dialup.
The dialup being the one I had hacked out several months before, and
gotten quite greedy with it (ok, I overabused the darn thing). In my
apartment, I placed around a $1000 worth of calls with it. I had made
calls with it before, but not to that extent.
I remained very cooperative, and talked to several phone security
representatives, including those from AT&T and U.S. Sprint (I had a
printout of 4 Sprint Codes, never had used them, just had them). The
phone security people are experts at adverse psychology, and I can
successfully say that they did a very good job of scaring me.
Nevertheless, I knew that they were trying to play with my brain, so it
wasn't as bad as it could have been.
My roommate had been charged with the same offense as myself, Class C
Felony Theft of Services (max 5 years/$5000). However, the only thing he
contributed to the whole matter was the fact that the telephone account
was in his name. The charges were dropped against him.
After almost two months of waiting, the sentence date came. I plead
guilty, playing on a deal that my lawyer had made with the state's
attorney. The sentence included restitution (which hasn't been determined
yet). The phone company is desparately trying to stick me with a large
bill, for services that cannot be proven that I had anything to do with; a
bill that could stretch up to $5000 (like hell if I'm paying that much),
and a very nice little clause called Deferment of Imposition. Basically,
I remain on probation until I pay back the restitution, at that time I can
go through hearings and prove that I haven't been involved in such
activities as for what I was convicted and the charges will not be placed
on my record. For the time being however, it's turning out to be monthly
payments with supervised probation. Needless to say, I, Docs Avage is
retired, at least as as retired as someone in my position can get."
Docs said that he had been looking to retire for some time and that this
incident was the final straw. He also added that he was questioned about
Jester Sluggo, Phrack Inc., and the Legion of Doom. He did not know anything.
Information Provided by Docs Avage and SpyroGyra
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 21, File 11 of 11
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN The Legacy... ...Lives On PWN
PWN Phrack World News PWN
PWN Issue XXI/2 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Written and Edited by PWN
PWN Knight Lightning and Epsilon PWN
PWN PWN
PWN The Future... ...Is Forever PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Man Charged with "Infecting" Computers May 24, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fort Worth, Texas (AP) -- A 39-year-old computer programmer is being prosecuted
on felony charges of infecting his ex-employer's computers with an electronic
"virus," and face up to 10 years in prison if convicted.
Donald Gene Burleson faces a charge of "harmful access to a computer," and is
free on a $3,000 bond pending his July 11 trial.
Police described the electronic interference as a "massive deletion" of more
than 168,000 records of sales commissions for employees.
Burleson is thought to be the first person charged under the state law
prohibiting computer sabotage, which took effect Sept. 1, 1985, about three
weeks before the alleged incident, said Davis McCown, chief of the Tarrant
County district attorney's economic crimes division.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Jury Selection In First Virus Trial Begins September 6, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from the Washington Post (September 7, 1988),Page C-1
Fort Worth, Texas (AP) -- Jury selection began today in the criminal trial of a
40-year-old programmer accused of using a computer "virus" to sabotage
thousands of records at his former work place. The trial is expected to last
about two weeks.
Donald G. Burleson faces up to 10 years in jail and a $5,000 fine if convicted
in the trial, a first for the computer industry. Burleson was indicted on
charges of burglary and harmful access to a computer in connection with
computer damage at a securities firm, said Nell Garrison, clerk of the state
criminal district court in Fort Worth. Through his lawyer, Jack Beech,
Burleson denies the charges but has declined further comment.
The firm has been awarded $12,000 in a civil lawsuit against Burleson.
Pretrial motions were scheduled to be heard today, followed by jury selection,
Garrison said.
Burleson is accused of planting a piece of computer software known as a virus
in the computer system at USPA&IRA Co. two days after he was fired. A virus is
a computer program, often hidden in apparently normal computer software, that
instructs the computer to change or destroy information at a given time or
after a certain sequence of commands. USPA officials claim Burleson went into
the company's offices one night and planted a virus in its computer records
that would wipe out sales commissions records every month. The virus was
discovered two days later, after it had eliminated 168,000 records.
_______________________________________________________________________________
White Lightning Speaks Up July 28, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
White Lightning was apparently previously accused of being an informant for
Sprint Security with regard to information concerning The Disk Jockey and
Compaq.
