Exploit Google Chrome V8 - Object Allocation Size Integer Overflow

[Exploiter]

EDB-ID

44584

Проверка EDB

1. Пройдено

Автор

GOOGLE SECURITY RESEARCH

Тип уязвимости

REMOTE

Платформа

MULTIPLE

CVE

cve-2018-6065

Дата публикации

2018-05-04

Google Chrome V8 - Object Allocation Size Integer Overflow

There's an integer overflow in computing the required allocation size when instantiating a new javascript object. 

See the following code in objects.cc

// static
bool JSFunction::CalculateInstanceSizeForDerivedClass(
    Handle<JSFunction> function, InstanceType instance_type,
    int requested_embedder_fields, int* instance_size,
    int* in_object_properties) {
  Isolate* isolate = function->GetIsolate();
  int expected_nof_properties = 0;
  bool result = true;
  for (PrototypeIterator iter(isolate, function, kStartAtReceiver);
       !iter.IsAtEnd(); iter.Advance()) {
    Handle<JSReceiver> current =
        PrototypeIterator::GetCurrent<JSReceiver>(iter);
    if (!current->IsJSFunction()) break;
    Handle<JSFunction> func(Handle<JSFunction>::cast(current));
    // The super constructor should be compiled for the number of expected
    // properties to be available.
    Handle<SharedFunctionInfo> shared(func->shared());
    if (shared->is_compiled() ||
        Compiler::Compile(func, Compiler::CLEAR_EXCEPTION)) {
      DCHECK(shared->is_compiled());
      expected_nof_properties += shared->expected_nof_properties(); // <--- overflow here!
    } else if (!shared->is_compiled()) {
      // In case there was a compilation error for the constructor we will
      // throw an error during instantiation. Hence we directly return 0;
      result = false;
      break;
    }
    if (!IsDerivedConstructor(shared->kind())) {
      break;
    }
  }
  CalculateInstanceSizeHelper(instance_type, true, requested_embedder_fields,
                              expected_nof_properties, instance_size,
                              in_object_properties);
  return result;
}

By supplying a long prototype chain of objects with a large expected_nof_properties we can control the resulting value of instance_size by causing (requested_embedder_fields + requested_in_object_properties) << kPointerSizeLog2 to be overflown to a small negative value, resulting in an allocation smaller than header_size, which is the minimum required size for the base object class being allocated. This results in memory corruption when the object is initialised/used.

void JSFunction::CalculateInstanceSizeHelper(InstanceType instance_type,
                                             bool has_prototype_slot,
                                             int requested_embedder_fields,
                                             int requested_in_object_properties,
                                             int* instance_size,
                                             int* in_object_properties) {
  int header_size = JSObject::GetHeaderSize(instance_type, has_prototype_slot);
  DCHECK_LE(requested_embedder_fields,
            (JSObject::kMaxInstanceSize - header_size) >> kPointerSizeLog2);
  *instance_size =
      Min(header_size +
              ((requested_embedder_fields + requested_in_object_properties)
               << kPointerSizeLog2),
          JSObject::kMaxInstanceSize);
  *in_object_properties = ((*instance_size - header_size) >> kPointerSizeLog2) -
                          requested_embedder_fields;
}

The attached PoC crashes current stable on linux.

See crash report ID: 307546648ba8a84a

Chrome issue is https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=808192

Attaching the working exploit for this issue.

Note that issue_808192.html is a template - it requires server.py to do a version check and patch a few version dependent constants in, since some object layouts have changed during the range of Chrome versions on which the exploit was tested.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/44584.zip