Exploit iOS 12.4 - Sandbox Escape due to Integer Overflow in mediaserverd

[Exploiter]

EDB-ID

47694

Проверка EDB

1. Пройдено

Автор

GOOGLE SECURITY RESEARCH

Тип уязвимости

DOS

Платформа

IOS

CVE

N/A

Дата публикации

2019-11-20

iOS 12.4 - Sandbox Escape due to Integer Overflow in mediaserverd

mediaserverd has various media parsing responsibilities; its reachable from various sandboxes
and is able to talk to interesting kernel drivers so is a valid target in an exploit chain.

One of the services it vends is com.apple.audio.AudioFileServer, a fairly simple XPC service
which will parse audio files on behalf of clients and send them the raw bytes.

Files are opened via their ipod-library:// URL; for the purposes of this PoC you will need to
ensure there is at least one audio file in the iTunes library
(I've used one of my highschool band's MP3s, available on request, it's not that bad!)

The files are actually parsed by the AudioFileReadPacketData method; here's the prototype from the docs:

OSStatus AudioFileReadPacketData(AudioFileID inAudioFile,
                                 Boolean inUseCache,
                                 UInt32 *ioNumBytes,
                                 AudioStreamPacketDescription *outPacketDescriptions,
                                 SInt64 inStartingPacket,
                                 UInt32 *ioNumPackets,
                                 void *outBuffer);

The docs tell us the meaning of the ioNumBytes and outBuffer arguments:

ioNumBytes
On input, the size of the outBuffer parameter, in bytes. On output, the number of bytes actually read.

outBuffer
Memory that you allocate to hold the read packets. Determine an appropriate size by multiplying
the number of packets requested (in the ioNumPackets parameter) by the typical packet size
for the audio data in the file. For uncompressed audio formats, a packet is equal to a frame.

For the purposes of the bug this function has memcpy semantics; the value pointed to
by ioNumBytes will be considered the correct size of the output buffer;
AudioFileReadPacketData will be unable to verify that; it's up to the caller.

Looking at the code which calls this the values are derived from three values passed
in the 'read' xpc message:

numbytes (uint64), numpackets (uint64), startingPacket (int64)

Those values are truncated to 32 bits then passed through a few layers of function calls during which
various integer overflow occur when they're multiplied and added (there are no checks anywhere.)

You eventually end up in a curious allocation routine which is able to allocate three different types of
shared memory using either mach memory entries, posix shm or xpc_shmem. This service uses posix_shm,
the PoC should cause mediaserverd to shm_truncate and mmap a 0x4000 byte region,
then attempt to write significantly more bytes there.

In the debug_output.txt file you can see the debug output and crash log demonstrating that audio data has clearly
corrupted an object and caused a pointer to be overwritten with audio data.

Tested on iOS 12.4 (16G77) on iPod touch 6G


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/47694.zip