He left the following message on the Phrack Voice Message System;
"Yeah, this is White Lightning. I'd like to make an official statement for
Phrack Magazine. As far as what happened to The Disk Jockey, Shit, I have no
idea, ok? I get on a bridge, I've been out of it for two weeks, I get on
Friday night, and fuck, this guy Laser outta 206 is saying I got him busted,
I don't know anything about it, ok? As far as Compaq goes, outta 219, Kent,
I'd just appreciate it, your information is messed.. <BEEP!> [The Phrack VMS
has a beep that lets you know that you only have 10 seconds left.] What the
hell is that!? Hello?!? Who is that?!"
Message For White Lightning from Phrack Inc.;
If you would care to explain your side of the story a little more clearly,
we would be happy to listen to what you have to say. We are sure that
everyone would be interested. Thank you.
Information Provided By White Lightning
_______________________________________________________________________________
AT&T Links Up With GTE August 1, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
AT&T is stepping up its efforts to boost revenues from telecommunications gear
by buying GTE's phone switch business. AT&T will become the leading equipment
supplier to GTE's phone companies, which are the main source of the
switch operations $500 million in revenues.
AT&T will take a 49% stake in a new company that will comprise GTE's switch
manufacturing operations in Illinois and a research and development facility in
Phoenix, Arizona. GTE, whose business employs 5,000, is counting on AT&T's
technical expertise to support its base of phone switching systems. It also
wants out of the phone equipment business. AT&T's main task; making the
switches capable of handling the massive voice and computer data transmission
requirements anticipated by GTE's phone companies over the next 15 years.
Neither partner disclosed financial terms of the joint venture. But AT&T will
own 80% of it by 1993 and 100% by 2003. Its management structure is not yet
decided. GTE has made similar moves in recent years that have ended in giving
full management control and ownership to its partners. Such deals include one
with West Germany's Siemens in communication transmission products and a second
with Japan's Fujitsu in office phone systems.
Information Provided by Business Week Magazine
_______________________________________________________________________________
Is There A Doctor In The House? August 1, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
It all started when I met him on a bridge in Texas. No one really understands
why he did it or why he chose that particular handle. He seems to have some
decent knowledge and would not have had much trouble reaching a high level of
notoriety. Unless there is more here than meets the eye.
Doc Holiday/Scott of 713 is an IMPOSTER!
He was doing a pretty good job pretending to be the original Doc Holiday. He
had researched all about him, including details concerning his recent bust for
COSMOS abuse, and created a framing story to explain how and why he now was
Scott instead of Robbie and how his family had moved from Tennessee to Texas.
The majority of the phreak/hack community bought the story and he would have
gone on unseen except for the return of some folks who had disappeared last
fall; Knight Lightning and Taran King. Upon hearing about this Doc Holiday in
713, they already suspected that he was bogus, and once they had spoken to him
they knew it was not the original Doc Holiday. To bring a hilarious end to
this charade they waited until they could contact the original Doc Holiday to
let him in on the exposure.
As destiny would have it, the real Doc Holiday was on vacation and happened to
end up spending a weekend in St. Louis, the weekend right after SummerCon '88.
So the three of them got together started Scott Holiday talking to further
incriminate himself and then let the REAL Doc Holiday introduce himself and
have the last laugh.
Scott Holiday was in shock at first and he tried to explain that he had a good
reason for doing it, but his mom got on the phone and he had to go.
After this incident, I talked to him voice, and he explained to me that he
enjoyed doing this, and it was "the biggest scam" he had ever pulled off,
except that you could argue that he did not really pull it off. Seeing as how
Scott is quite adept at the art of social engineering, he really had little to
no trouble convincing (for lack of a better word) people who did not know the
original Doc Holiday. However when he came up against the best, he failed the
test miserably.
The point of publicizing this incident is to document that people can be easily
fooled and deceit by phone phreaks is not limited to the phone companies. Keep
in mind that people are not necessarily whom they claim and in that lies the
greatest truth of all.
Information Provided By Epsilon
Special thanks to Knight Lightning and Taran King for the exposure.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Canada Cancels The Underlord August 3, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"I still Hack!"
The Underlord awoke on February 11, 1988 at 7:30 AM to the sound of his
doorbell. Moments later, his mother entered his room to inform him that there
were three men waiting to see him. She had a rather puzzled look on her face.
He threw on some clothes and ran downstairs to meet his fate head on. The "fat
man" showed him a search warrant and informed him that he was under arrest for
7 offenses. They confiscated everything.
The Underlord was escorted to their car (his mother followed behind) and driven
off to the police station. They told him something about cameras being all
over the station, but it did not matter to him because, "I wasn't going to kill
the guy or anything anyway." From there he was taken to a little room, in
which he overheard the police playing with my computer, phone, and tapes that
they confiscated.
He had to sit there alone for four hours until his dad drove his home and later
showed his the papers.
"They said I was being charged for four counts of 'theft of telecommunications'
(a real law in Canada), and three counts of mischief."
He was told that the mischief charges were because he called Emergency 911
(although he said he did it through a PBX) and told them obscenities with a
friend on three-way.
Practically six months later, on June 16, 1988, The Underlord finally received
everything back and went to court. He had to pay $750.00 total and serve eight
months probation. However, he only had the three counts of mischief on his
record.
He explained that in Canada, if the government wants to make you pay a fine,
they must prove that you have enough money to pay it first. However, UL did
not and so the authorities said they would drop the charges if he would pay the
$750.00.
Information Provided By The Underlord 416
Through The Phoenix Project
_______________________________________________________________________________
Teen Hackers Ring Up Huge Phone Bill October 7, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Robert Macy (Associated Press)
Las Vegas, Nevada - Ten teen-age hackers may have run up to $650,000 in
telephone calls by tricking phone company computers, and their parents could be
liable for the tab, authorities said.
Tom Spurlock, resident agent-in-charge of the Las Vegas Secret Service office,
said the teen-agers engaged in Blue Boxing, a technique that enabled them to
talk to fellow hackers throughout Europe.
The teen-agers were not taken into custody or charged, but their computers were
seized. Spurlock said it will be up to AT&T to decide whether to seek
reimbursement once a final tally is obtained.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Virus Hits Unix at Bell Labs May 13, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Friday the 13th, a devastating virus hit Bell Labs at Murray Hill. Initial
reports from survivors indicate that the destruction caused was very
widespread, although limited to Sun workstations. Rumor has it that the virus
was planted by a disgruntled Sun employee in the Sun Unix kernel. The actual
amount of work lost is unknown, as is the Murray Hill policies on frequency of
disk backups.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Translation Of 2600 Magazine Fall 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The following appeared on page 46 of 2600 Magazine, Volume 5, Number 3. It was
in German and I took the liberty of having a friend who is a member of the
Chaos Computer Club in Germany translate it for PWN.
"Hacker" Free Again
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
One of the heads of the Hamburg CCC, S. Wernery, was released from jail in
Paris. The 26-year-old arrived at Hamburg airport yesterday (whenever that
was, there was no date on the article). He stated the accusations against him
were still being investigated. After having been questioned by a judge he was
released from bail, but has to return to Paris at request, though.
:Knight Lightning
_______________________________________________________________________________
Quicknotes
~~~~~~~~~~
1. BIG! The New Telecom Library Catalog! 1-800-Library. Free, 125 Books, etc.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Teleconnect Dictionary; A Glossary of Telecom Acronyms, Terms, and
Jargon. Not just definitions...mini essays. $9.95 -- 1-800-LIBRARY.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Microlog Demo Numbers - Microlog, Irvine, California, makes voice response
equipment. Call for demos:
o Microlog (800)562-2822
o Immigration and Naturalization (800)777-7770
o Canadian Embassy (202)785-1431
o Office of Personal Management (202)653-8468
o Australian Consulate (202)797-3161
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Most accurate time in the world; (303)499-7111. It's tied to the atomic
clock at the National Bureau of Standards in Boulder, Colorado.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Sue the United States Postal Service? Good Luck.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
If the US Postal Service loses a package sent by Express Mail, you can't sue
for damages the way you can other delivery services.
Reason: The United States government is immune from lawsuits except when
they consent to being sued. The Postal Service has retained this immunity.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Announcing a new electronic mailbox named Sub-Etha. It is owned and
operated by the Computer Club of Oldenburg, West Germany.
Phone number: (0441/777397) 300 Baud N/8/1
_______________________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Источник
- www.exploit-db.com
